The President and Immigration Law Redux by Cox, Adam B & Rodríguez, Cristina M
ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ
The President and Immigration Law Redux
ABSTRACT. In November 2014, President Obama announced his intention to dramatically
reshape immigration law through administrative channels. Together with relief policies
announced in 2012, his initiatives would shield nearly half the population of unauthorized
immigrants from removal and enable them to work in the United States. These events have
drawn renewed attention to the President's power to shape immigration law. They also have
reignited a longstanding controversy about whether constitutional limits exist on a central source
of executive authority: the power to enforce the law.
In using the Obama relief policies to explore these dynamics, we make two central claims.
First, it is futile to try to constrain the enforcement power by tying it to a search for
congressional enforcement priorities. Congress has no discernible priorities when it comes to a
very wide swath of enforcement activity - a reality especially true for immigration law today. The
immigration code has evolved over time into a highly reticulated statute through the work of
numerous Congresses and political coalitions. The modern structure of immigration law also
effectively delegates vast screening authority to the President. Interlocking historical, political,
and legislative developments have opened a tremendous gap between the law on the books and
the law on the ground. Under these conditions, there can be no meaningful search for
congressionally preferred screening criteria. Far from reflecting a faithful-agent framework, then,
immigration enforcement more closely resembles a two-principals model of policymaking-one
in which the Executive can and should help construct the domain of regulation through its
independent judgments about how and when to enforce the law.
Second, when exploring limits on the enforcement power, we should focus not on who
benefits from enforcement discretion but on how the Executive institutionalizes its discretion.
The Obama relief initiatives are innovative: they bind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to a
more rule-like decision-making process, constrain the judgments of line-level officials by
subjecting them to centralized supervision, and render the exercise of enforcement discretion far
more transparent to the public than is customary. These efforts to better organize the
enforcement bureaucracy ultimately advance core rule-of-law values without undermining
deterrence or legal compliance, as some critics have worried. Moreover, while our focus on
discretion's institutionalization requires contextualized judgments that may rarely translate into
clear doctrinal rules to govern the enforcement power, we believe it is generally unnecessary and
unwise to use constitutional law to limit the President's authority over how to organize the
enforcement bureaucracy.
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THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW REDUX
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced sweeping executive
reforms of immigration law.' The centerpiece of his announcement was an
initiative designed to provide a measure of security to millions of unauthorized
immigrants. Under it, executive branch officials would exercise discretion to
defer the deportation of unauthorized immigrants who have lived for years in
the United States and have U.S. citizen (or green-card holding) children.
Parents who received this "deferred action" also would be eligible to receive
work permits. As many as 3.6 million noncitizens may be eligible for relief
under the program -a number that jumps to more than five million when the
program for parents is combined with an earlier-announced initiative for
unauthorized immigrants who arrived in the United States as children.
2
Together, President Obama's efforts could protect nearly fifty percent of
today's unauthorized immigrant population.'
The President's decision to defer the deportation of millions of immigrants
sparked sharp debate among scholars and political figures about his authority
to create such a large-scale relief program. The Administration provided an
unusually meaty framework for the debate by releasing an opinion, prepared
by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice, concluding
that the initiative was well within the Administration's statutory and
1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11
/2o/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/LHK7-DZE4]. The
President's address was accompanied by, and implemented through, a series of memoranda
issued by U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. See Fixing Our Broken
Immigration System Through Executive Action - Key Facts, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action [http://perma.cc/U5K8
-RE3R] (displaying the list of memos).
2. See National and State Estimates of Populations Eligible for DACA and DAPA Programs, 2oo9-
2013, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files
/datahub/DACA-DAPA-2o13State%2oEstimates-Spreadsheet-FINAL.xlsx [http://perma.cc
/RE 7 6-2TBJ].
3. For a detailed account of the President's initiatives, see infra notes 102-111 and
accompanying text. In addition to the deferred action policies, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) also announced a shift in enforcement priorities more generally. One study
estimates that this shift, if "strictly implemented," coupled with the deferred action
programs, could result in eighty-seven percent of unauthorized immigrants in the United
States receiving some form of protection or relief from removal. Marc R. Rosenblum,
Understanding the Potential Impact ofExecutive Action on Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. 2 (July 2015), http://migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-potential
-impact-executive-action-immigration-enforcement [http://perma.cc/Y2YS-SRQ.8].
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constitutional authorities.4 Critics disagreed with OLC's conclusion, decrying
President Obama's actions as not just unwise but unconstitutional - the latest
installment in the rise of an imperial presidency.s The debate quickly made its
way to the federal courts, as nearly two dozen states challenged the relief
programs in a lawsuit that, as of this writing, remains pending and has resulted
in the temporary injunction of the President's initiatives.
These events have drawn renewed attention to the President's power to
shape the substance of immigration law through the exercise of his
enforcement power. They have also reignited the longstanding controversy
over whether any limits exist on this central source of executive authority. Both
of these issues were at the heart of our previous work, The President and
Immigration Law.' Published in these pages six years ago, that article provided a
historical account of the distribution of immigration lawmaking authority
between the President and Congress. Our core claim in that piece was that a
series of twentieth-century developments -constitutional, historical, and
institutional -had, as a functional matter, given the President tremendous
power over the immigrant-screening system: power to determine which
immigrants would be permitted to remain in the United States, and which
would be forced to leave.8 We labeled this constellation of developments "de
facto delegation" and argued that it constituted one of the most important
features of modern American immigration law.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
6. See infra notes 109, 117, 310-311 and accompanying text.
7. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458
(2009).
8. In The President and Immigration Law, we identified three models that have defined the
nature of executive power in immigration law. Each of these models finds some foundation
in Supreme Court case law, but because the Court's opinions generally have been concerned
with defining federal power writ large, they abstract from the institutional details of the
separation of powers. See id. at 460-83. We therefore turned to historical practice to
understand interbranch relations in immigration law and found that the President has
derived considerable policymaking authority from three sources: (1) inherent power; (2)
express delegation; and (3) de facto delegation. Id. at 483-519. With the rise of the modern
administrative state, the inherent authority model has receded into history. Yet it was not
supplanted by a widespread practice of express congressional delegations as has been true in
some other regulatory areas (though, to be sure, formal delegations in limited areas of
immigration law have also given presidents avenues to advance their own policy objectives
in a unilateral fashion). Instead, a more complex phenomenon that we labeled "de facto
delegation" has enabled the President to set immigrant-screening policy through
enforcement judgments. For elaboration on the meaning of de facto delegation, see id. at
510-19; and infra Part I.
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Developments since we last wrote, culminating in President Obama's
recent announcement, have both confirmed our earlier account and raised
important new questions. While our previous work was mostly descriptive and
historical, intervening developments have sharpened the legal and theoretical
separation of powers questions raised by our argument. Moreover, whereas in
2009 we chiefly addressed the allocation of power between the branches in
immigration law, the passage of time has highlighted the importance of power
allocations within the Executive Branch for understanding the on-the-ground
practice of presidential immigration law. Thus, this Article seeks to move
beyond our earlier arguments in two ways -by squarely confronting the legal
and normative questions about the President's power over immigration policy,
and by carefully unpacking the "unitary" Executive to develop better purchase
on these questions and on our earlier descriptive account of the President and
immigration law.
This Article makes two central claims about the relationship between
enforcement discretion and the separation of powers, both in immigration law
and more generally. The first concerns the substantive limits on enforcement
discretion: what (if anything) constrains executive branch choices about which
immigrants will be protected through the exercise of enforcement discretion?
The second concerns the institutionalization of that discretion: what (if
anything) constrains executive branch choices about how to institutionalize the
exercise of enforcement discretion within the bureaucracy? While we address
these questions by focusing on the Obama relief initiatives, the questions
themselves implicate broader separation of powers debates and will remain
pressing even if opponents of the President's relief initiatives emerge victorious
in the pending federal litigation.'
With respect to our first argument, we show that efforts to constrain the
President's enforcement authority with reference to "congressional
enforcement priorities" -an approach taken by both defenders and critics of
the President -are doomed to fail.o We recognize the appeal of this approach.
By tying the exercise of enforcement discretion to inferences about
congressional intent drawn directly from immigration statutes, the
Administration can claim to be acting as Congress's faithful agent, following
the principal's wishes rather than making policy unmoored from the dictates of
9. We discuss our views as to the likely outcome of this litigation infra Parts II, IV and infra
notes 119-120, 310 and accompanying text.
io. For use by supporters, see Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Sec'y of
Homeland Sec. and the Counsel to the President io (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2o14/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal
.pdf [http://perma.cc/85Y5-N94M] [hereinafter OLC Memorandum Op.]. For use by
critics, see infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
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immigration law's elaborate statutory scheme. On this account, Congress
makes the tough value judgments, not the President. He or she simply extracts
those underlying value judgments from the statute through sophisticated legal
analysis. The approach also provides a seemingly clear limiting principle to
prevent the enforcement power from devolving into dispensation of the law -
something that supporters of large-scale administrative relief had failed to
provide until OLC shifted the tenor of the debate.
The trouble is that this faithful-agent model obscures the role that
enforcement discretion plays in our modern system of separated powers. Even
outside the immigration context, it would be passing strange to argue that the
myriad discretionary decisions made by law enforcement officials should
always be motivated and constrained solely or even primarily by the value
judgments those officials can trace to a code enacted by Congress. Moreover,
this model is especially limited as an account of immigration law. Our
historical account of separation of powers in this domain highlights the
ubiquity of presidents exercising discretionary immigration authority in ways
that cannot be characterized as consistent with clearly identifiable
congressional priorities." That history has combined with a series of other
developments - most notably the growth of the deportation regime and the size
of the unauthorized population -to create the de facto delegation model of
immigration policymaking. The tremendous authority wielded by the
President under that model to shape our immigrant screening policies renders
talk of "congressional priorities" for enforcement inapposite. We do not think
it possible to coherently identify a set of congressional priorities for
immigration enforcement through a careful, lawyerly exercise of intertextual
fidelity to the 300-page immigration code."
Far from fitting into a faithful-agent framework, therefore, our modern
system of presidentially driven, ex post immigration screening is better
understood as embodying a "two-principals" model of immigration
policymaking. One possible response to the emergence of this model would be
to decry it as lawless. But that would be a mistake. We see significant value in a
model of the enforcement power according to which executive priorities stand
ii. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 483-528; see also Adam Cox & Cristina
Rodriguez, Executive Discretion and Congressional Priorities, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 21, 2014,
2:05 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o14/1/executive-discretion-and-congressional.html
[http://perma.cc/5A78-NCY9]. In fact, many historical episodes reveal the President
exercising immigration enforcement authority in ways contrary to the plausible preferences
of Congress. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 483-528.
12. See infra Part I.C; see also Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 510-18 (describing three key
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alongside congressional ones. As the history of immigration law has
demonstrated, this model empowers the Executive to address the unanticipated
costs and epistemic limits of ex ante congressional lawmaking, calibrate the
policies enacted by Congress to changed circumstances, provoke constructive
and innovative policy reforms in both branches, and guard against the perils of
legislative stasis. Policymaking through enforcement may not advance these
objectives all the time, and it could certainly be abused. But given the reality of
de facto delegation and the benefits that flow from the President's current role,
it would be a mistake to dismiss policymaking through enforcement as lawless.
While we reject substantive limits derived from congressional priorities,
our second claim is that we can still meaningfully address the desirability or
legality of particular regimes of enforcement discretion. As we explore in Part
III, the better inquiry into the legality of President Obama's relief programs,
and the use of the enforcement power more generally, asks whether the
Executive should be constitutionally prohibited from institutionalizing
enforcement discretion in particular ways. The most important aspects of the
President's immigration initiatives have nothing to do with the substantive
criteria for relief; the program's focus on children, families, long-term
residence, and clean criminal records strongly resembles the approach
contained in many earlier, much less controversial guidance documents
intended to channel prosecutorial discretion." Instead, the more important
innovation was to make the exercise of discretion more rule-like, centralized,
and transparent. These features have been the focus of prominent critics, who
have argued that the President has wielded prosecutorial discretion in an
impermissibly "categorical" way, rather than in a valid "individualized"
fashion, or that he has extended substantive "legal benefits" to unauthorized
immigrants, rather than mere forbearance."
The institutional choices embodied in the President's initiatives thus raise
issues far beyond immigration law: they concern broader debates about
centralization, transparency, and bureaucratic justice. How one evaluates the
choices embodied in the President's plans, therefore, cannot be divorced
13. See infra text accompanying notes 234-236.
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781 (2013); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REv. 671 (2014); Peter Margulies, President Obama's Immigration Plan: Rewriting the Law,
LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/11/president-obamas
-immigration-plan-rewriting-the-law [http://perma.cc/ND78-RDGL]; David A. Martin,
Concerns About a Troubling Presidential Precedent and OLC's Review of Its Validity,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:3o AM), http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11
/concerns-about-troubling-presidential.html [http://perma.cc/H4M8-B4MP].
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entirely from one's views on some classic debates about the theoretical and
legal underpinnings of the American administrative state. In that sense, the
President's critics are correct that much more is at stake than the justice of
deferring the removal of long-term residents of the United States.
At the same time, critics err in thinking that those debates can be resolved
in this instance without a historically grounded understanding of the
immigration separation of powers. The institutional account of immigration
law that we have jointly developed over the course of the last several years
ultimately helps explain exactly why the President's immigration initiatives are
both lawful and desirable. They promote important rule-of-law values, such as
transparency and accountability, as well as the age-old aim of treating like cases
alike. And they do so without threatening to undermine another rule-of-law
value - legal compliance - that some have claimed will be compromised by the
President's initiatives. 15 Conjuring out of Article II ether a constitutional
prohibition on the way the President has institutionalized discretion in his
recent immigration initiatives would significantly undermine these values, and
for essentially no benefit. Moreover, it would entrench the authority of low-
level bureaucrats against alternative judgments about how best to arrange
power within the bureaucracy- even judgments by the very Congress that
created the bureaucracy.
Our complementary arguments - against the congressional priorities
approach and in favor of a focus on discretion's institutionalization - ultimately
show how the leading critiques of the President's relief initiatives go wrong. "
Yet our two central claims are important not only (or even primarily) because
they help us properly evaluate the legality of the most important presidential
immigration initiative in several decades. They also address a set of
shortcomings in modern separation of powers and administrative law theory.
Principal-agent models borrowed from contract theory and positive political
theory have been invaluable tools for analyzing the administrative state. But
those models also have serious limitations. In this Article, we illuminate one
crucial area of executive power where standard principal-agent models obscure
much more than they illuminate. We also show that the project of fleshing out
separation of powers theory, descriptively and normatively, must occur with
much more institutional and domain-specific context than is typical in
contemporary constitutional scholarship. Far from an argument for
immigration exceptionalism, our analysis highlights how immigration is just
like multiple other domains of regulation, in that each evolves according to
particular legal, practical, and political dynamics. Though we may be able to
15. See Price, supra note 14.
16. See infra Part III.A and infra notes 152-157, 286-294 and accompanying text.
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identify abstract goals that a system of separated powers should serve, how
power has been and ought to be allocated among the branches to serve those
goals will differ across time and setting.
This emphasis on context does not mean that the search for generalizable
limiting principles or theories in separation of powers contexts is doomed. In
fact, the arguments we make in Parts II and III together provide a framework,
which we develop in Part IV, for thinking about limiting principles that can
serve separation of powers values while accounting for institutional and
historical context. Moreover, our defenses of presidential immigration law in
general, and President Obama's immigration initiatives in particular, do not
amount to a conclusion that current congressional-executive dynamics are
optimal. We conclude in Part IV, therefore, by taking seriously the second-best
nature of immigration law's current structure. We consider reforms-both
modest and radical-that would promote and discipline the role that the
President currently plays in American immigration law.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMIGRATION LAW
Before we can evaluate the immigration enforcement initiatives announced
by President Obama and understand the scope of the contemporary
enforcement power, some history is in order. This Part situates the initiatives
within a century-long story of administrative innovation that produced
modern American immigration law. Only with this context can we make sense
of the motivations for, and the legality of, the President's deportation relief
programs.
We show that the Obama relief initiatives represent only the most recent
examples of the executive policymaking that has been part and parcel of
immigration history. The President has always been an immigration
policymaker alongside and sometimes in competition with Congress. President
Obama's recent actions simply reinforce the ways in which the content and
scope of the President's regulatory authority have evolved in response to the
actions of Congress, as well as underlying historical and social factors. That
evolution has been complex, involving a combination of partisan politics,
economic and demographic forces, social movement pressures, and
institutional demands. This specificity of context, however, does not turn our
account into a tyranny of particularism. The trajectory we trace provides
important, generalizable lessons that, as we will show in Parts II and III, have
direct implications for how we judge the legality and desirability of the
113
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President's relief initiatives and the use of the enforcement power more
generally."
These lessons ultimately differ considerably from the ones that some
supporters of the President's initiatives have drawn from pieces of the history
we recount below. Some commentators have argued that the initiatives are
lawful because they sufficiently resemble actions by previous administrations -
in particular, the use of administrative relief by Presidents Reagan and Bush
during the implementation of a legalization program enacted by Congress in
1986. We neither treat this history as quasi-legal precedent, nor rely on
debatable notions of congressional acquiescence to executive branch practice to
make claims about constitutional settlements between the branches. Instead,
we use this history to provide a thorough account of the structure of modern
17. In much of the debate over the 2014 policies, commentators have drawn a distinction
between legal arguments and policy arguments. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti et al., As
Implementation Nears, U.S. Deferred Action Programs Encounter Legal, Political
Tests, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article
/implementation-nears-us-deferred-action-programs-encounter-legal-political-tests [http://
perma.cc/7CQH-CNDZ] (analyzing separately political and legal opposition to
the President's actions); Understanding the Legal Challenges to Executive Action:
Long on Politics, Short on Lau', AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 2, 2015), http://
www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/understanding initial_1egal-challenges
toimmigration-accountability-executive actionlong-on-politics-shorton_1aw final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5Z7B-3H2Y] (characterizing legal challenges to the 2014 policies as in fact
predicated on policy arguments). Defenders of the President's actions have insisted that the
legal authority for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) is clear and that the only
source of debate is whether it makes good policy sense to defer the removal of unauthorized
immigrants. See, e.g., The Unconstitutionality of President Obama's Executive Actions on
Immigration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 83-84 (2015) (written
testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law)
[hereinafter Legomsky, Written Testimony] ("While I appreciate that reasonable minds can
and do differ about the policy decisions, I take this opportunity to respectfully share my
opinion that the President's actions are well within his legal authority."); Hiroshi
Motomura, The President's Discretion, Immigration Enforcement, and the Rule of Law, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives
/president%E2%80%99s-discretion-immigration-enforcement-and-rule-law [http://perma
.cc/77F3-JVZV] ("[N]o matter how one might debate how the President should weigh these
considerations, the fact remains that this is a policy debate."). But there is a third line of
debate, legal in nature, that defenders of the policy sometimes obscure-whether the
President's use of his prosecutorial discretion in the form of the 2014 initiatives reflects a
desirable or healthy form of executive decision making. With this Article, we illuminate that
terrain. It is possible to conclude that the President's actions are legal in the sense of being
within his constitutional powers historically understood, but to also debate whether they
embody a form of presidentialism that advances the objectives of the general separation of
powers - a debate we take up throughout this Article. The answer to the latter question may
be informed by whether deferring removal of millions of unauthorized immigrants is a good
idea, but the two questions are not the same.
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immigration law, identify the imperatives and temptations that attend the use
of the enforcement power in light of that structure, and explain the motivations
for present-day uses of that power.'8 Our history underscores what critics fail
to understand about the nature of enforcement today, and in that sense it
provides the context for a reality-based articulation of the scope of the
enforcement power.
In this Part, we begin by summarizing our 2009 account of how the
President historically has used the powers expressly delegated to him to
advance his own policy agenda, resulting in what we term executive
unilateralism. We then turn to the central source of power at issue in this
Article -enforcement discretion. We demonstrate how the underenforcement
of certain parts of the immigration code, as in many domains, has transformed
the law enacted by Congress into regulation that reflects executive branch
priorities. We then elaborate on the concept of de facto delegation introduced
in our earlier work and explain its relevance to current controversies. In
keeping with our focus on the internal organization of the Executive Branch,
we close by documenting the trend in recent decades toward the Executive's
centralization of its enforcement discretion. Taken together, these perspectives
on executive power help make the descriptive case for the two-principals model
defended in Part II and provide the institutional detail required to understand
what precisely is at stake with the Obama relief initiatives.
A. From Delegation to Unilateralism
In our 2009 work, we identified three models of executive authority that
emerged over the course of the twentieth century: inherent presidential
authority,9 express delegation,2 o and de facto delegation.' Each model arose
through institutional practice and amidst confusion in the courts about the
constitutional role each branch was supposed to play in the exercise of the
federal government's immigration power. By the late twentieth century,
consonant with the dramatic expansion of the delegated administrative state,
18. See, e.g., Mark Noferi, When Reagan and GHW Bush Took Bold Executive Action
on Immigration, HILL (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress
-blog/foreign-policy/219463-when-reagan-and-ghw-bush-took-bold-executive-action-on
[http://perma.cc/HSQF-ZQN2]; see also Lauren Gilbert, Obama's Ruby Slippers: Enforcement
Discretion in the Absence ofImmigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 255 (2013).
ig. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 465-66.
2o. Id. at 492.
21. Id. at sio.
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the first tradition of inherent authority had receded.' But presidents looking to
mold immigration law to advance their own objectives have rarely needed to
resort to claims of inherent constitutional authority. Instead, they have used
authorities expressly delegated to them by Congress, or taken advantage of
their role in enforcing congressional schemes (the source of de facto
delegation) to advance their own agendas.
Throughout the twentieth century, and up to the present, the President has
used powers expressly delegated to him by Congress to advance his own
immigration agenda. Importantly, these uses have often been innovative,
accomplishing objectives Congress almost certainly did not intend and
22. See id. at 474. The most prominent (and likely only explicit) example of the President
claiming inherent authority over immigration policy today is his use of Deferred Enforced
Departure (DED) to defer the removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. See
Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 26,
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o14/o9/26/presidential-memorandum
-deferred-enforced-departure-liberians [http://perma.cc/3RCD-9P8Y] (extending President
Bush's 2007 grant of deferred enforced departure to Liberians "[p]ursuant to [his]
constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States"); Adjudicator's
Field Manual, 5 38.2: Deferred Enforced Departure, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/o-o-o-1/o-o-o-166o6/o
-o-o-16764.html [http://perma.cc/JK68-927C]. Citing inherent Article II authorities,
Presidents since at least George H.W. Bush have halted the removal of nationals to their
countries of origins where doing so would have foreign policy implications. DED has been
exercised in a very limited fashion, but the President's turn in these discrete cases to
inherent foreign affairs powers as justification presents a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be
that the existence of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012),
enacted in 1990 to enable the Executive to defer removal of nationals from states coping
with environmental calamities or civil strife, requires the President to resort to extra-
statutory sources to provide relief for groups who do not fall within the TPS criteria. But it
is not altogether clear why the groups given relief pursuant to DED could not have their
removal deferred under the theories of prosecutorial discretion advanced to support DAPA
and DACA. In other words, why must DED even exist?
The answer is likely that the justifications or legal frameworks for various executive
policies emerge in an ad hoc fashion and in response to the particular circumstances at issue
in a given case. DED evolved out of another exercise of enforcement discretion - extended
voluntary departure (EVD), see infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text -and served the
very particular foreign affairs needs to which it has been put, namely protecting groups of
noncitizens based on their nationality. At the time Presidents began invoking DED, the use
of "ordinary" prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action does not appear to have
been used in a categorical fashion, see infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing other
"categorical" uses of deferred action), and so deferred action might not have appeared as the
obvious framework through which to grant relief to the groups given DED, leading
Presidents to devise a form of enforcement discretion grounded in inherent presidential
authorities, hence the link to foreign affairs. The collection of enforcement powers or
programs-EVD, DED, deferred action- highlights how the content of the enforcement
power develops historically and iteratively, as opposed to emanating from some sort of ex
ante, coherent constitutional scheme of powers.
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expanding or repurposing Congress's original design. Congress has at different
moments resisted and accommodated these efforts, in some moments moving
to limit the originally delegated power in an effort to rein in executive branch
efforts, while at others creating new statutory frameworks to accomplish some
of the Executive's objectives.
Perhaps the best twentieth-century example of this phenomenon is the
President's use of the parole power. Contained within the original Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, the parole power permits the President to
exercise discretion and allow otherwise inadmissible noncitizens into the
United States. 2 As we explained in 2009, beginning with President
Eisenhower's admission of 15,ooo Hungarians fleeing the communist
crackdown in their country, the power served as "the central tool of American
refugee policy," enabling the President to control refugee admissions for over
twenty years.' Though Congress attempted to curtail the President's use of the
power by enacting a refugee preference regime in 1965, presidents continued to
wield the discretionary power that Congress intended only for "emergent,
individual, and isolated situations" in order to admit large groups of
noncitizens, including during refugee crises from Cuba, Haiti, and Vietnam."
A combination of settled expectations and political pressures eventually led
Congress to make those temporary admissions permanent, underlining the
President's agenda-setting power.
With the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress directly responded to the
executive-driven agenda in two ways. First, it added language to the parole
provision requiring that the discretionary act serve compelling reasons in the
public interest -an addition many in Congress (perhaps mistakenly) regarded
23. Today, the parole power is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 182(d)(5 ) (2012) and permits the
President to parole otherwise inadmissible noncitizens into the country "for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit."
24. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 502.
25. Id. at 503.
26. Id. at 506. Episodes such as these help explain some of the Republican resistance to the
President's recent uses of deferred action. Even though deferred action is styled as
temporary, its opponents believe, with reason, that its extension will create settled
expectations, which, when they exist on a large scale, may effectively tie the hands of future
administrations and perhaps even require Congress eventually to recognize the temporary
status as permanent. We discuss this phenomenon of entrenchment further infra notes 286-
294 and accompanying text. In our view, we think it is far more likely that the Obama relief
initiatives will tie the hands of future administrations rather than force Congress to adopt a
legalization program. As a result, the initiatives do present a risk of further entrenching the
unauthorized population, thus threatening the creation of a permanent underclass. That
said, we could describe the state of affairs pre-DACA and DAPA the same way, suggesting
that the President's relief initiatives make the best of a bad situation.
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as a means of "bring[ing] the admission of refugees under greater
Congressional and statutory control."' Second, and more importantly, it
created a scheme for overseas refugee selection that expressly delegated power
to the President to set the number of annual refugee admissions and to select
the countries from which they would be accepted.8 In 1990, Congress further
systematized the process of admitting noncitizens fleeing disaster by creating
the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation, which authorizes the
President to permit categories of noncitizens to remain in the United States on
a temporary basis, provided they meet statutory criteria defining the types of
calamities Congress deemed worthy of response through protection.9 The
combination of these new provisions suggests that Congress sought to replace
the nontransparent use of parole and other discretionary mechanisms with
semi-supervised and controlled schemes of delegation that required the
President to submit his recommendations to congressional committees and to
consult with various agency heads in the process.3o
As we will explain later, the substitution of delegated and visible authority
for discretionary and opaque authority generally should be welcomed. But
here, it is important to see how the President made these supposed new
constraints on his authority his own. A common critique of the President's
implementation of the refugee selection system in the 198os and 1990s, for
example, was that admissions during that period skewed toward nationals of
27. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 198o, 15 INT'L MIGRATIONREV. 141,146 (1981).
28. Refugee Act of 198o, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §201, 94 Stat. 102, 102-03.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012). TPS replaced the Executive's use of a discretionary mechanism,
known as Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD), to provide relief from removal for persons
fleeing certain kinds of disasters. See KATE M. MANUEL & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., R43782, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AS TO IMMIGRATION: LEGAL OVERVIEW 6
(2014). For further discussion of EVD, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. TPS
filled a gap in the statutory protection of noncitizens fleeing calamities. The Refugee Act's
asylum provisions, and pre-existing provisions authorizing the withholding of removal,
applied only to those who met the definition of refugee, which required having a fear of
persecution on account of one of several recognized grounds, including political opinion,
race, and religion -the classic definition of refugee. The TPS statute provided a statutory
mechanism for the Executive to protect persons fleeing disaster and civil strife. See Bill
Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD.
339 (1995).
30. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 539. The statutory scheme requires the President's
"appropriate consultation" with Cabinet members and members of congressional
committees in determining that refugee admissions are justified and in setting admissions
numbers. Immigration and Nationality Act §207(a)(3)-(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3)-(e) (2012);
see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of
Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REv. 675, 697 (1995) (characterizing section
1157(e) as requiring "personal discussion").
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then-Communist regimes, suggesting that the President used the system in
order to advance his particularistic foreign policy goals rather than
the more universal humanitarian objectives of the 1980 Act." This critique
simultaneously assumes that the two goals are mutually exclusive and that
Congress had a clear purpose it thought should drive refugee selection.
Whether either of these claims has merit is beside the point for our
purposes. Instead, what matters is that the President utilized his delegated
authority to serve a decidedly executive agenda. The creation of the refugee
selection process in 1980 and TPS authority in 1990 may have diminished the
need for sweeping and categorical use of the parole power, as well as the
political and legal flexibility of the President to rely on parole as he had in the
past. But these effects have been more modest than one might suppose, and
parole remains an important alternative route of admission for those who may
not qualify for refugee status." The authority also continues to serve as a basis
for innovation. Most recently, the Obama Administration has invoked parole in
place-itself an innovation on the parole power" -to provide relief for a large
group of unauthorized immigrants already in the United States - relatives of
members of the military. Though the application for and granting of parole
continues to be framed as case-by-case, the memorandum announcing parole
in place for military families clearly reflects an intent to provide relief to a
favored category of unauthorized immigrants.
This sort of creative unilateralism, which we identified in our 2009 article,
has arisen in many other instances. A vivid example is the once obscure but
now frequently invoked "family fairness" policies adopted by Presidents
31. See Legomsky, supra note 30, at 699-700.
32. See In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala (Central American Minors-CAM), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/country
-refugeeparole-processing-minors-honduras-el-salvador-and-guatemala-central-american
-minors-cam [http://perma.cc/782B-GPEK].
33. The parole provision of the INA authorizes parole for "any alien applying for admission."
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)( 5 ), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2012). Section
235(a)(1) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012)), in turn, defines "applicant for
admission" to include noncitizens present in the United States without having been
admitted. Thus, while parole was available, prior to some 1996 changes to immigration law,
only to noncitizens who had yet to enter the United States, the Executive has now
interpreted its parole authority to extend to immigrants who have entered the country
without having been admitted. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office
of the Gen. Counsel to Immigration & Naturalization Serv. Officials (Aug. 21, 1998),
reprinted in 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1050 app. (1999).
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Reagan and George H.W. Bush after Congress enacted a large-scale
legalization program in 1986. The legalization program, part of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), provided a path to legal status
for millions of unauthorized migrants, but it did not extend to many of the
spouses and children of those immigrants. Despite this, President Reagan's
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1987 elected to defer the
removal of many of these family members35 - a deferral President Bush
continued, and then expanded in 1990 when legislation to legalize their status
stalled in Congress. Later that year, Congress enacted a statutory legalization
for the group.
These deferrals of removal can be cast in two very different lights. First, we
might see them as nothing more than a form of transitional relief. On this
account, Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush operated within a
statutorily created legalization framework, but in the course of implementation
3s. Memorandum from Gene McNarv, Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg'l
Comm'rs (Feb. 2, 1990); INS Reverses Family Fairness Policy, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 153
(1990). The Reagan Administration deferred removal of minor children where all parents
with whom the child was living had permanently legalized their status pursuant to IRCA.
INS Announces Limited Policy on Family Unity, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1191 (1987). The
Administration also deferred removal of spouses on a case-by-case basis, where "compelling
or humanitarian factors" existed. Id. When the Immigration and Nationalization Service
(INS) continued the policy under President Bush in 1990, the agency amended the policy to
include most spouses and unmarried minor children. See INS Reverses Family Fairness Policy,
67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 153, 153-54 (1990) (enumerating the prerequisites for spouses and
children to benefit from the family fairness policy, including admissibility as immigrants
and a maximum number of criminal convictions).
36. It is worth pausing for a moment in thinking about this episode to observe that the actions
of Presidents Reagan and Bush arguably defy conventional understandings of how party
dynamics affect immigration policy. We might not have expected Republican presidents to
extend the reach of a legislative "amnesty." These Presidents' actions might be evidence of
how the Republican Party in particular has evolved, as well as evidence of the way in which
American presidents have often supported more open immigration policies than have their
contemporaries in Congress. For a discussion of this pattern over time, see Adam B. Cox,
Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31. See also
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 484 (discussing presidents' repeated veto of literacy tests
for immigrant screening adopted by Congress).
37. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 301, 104 Stat. 4978, 5029-39; see also JOYCE
C. VIALET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 91-493 EPW, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION-QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS 1 (1991) (explaining the deferral and work authorization provisions for
spouses and unmarried children of legalized noncitizens in the Immigration Act of 1990's
"Family Unity" section); Applicant Processing for Family Unity Benefits, 57 Fed. Reg. 6457,
6457-62 (Feb. 25, 1992) (interim rule implementing the Family Unity Program); The
Immigration Act of 1990 Analyzed: Part 2-Family-Sponsored Immigrants, 67 INTERPRETER
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identified inequities (and perhaps oversights) in the design of IRCA's original
program. They used their discretion to ameliorate those inequities - to prevent
the removal of family members who eventually would be eligible for
immigration status through their newly legalized spouses or parents. Once
debate began in Congress over new legalization legislation that would reach
family members left out of the initial legislation, thus obviating the need for
those family members to petition through the ordinary immigration process,
the actions of the Presidents truly became transitional amelioration pending
congressional action. 8 If the statutory legalization scheme would soon
encompass those family members, it would make little sense -as a matter of
resource allocation or justice-to deport large numbers of them during the
period of legal transition." Far from being oppositional, the President's actions
could be seen to exemplify cooperation between the Executive and Congress in
the implementation of a large new initiative.
Of course, the family fairness regulations could also be seen as an act of
executive defiance. On this account, Congress's intent as reflected in IRCA was
to provide legal status to a precisely defined group of unauthorized
38. In this sense, the "family fairness" initiatives resemble decisions by President Clinton to
defer the removal of victims of domestic abuse during debate over the reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which contained provisions that would have made
them eligible for visas. They also resemble President George W. Bush's decision to defer the
removal of student visa holders who temporarily lost their enrolled student status in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina. See Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue, Acting Exec. Assoc.
Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg'1 Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Officers-in-Charge
& Serv. Ctr. Dirs. (May 6, 1997), http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/Virtue
Memo_97pdf 53DC84D782445.pdf [http://perma.cc/RH5S-SWGE] (explaining the
process for deferred action and work authorization during the debates over VAWA);
Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Announces Interim Relief for
Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005), http://www
.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/FiStudent_11_25 _0 5 _PR.pdf [http://perma.cc
/H9PK-X5YG] (announcing the deferral of removal for F-i visa holders whose enrollment
was affected by Hurricane Katrina). The deferrals, while categorical, can also be
characterized as transitional.
39. Because those legalized by the IRCA would become eligible to petition for the admission of
their spouses and children through the already existing immigration system, deferring their
removal would arguably have simply facilitated the inevitable operation of the law. The
fight in Congress was about whether to allow spouses and children to "skip the line," or
become permanent residents without having to wait for the green card queue to run its
course. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1985,
S. REP. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985) ("It is the intent of the Committee that the families of
legalized aliens will obtain no special petitioning rights by virtue of the legalization. They
will be required to 'wait in line' in the same manner as immediate family members of other
new resident aliens."). In IRCA, Congress initially rejected that option, but in so doing it
did not expressly or even impliedly preclude the President from deferring removal of that
same group of noncitizens.
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immigrants. And President Reagan's actions, in particular, amounted to a kind
of executive rejection of the parameters of IRCA's legalization program and a
unilateral decision to protect a group that the President, but not Congress,
regarded as deserving. Perhaps these very actions forced the issue onto
Congress's agenda and helped secure the statutory change adopted in 1990.
Such unilateralism might have made Presidents Reagan and George H.W.
Bush's judgments at the time more subject to question, but this
characterization would also make so-called family fairness more of an on-point
precedent for the Obama relief initiatives,4 o which emerged through the
President's use of quintessentially executive authority, rather than in the
implementation of a congressional egalization scheme."
Whatever the appropriate characterization of family fairness, the episode
embodies two of the characteristics of the separation of powers in immigration
law that we have emphasized here and in other work. First, the particular tool
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush used to extend relief to the
"ineligible spouses and children of legalized aliens" -extended voluntary
departure (EVD) -was an innovation on enforcement discretion that emerged
to address particular contingencies and grew in scope over time. The origins of,
justifications for, and evolution of EVD are somewhat obscure and poorly
understood. But it appears to have developed in an ad hoc fashion in the 196os
and 1970s, as a class-based form of relief from deportation. The Executive
typically, though not exclusively, directed it at nationals of particular countries,
often for humanitarian reasons or because conditions in the noncitizens' home
countries were dangerous or chaotic.42 Certain Cuban nationals permitted by
President Eisenhower to remain in the United States in 1960, for example,
benefitted from EVD." And though it was most often used to address foreign
40. We think this claim of defiance would go too far, for the reasons expressed supra note 39.
41. As we discuss infra Part II, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice found
the President's decision to initiate DAPA lawful in part because it concluded that DAPA
cohered with congressional priorities of family unity expressed in the Act. As we note there,
however, this claim is not that Congress delegated authority to the President to initiate
DACA and DAPA. Rather, it is a claim that, in the enforcement of the INA, the President's
DACA and DAPA programs advance a congressional priority, which implies that for the
exercise of enforcement discretion to be lawful, it must match up with some goals of
Congress.
42. Certain class-based deferrals, characterized after the fact as examples of EVD, were not
understood at the time to be exercises of EVD, underscoring the murkiness of the sources of
discretionary decision making by the President in immigration law. SHARON STEPHAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 85-599 EPW, EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE AND OTHER
GRANTS OF BLANKET RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION 10 (1985).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1978, at 2 (1966) (observing that in September 1966, prior to the
Cuban Adjustment Act, roughly 47,000 Cubans benefited from EVD).
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policy-related exigencies, presidents came to use EVD to exert considerable
authority over who could remain in the United States even when foreign policy
was not at issue."
The innovative nature of EVD extended to the legal justifications for the
power: executive branch officials appear to have toggled between at least two
different sources of legal authority to support its use. In 1985, officials in the
Reagan Administration testified that EVD stemmed from the "Executive's
constitutional authority in the areas of foreign and prosecutorial policy
(supplemented by the general delegation of power over immigration in 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a))."45 In 1987, however, officials claimed a more specific
statutory source for the authority, contending that the power expressly
delegated in the INA to grant voluntary departure (an alternative to formal
removal whereby a noncitizen departs of his own volition) implied the power
to grant EVD, or a temporary reprieve from removal.*6 Though the latter
justification appears to have prevailed, probably because it points to a firmer
statutory foundation than the former, it is clear that the legal authority for the
practice emerged and evolved alongside (and not in advance of) the practice
itself.
Second, the family fairness episode highlights the dynamic nature of the
congressional-executive relationship. Executive actions like those taken by
44. See Oversight of INS Policies and Legal Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, & Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 86-87 (1978)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of David Crosland, General Counsel,
Immigration and Naturalization Service) (describing the INS Operations Instructions in
effect from 1956 to 1972 granting voluntary departure to certain highly skilled noncitizens,
including foreign medical graduates); 93 CONG. REC. 13,844 (1973) (including INS associate
commissioner stating that certain individuals from the Western Hemisphere with family-
based visa preference would receive EVD); MANUEL & GARCIA, supra note 29, at 6 (listing
EVD grants, at various times during the 196os and 1970s, to those from, inter alia, Chile,
Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Hungary, Romania, Iran, Nicaragua,
and Uganda).
45. Extended Voluntary Departure Issues: Hearing on S. 337 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration &
Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 67 (1985) (statements of Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
and Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
46. The Reagan Administration cited statutory provisions that, after changes in the immigration
laws' organization, are now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2012), which provides that
"[t]he Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the
alien's own expense." See Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, & Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ooth Cong. 163 (1987)
[hereinafter Temporary Safe Haven Act Hearing] (statement of the Office of Legislative
Affairs to questions posed by Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli). On this reading, the statute's lack
of a specific required time period for the voluntary departure confers on the Attorney
General the power to grant EVD to classes of individuals.
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Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush can powerfully shape the
congressional agenda and the future path reform takes in the legislature. They
can also, as the broader history of EVD highlights, prompt Congress to
attempt to control executive discretion in order to advance Congress's own
policy goals. In the 1980s, for example, House and Senate subcommittees
called hearings to insist that the President exercise his EVD power to defer the
removal of noncitizens from El Salvador.4 ' The appropriations process was
used for a similar purpose: appropriations bills for fiscal years 1982-1983 and
1984-1985 contained statements, admittedly nonbinding, that it was "the sense
of the Congress" that Salvadorans should be granted EVD. In other words,
Congress sought to use and constrain novel forms of executive decision making
to advance the congressional agenda, ultimately replacing the Executive's ad
hoc discretionary tool with clear statutory authority to extend relief under
circumstances specified by Congress." These dynamics are by no means
unique to immigration law, but they have been notable throughout its history.
B. Policymaking Through (Under)Enforcement
A central feature of the examples of innovation discussed above is that they
all emanated in some way from either express congressional delegation or the
process of implementing a discrete congressional program over which
Congress had given the Executive expansive implementation authority. These
historical instances of executive policymaking therefore differ in significant
respects from the Obama relief initiatives. The latter were formulated
47. See Temporary Suspension of Deportation for Nationals of Certain Countries: Hearing on H.R.
822 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, & Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 9 9 th Cong. 1 (1985); Extended Voluntary Departure Issues: Hearing on S. 337 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 9th Cong. 1
(1985); Extended Voluntary Departure for Salvadorans: Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the
Subcomm. on Rules of the H. of the H. Comm. on Rules, 9 8th Cong. 1 (1984); Temporary
Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, & Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong. 1 (1984).
48. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 731,
95 Stat. 1519, 1557 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012)); Department of State Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164, §1012, 97 Stat. 1017, 1062 (1983).
49. For a discussion of the TPS program that replaced EVD, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
50. As noted above, supporters of the Administration have enthusiastically cited family fairness
as precedent for the President's actions, both because the policy was based not on delegated
authority but on the President's enforcement power, and because of the scale of relief it
provided. See Noferi, supra note 18; cf Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17, at 83-
84 (discussing the "family fairness" policies of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush
and their similarities to President Obama's policies). Though Congress considered and
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pursuant to the President's determination as to how to go about enforcing the
INA as a whole, not as the result of an express statutory delegation to defer the
removal of certain categories of noncitizens or as part of the implementation of
a larger program. To be sure, the INA expressly grants the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) broad authority to enforce the
Code -a provision numerous defenders of the Administration have cited to
support the Obama relief initiatives.s" But this general authority to enforce the
Code cannot reasonably be characterized as an express delegation of any
particular form of authority; it is instead a recognition that the Executive will
need to develop policies and protocols to accomplish all that the INA does
expressly delegate.
The scope for executive policymaking in law enforcement contexts is vast,
as commentators have emphasized with respect to numerous domains.s2
Immigration law is no exception to this basic fact of the American system of
rejected the inclusion of spouses and children in IRCA's legalization program, we still think
it possible to regard Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush's enforcement actions as
transitional, in the sense that the legalization program gave immigration status to its
beneficiaries that in turn would have enabled them to petition for the admission of their
spouses and children through already existing channels. DACA cannot be characterized in
that fashion, because there is no clear existing route in the law for its beneficiaries to petition
for lawful status. See infra note 1o5 and accompanying text. As for the beneficiaries of DAPA,
while they may one day be able to adjust status, without DAPA, because of their
relationships to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs), in many cases that
adjustment would be so far in the future as to stretch thin the meaning of transition. See
infra notes 15o-151 and accompanying text. More important, the political context of IRCA
differs dramatically from the present one. We think it at least arguable that Congress's
creation of a legalization program in 1986 licensed executive authority to engage in gap
filling and other forms of ameliorative action throughout implementation. To be clear, the
absence of such license in the current context does not make the Obama relief initiatives
unlawful. It just makes them different from family fairness. Ultimately, however, we think
these debates about the details of family fairness and its resemblance to DACA and DAPA
amount to a red herring because they obscure the larger difficulties of using history as legal
precedent.
5i. See 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) ("The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Border
and Transportation Security, shall be responsible for the following . . . (5) Establishing
national immigration enforcement policies and priorities."); 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012);
Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17, at go (citing "the additional broad authority
conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)"); OLC Memorandum Op., supra note 1o, at 3-4.
52. For a discussion of the power of prosecutors and proposals for how to rein in that power
through institutional design, see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869 (2009); and Rachel E.
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L.
REV. 271 (2013). For an account of the President's use of the enforcement power to advance
his objectives in civil contexts, see Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031, 1031 (2013), which argues that the President's enforcement authority
has been extensive but also "ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque."
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separated powers. As is true in other arenas, the way the Executive exercises its
enforcement discretion over time powerfully shapes the meaning and
significance of the law. In enforcing the INA- a multi-faceted and complex
code -the Executive must make numerous decisions, large and small, about
how and when to wield its power." In so doing, it must navigate the vagaries
of ideologically diverse public and congressional opinion; observers will often
criticize the same enforcement strategy as both feckless and draconian. In
addition to addressing the basic question of how to allocate enforcement
resources between the border and the interior,5
4 the President and officials
within DHS must determine the specific means for each sort of enforcement.
At the border, should it rely on fencing and technology as deterrents,ss or
apprehensions and quick returns? In the interior, should its focus be on
employers who hire unauthorized workers, on identifying and removing
noncitizens who have committed crimes, " or on removing unauthorized
noncitizens generally? Congress sometimes sets the stage for or constrains
these choices through authorization and appropriations laws," but in the main,
the complexity and breadth of the tradeoffs required of the Executive
transform him into a policymaker.
Historically, the President has exercised this power using a variety of legal
tools. Prosecutorial discretion in the form of "deferred action" - the mechanism
for the Obama relief initiatives -represents just one. We reserve analysis of
that law enforcement tool until Part III and focus here instead on another
crucial but oft-overlooked example of the President's use of the enforcement
power to advance his agenda (arguably at the expense of Congress):
underenforcement of the employer sanctions regime. The history of the
Executive's weak (some might say irresponsible) implementation of this major
congressional initiative illuminates how the President's constitutionally
53. These choices sometimes but do not always track partisan lines, for Republicans and
Democrats alike have reasons to support both strong and lax enforcement. For a discussion
of these dynamics with reference to the enforcement of a particular statutory framework - in
this case, the employer sanctions provisions - see infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
54. Under the Obama Administration, there is some evidence that enforcement resources have
been shifting toward the border. For example, the number of interior removals has been
falling for several years. See Rosenblum, supra note 3, at 6.
ss. For a discussion of Congress's grants of power to the Executive to build physical barriers at
the border and a more general analysis of the utility of border enforcement as a screening
mechanism, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 524-28.
56. For recent developments related to this sort of enforcement, see infra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text.
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assigned role to execute the laws gives him power over the contours and
significance of a statutory scheme.
Created in 1986 by Congress in tandem with IRCA's large-scale
legalization program in 1986, the employer sanctions regime imposes both civil
and criminal sanctions on employers who hire immigrants not authorized to
work in the United States." The theory behind employer sanctions was that
penalizing employers who hired unauthorized workers would reduce the labor
market incentive for illegal immigration. Congress also included employer
sanctions to help justify legalization -as a promise that future legalizations
would be unnecessary because IRCA would eliminate one of the primary
reasons for illegal immigration.9
From its inception, however, the employer sanctions regime has been
largely ineffectual.so Its weaknesses tem in part from the statute itself and the
tradeoffs built into it. As the Supreme Court recognized in Arizona v. United
States, IRCA reflects Congress's efforts to balance the desire to prevent the
hiring of unauthorized immigrants with the concern that overzealous
prosecution could give employers incentives to discriminate against potential
workers on the basis of race or national origin.6 ' But these legislative tradeoffs
form only part of the story. The Executive itself has taken much of the bite out
of this signature congressional enforcement initiative. Across administrations,
different combinations of political desires and institutional concerns have led to
varying degrees of underenforcement of the statute, leading lawmakers
and scholarly commentators to doubt that IRCA has played a significant
role in curbing unauthorized immigration to the United States. 62 This
58. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 1o, ioo Star. 3359,
3360-72 (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1324a (2012)).
59. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 200-04 (describing IRCA's employer sanctions
as part of a one-time "grand bargain" among interest groups).
6o. Data on the enforcement of employer sanctions is spotty and often relies on inconsistent
methodologies. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4 0002, IMMIGRATION-
RELATED WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4 (2015) (noting that
assessments of worksite enforcement programs have been complicated by "data reporting
problems, the existence of conflicting data," and the paucity of data before the creation of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)). But data pertaining to different discrete
periods of IRCA enforcement are suggestive of underenforcement. See, e.g., id. at 5 tbl.i
(showing low numbers of final orders and administrative fines relative to the number of
employers from 1999-2012).
61. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503-o8 (2012).
62. See Verification of Eligibility for Employment and Benefits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo4th Cong. 8 (1995) (statement of
Barbara Jordan, Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform) (arguing that IRCA's
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underenforcement may reflect the Executive's desire to satisfy business or labor
constituencies (to varying degrees depending on the party in office). It could
also reflect the government's desire to target enforcement resources in the
direction most saleable to the general public -toward safety risks and border
enforcement-goals also reflected in Congress's expansion of the criminal law
grounds for removal and appropriation of funds for border enforcement.
Considered at a more granular level, it also becomes clear how each
administration has calibrated its enforcement judgments under IRCA to
address the particular mix of political and institutional pressures it has faced,
managing the domain of enforcement according to its own policy preferences.
Studies of the early years of implementation point to low levels of enforcement
that declined over time, accompanied by the failure to develop strong
incentives for compliance in immigrant-heavy industries.64 One leading history
of IRCA argues that the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations'
commitments to deregulation led to INS policy focused on educating
businesses, rather than imposing penalties on them.6s
Not much changed in later years. With one limited exception, the
number of investigations, warnings, and fines directed at employers all
declined steadily and dramatically from around 1990 into the 2000S.66 A brief
uptick in enforcement occurred during the mid-1990s,6 following a Clinton
Administration directive that called for "strengthening worksite enforcement
and work authorization verification . .. to better protect American workers and
work authorization verification system failed to "[r]educ[e] the employment magnet"); S.
REP. No. 113-40, at 11 (2013) (criticizing IRCA's employer sanctions and legalization scheme
for having "significant gaps"); H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 129 (1996) (faulting INS's
enforcement of IRCA sanctions as "[t]epid"); Wishnie, supra note 59, at 209-11 (discussing
the "decline in government enforcement" as part of an argument for repealing IRCA's
employer sanctions).
63. See generally Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a
Formidable Machinery, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 23-47, 92-116 (Jan. 2013), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/enforcementpillars.pdf [http://
perma.cc/R38H-GQRE] (describing the implementation of IRCA and other immigration
enforcement systems, including border enforcement and criminal justice system
intersections).
64. See MICHAEL Fix & PAUL T. HILL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: CHALLENGES AND
STRATEGIES 3 (1990) (describing concerns with the implementation of the employer
sanctions); Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. (Sept. 1, 200s), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/declining-enforcement
-employer-sanctions [http://perma.cc/VWV33-3XL8].
65. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA
262-63 (2002).
66. See Brownell, supra note 64.
67. Id. at fig.l.
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businesses that do not hire illegal immigrants."6" But this strengthening of
enforcement dissipated within two years as the Clinton Administration shifted
its efforts away from both sanctions and worksite raids and toward targeting
the removal of noncitizens with criminal convictions.
This trend toward targeting noncitizens who had committed crimes
continued under the George W. Bush Administration, which seemed
uninterested in employer sanctions and was focused on national security
targets in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. While we know
that millions of unauthorized immigrants have long been employed by
hundreds of thousands of employers, 70 for years during the Bush
Administration, DHS fined fewer than one hundred employers for violating
IRCA.' For several years, the number of both final orders issued and fines
levied hovered close to zero,2 suggesting the Administration was doing next to
nothing to enforce the statute." Even when the Administration increased
scrutiny of workplaces near the end of President Bush's second term, the
enforcement that resulted took the form of a series of high-profile worksite
68. Deterring Illegal Immigration: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 60 Fed. Reg. 7885, 7885-86 (Feb. 10, 1995). For a time in 1996, the
Administration also launched a series of high-profile worksite raids. ALISON SISKIN ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33351, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
37-38 (20o6); INS Steps Up Worksite Enforcement, Targets Eastern U.S., 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 531 (1996). But by 1998, criticism from Congress, industry, and advocacy groups
led the Administration to soften its enforcement strategy by curbing the abusive tactics
critics had identified. INS Distributes New Guidelines for Worksite Raids, 75 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 979 (1998). In December 1998, further responding to advocates' concerns over
the implications of worksite enforcement for the protection of workers, the INS and the
Department of Labor (DOL) entered into a memorandum of understanding, according to
which DOL would cease referring suspected immigration law violators who complained
about worksite violations to INS. See Labor Department, INS Sign MOU on Labor Standards
and Employer Sanctions, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1696 (1998).
6g. The focus on noncitizens with criminal convictions was also facilitated by a series of
legislative changes in the Illegal Immigrant and Immigration Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
70. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, between 2000 and 2010, the estimated unauthorized
labor force ranged from 5-5 million in 2000 to as high as 8.4 million in 2007. See Jeffrey S.
Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends,
2010, PEw RES. CTR. 17 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZDP3-YLJR].
i. See BRUNO, supra note 60, at 5 tbl.i.
72. Id.
73. Interestingly, even in this period we are not aware of anyone arguing that the lack of
enforcement violated the statute or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.
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raids that led to the arrests of hundreds of workers. DHS issued only thirty
administrative fines against employers.'
The Obama Administration disavowed high-profile raids in favor of
employer audits, while continuing the focus on noncitizens who had
committed criminal offenses.' The emphasis on audits led to increasing
numbers of employer sanctions during President Obama's first term." Yet
even with the Obama Administration's increased attention to employer
compliance, weak enforcement of IRCA has been a perennial feature of the
immigration system. This underenforcement likely stems in part from
Congress's ever-growing focus on border enforcement in the appropriations
process'-an indirect means of de-prioritizing employer sanctions. But the
Executive has been more directly responsible for deflating the 1986 statute. It
has consistently chosen to focus its enforcement strategy elsewhere, rendering
a signature congressional enforcement initiative largely irrelevant to
immigration policy.
The complex enforcement history of IRCA reflects a crucial feature of the
enforcement power we take up in more detail in Part II - that the President
(through enforcement) and Congress (through appropriations and oversight)
together continue to make policy and redefine the meaning of a statutory
regime long after its enactment, as the regime unfolds in practice. This history
also underscores how the President's enforcement judgments drive much of
that development, constructing over time the domain of regulation. These
enforcement judgments may take the scheme in practice far from the intentions
of the enacting Congress, but such is the consequence of enforcement.7
C. The Rise ofDe Facto Delegation
In our 2009 article, we juxtaposed how presidents have used authorities
expressly delegated to them, such as the parole power, with a phenomenon we
termed de facto delegation. The concept relates to the sort of ordinary
enforcement discretion that requires priority setting and judgment and can
74. See BRUNO, supra note 6o, at 5-6.
75. Id. (showing how trends in arrests and administrative fines issued to employers moved in
opposite directions as the Bush Administration gave way to the Obama Administration).
76. See Meissner et al., supra note 63, at 84 (citing Bruno, supra note 6o).
77. See, e.g., id. at 22 (noting that Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) receives more funding than
all other immigration agencies combined, and that CBP's budget increased by eighty-five
percent between fiscal years 2005 and 2012).
78. The Supreme Court has recognized as much, for reasons we explore in the immediately
following section, Part I.C. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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lead to the underenforcement we describe above. But the phenomenon is also
more radical, amounting to a system of executive decision making about who
may remain in the United States-a system that effectively substitutes for
congressional judgment. Importantly, this delegation of de facto screening
authority comes not from specific statutory enactments, but emerges instead
from the modern structure of immigration law as a whole.
At bottom, de facto delegation is the result of a profound mismatch
between the law on the books and reality on the ground, which has resulted
from a series of legal, political, and demographic developments that have
accelerated over the last four decades.' Three features of the immigration code
produced by Congress helped establish the conditions for de facto delegation.
First, the Code renders removable any noncitizen who enters the United States
without authorization. This seemingly simple legal command has intersected
with complex demographic and social trends - in particular, record levels of
8,
migration, both legal and illegal, over the last thirty years - to produce an
unauthorized population that reached over twelve million at its peak in 2007
and has remained above eleven million in recent years."' This is an arrestingly
7g. A key consequence of this mismatch has been the emergence of a large gap between formal
citizenship and a sociological account of membership-a distinction even courts have
recognized when assessing whether and how unauthorized immigrants constitute subjects
under the Constitution. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration, Civil Rights & the Evolution
of the People, 142 DAEDALUS 228, 232-35 (2013). This sociological understanding of
membership helps to explain the power of de facto delegation and executive branch
policymaking, which arises from the fact that a perfect world is not a world of perfect
compliance with current immigration law. See infra Part III.C.2.
so. These trends, in turn, have been the function of complex legal, economic, labor market, and
social forces in the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere. See, e.g., MARCELO SUAREZ-
OROZCO ET AL., THE NEW IMMIGRATION: A READER, at ix-x (2005) (noting that "[t]he
current pattern of U.S. immigration" began "to intensify in 1965 and gained extraordinary
momentum in the last two decades" and attributing this pattern to the combination of the
postindustrial economy's "voracious appetite" for labor, the emphasis of the 1965
immigration reforms on family unity, social forces such as the ease of transportation and
dissemination of information, and variables such as armed conflict and political repression).
81. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May
Have Reversed, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2o13/o9/23
/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed [http://perma
.cc/Z8ZE-VEBB]. Demographers pinpoint the peak of illegal immigration to the United
States to sometime in the early 2000s. The size of the unauthorized population present in
the United States has remained relatively constant in recent years, even as net migration has
approached near zero, as the result of factors such as the Great Recession, demographic
shifts in Mexico, and U.S. enforcement policy at the border. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al.,
Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero-and Perhaps Less, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls
-to-zero-and-perhaps-less [http:// perma.cc/96PZ-ZLLV].
131
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
large number. It means that nearly half of all noncitizens currently living in the
United States are formally deportable under the immigration code."'
Second, since the late 198os, Congress has made increasing numbers of
criminal offenses predicates for removal, sweeping even minor drug crimes
into the Code and expanding the definition of so-called "aggravated felonies."
That term of art initially only encompassed very serious crimes, such as murder
and rape, but has come to encompass numerous minor offenses, including
many misdemeanors. 8 This makes the pool of deportable noncitizens
significantly larger, adding to those who are unauthorized many legal
immigrants, including large numbers of lawful permanent residents. The size
and complexity of the population thus eligible for removal, coupled with the
fact that removal requires investigations, arrests, and charging decisions by
immigration police and prosecutors, means that the Executive wields
tremendous screening power -functional authority to make judgments about
the types of noncitizens who should be permitted to remain in the United
States.
Finally, the scope of the Executive's discretion at the enforcement stage has
only been augmented by recent congressional decisions to constrain the
authority of immigration judges to grant relief from removal at the end of
deportation proceedings. 84 These restrictions on relief have often been
conceptualized as limiting the role discretion plays in immigration
enforcement. But far from eliminating executive discretion, these provisions
have simply moved the power to provide relief to the arrest and charging
phase, shifting the exercise of discretion from immigration judges to
prosecutors and immigration police."'
Given the central role Congress has played in the rise of de facto delegation,
we chose in 2009 to describe it as a cousin to ordinary delegation. But in using
the term "delegation," we do not mean to suggest that Congress clearly
intended at any moment in time to create a system of vast ex post executive
screening. Instead, the concept describes a structural reality inherited from a
series of choices over time-choices that have created a parallel executive
82. According to the 20o Census, approximately 22,480,ooo noncitizens reside in the United
States. See Elizabeth M. Grieco et al., The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (May 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SBG6-UT8T].
83. See 8 U.S.C. § niol(a)(43) (2012) (defining "aggravated felony"). For an accounting of these
trends and an explanation of how a once narrow definition has become a "colossus," see
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 597-99 (6th ed. 2015).
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screening regime through which the Executive exercises its own value
judgments about the scope of our immigration policy.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to describe de facto delegation as the
product solely of congressional choices. Enforcement judgments also have
contributed to its rise during the era of mass migration, through the sorts of
enforcement tradeoffs described in Part B. For instance, the Executive arguably
has contributed to the scope of illegal immigration by declining to either
prevent the entry of or remove in large numbers unauthorized immigrants who
do not pose public safety or national security risks.8 Even in a world of ever-
increasing resources for immigration enforcement8, the gap between law on
the books and on the ground has failed to close in any meaningful way, in part
because of executive policy judgments. Seen in this light, Congress's decision
to shower the enforcement bureaucracy with resources has served only to
further increase the Executive's capacity to shape the pool of immigrants living
in the United States.
Even the Supreme Court has embraced the central role the President plays
in structuring the modern immigration screening system. In Arizona v. United
States, the Court struck down most provisions of an Arizona law designed to
augment federal immigration enforcement. While many of the provisions of
the Arizona statute precisely tracked the INA- statutory text one might think
embodied Congress's enforcement priorities - the Court rejected Arizona's
attempt at redundant enforcement. Under the Court's theory of preemption,
federal immigration law consists not only of the legislature's work, or the terms
of the Code, but also of the enforcement choices the Executive makes. These
choices elevate certain elements of the Code over others or reflect the
Executive's desire to emphasize "human concerns" that the Executive has come
to appreciate in the course of its enforcement but that might not be embedded
86. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN.
L. REv. 809, 843-44 (2007) (arguing that the Executive may prefer a system of illegal
immigration because it poses fewer constitutional obstacles to removal); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age, 1o6 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1123-24
(2008) (reviewing HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (20o6)) (arguing that citizens and
lawmakers have tolerated illegal immigration because of its economic benefits). Whether
any given administration has in fact tolerated illegal immigration may be in the eye of the
beholder. For immigrants' rights activists, enforcement policy in recent years has seemed to
mercilessly target large numbers of unauthorized immigrants with families and ties in the
United States. For enforcement enthusiasts, the presence of millions of unauthorized
immigrants suggests a lack of will on the Executive's part to remove.
87. See generally Meissner et al., supra note 63 (describing the build-up of federal immigration
enforcement resources over the last several decades).
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in the Code." By conceptualizing immigration law in this way, the Court
converted the ordinary exercise of prosecutorial discretion into binding federal
law that preempted Arizona's immigration initiatives."' Thus, even though the
state sanctions mirrored the federal statute, they were preempted because they
conflicted with the way in which the Executive Branch had wielded its
enforcement discretion. Whether we think federal enforcement priorities ought
to have preemptive effect -a move that could be quite disruptive to federalism
in the administrative state-the Court's move speaks powerfully to the
independent role the Executive plays in the development of the very meaning
of a statutory scheme."o
For our purposes here-dissecting and understanding the enforcement
power -the signal feature of de facto delegation has been the priority setting it
entails, which can result in profound and widespread policy effects. As we
argued in 2009, "[T]he President's inability to set formal admissions and
removal criteria has not precluded him from playing a major role in shaping
screening policy."91 This ex post form of screening authority has amplified the
President's control over our immigration policy, despite the fact that (and
paradoxically because) Congress has maintained a virtual monopoly over ex
ante screening. Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has borne considerable
responsibility for expanding the domain of enforcement in a way that has
magnified executive policymaking power, by making the INA more and more
complicated and rule-bound since its adoption in 1952. As we will argue in Part
II, the fact that Congress may not have contemplated or intended these effects
does not render the presidential actions producing them unlawful. Instead, the
88. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) ("Discretion in the enforcement of
immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens
who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors,
including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the
community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions
involve policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations. . . . The foreign state
may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that
create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature
of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement
policies are consistent with this Nation's foreign policy with respect to these and other
realities." (emphasis added)).
89. See Cox, supra note 36, at 54.
go. Justice Kennedy's conception of federal law even seems to contemplate that the enacting
Congress understands the Executive Branch will make crucial choices about the reach of a
statute when it creates the enforcement scheme to begin with. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
As we explain below, however, our account does not turn on ascribing specific intent to the
enacting Congress(es). See infra text accompanying notes 139-148.
gi. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 5u.
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rise of de facto delegation underscores how regulatory domains evolve over
time through the interplay of legislative acts and discretionary enforcement
choices.
D. Centralizin g Enforcement Within the Executive
As we explained in 2009, there are reasons to be concerned about the
increasingly outsized role enforcement policy has come to play in the
formulation of immigration policy. The scale of de facto delegation, in
particular, has given rise to a variety of good governance and rule-of-law
concerns. As has been emphasized recently in debates about policing and
criminal justice, enforcement judgments are often opaque and, for that reason,
frequently resist accountability." In addition, enforcement imperatives often
empower low- and mid-level officials, especially as the size of the enforcement
pool expands." The diffusion of responsibility that results may make it more
difficult to structure and control enforcement policy according to priorities
established by executive branch leadership, let alone by Congress.
Presidential administrations are, of course, attentive to these concerns, if
only because they implicate the territorial tussle between political leadership in
Washington and agents in the field. Without control over the bureaucracy, it
can be difficult, if not impossible, for a modern administration to implement
its agenda. Accordingly, the modern history of presidential immigration law is
as much a story about the organization of the Executive Branch, and dynamics
among actors within it, as it is an account of the relationship between the
Executive and Congress. Whereas in our 20o9 article we focused exclusively on
the latter, here we also seek to highlight how the former should factor into our
account of the enforcement power and the separation of powers.
The Obama Administration, in particular, has responded to the demands
engendered by de facto delegation with systemic and organizational changes,
of which the 2014 relief policies represent only one example. The
Administration's enforcement policy as a whole has become increasingly
directed at regularizing and making more consistent the operation of the de
facto, ex post screening system -a system executive leadership came to see as
too random and overly subject to the views of low-level bureaucrats and state
92. See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008); David Alan Sklansky,
Prosecutorial Discretion Through the Looking Glass, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 23, 2014, 10:30 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o4/11/prosecutorial-discretion-through.html [http://perma.cc
/H8AD-Q 9 DV].
93. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 528-36.
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and local officials.9 4 The motivations for its various regularization efforts have
been simultaneously institutional and political. As a Democratic
administration, the politics of immigration required that it commit to
enforcing the law, but also that it respond to enforcement's perceived excesses.
And from DHS's institutional point of view, agents in the field (both federal
and local) had become too powerful in dictating the direction of administration
policy.
The Administration's centralizing and regularizing moves have been
myriad, but three prior to the announcement of the first relief initiative in
2012-Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) -stand out. First, the
Administration's virtually unprecedented decision to file preemption lawsuits
against Arizona and several other states, challenging state laws designed to
buttress the federal enforcement regime, reflected a desire to retake federal
control over the immigration debate and suppress state efforts to shape both
immigration policy and politics.9s Second, in 2011, DHS released the so-called
Morton Memos, a pair of agency memoranda designed to regulate the use of
prosecutorial discretion by line-level enforcement officials. These memos grew
out of a long tradition of similar efforts in previous administrations to provide
guidance to immigration enforcement officials.96 But the Morton Memos
94. The role of state and local officials in driving federal immigration enforcement has been a
subject of extended scholarly inquiry. Studies of the 287(g) Program, for example, have
shown that the priorities of state and local officials involved in immigration enforcement
often veer from those of federal officials, though federal agents in the field can also develop
common cause with local officials, creating tension with officials in Washington. See, e.g.,
Randy Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local
Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (2011), http://migrationinformation.org
/sites/default/files/publications/287g-divergence.pdf [http://perma.cc/EB3H-B98R]. In
addition, because convictions under state law serve as predicates for removal, the federal
government has been dependent on cooperation from state police to identify potentially
removable noncitizens, and state and local arrests and prosecutions can determine who gets
funneled into removal proceedings. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A
Study of Arizona Before SB 1o7o, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1749 (2011) (showing how Arizona
employed criminal anti-smuggling laws in ways that redefined and restructured the system
of immigration enforcement); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal
Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
REv. 1819 (2011) (arguing that state and local police have de facto power to set the
immigration enforcement agenda through ordinary policing and that any policy that
permits state and local police to act as gatekeepers can undermine federal authority).
95. For a discussion, see Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism:
Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2104-05 (2014); and Cox, supra note
36.
g6. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration and Customs Enft (ICE), to
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reached significantly beyond their predecessors by creating a tiered
enforcement scheme. Accordingly, the immigration law world regarded them
as more serious efforts to regularize discretion than past guidance documents.
Finally, the Obama Administration's decision to make Secure Communities
(launched during the waning days of the Bush Administration) the centerpiece
of its enforcement strategy reflected a turn to technology to systematize
enforcement against criminal offenders. Secure Communities promised to
displace the unpredictable human element of formal and informal cooperation
with local police." Even though the President, as part of his November 2014
announcement, declared an end to the program and DHS replaced it with the
Priority Enforcement Program, the core centralizing, data-sharing feature
remains in place and likely reflects a permanent shift in the way DHS collects
the information essential to its enforcement activities.'
With these moves as prelude, the motivations for the Obama relief
initiatives come into sharper focus. Two of the centralizing moves succeeded,
but one resulted in limited, if any, success and required recalibration.
Federal lawsuits in Arizona and elsewhere successfully muted the state
policymaking initiatives that had been accelerating prior to the litigation."
.Cc/V3FE-DTUG] [hereinafter Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion]; Memorandum
from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge & Chief
Counsel 1 (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic
-violence.pdf [http://perma.cc/XN2F-ZG33]; Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant
Sec'y, ICE, to Field Office Dirs. & Special Agents in Charge i (Nov. 7, 2007),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/custody-pd.pdf [http://perma.cc
/9XEQ-LLDJ]; Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to Reg'1 Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents & Reg'1 & Dist.
Counsel 1 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac
/Meissner-2000-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/2DEH-8TLB].
97. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 8o U. CHI. L. REv. 87 (2013);
Rodriguez, supra note 95, at 2105 n.26 (describing Secure Communities as reflecting a desire
to use "federalism's institutions while holding its actors at bay"). Under the program, the
FBI shares with DHS the fingerprint and arrest data sent to it by state and local police. DHS
then runs the data through its own database to determine if state and local police have
identified a potentially removable noncitizen. ICE then determines whether to request that
local officials hold the noncitizen until it can decide whether to take custody for removal
purposes. See Cox & Miles, supra, at 93-96. The 2014 replacement of Secure Communities
with the Priority Enforcement Program leaves the data-sharing function in place and simply
changes what the Administration will do with the information it receives from the FBI and,
by extension, state and local officials.
98. It should be noted that this centralization is relative. Because ICE depends on information
held by local and state officials to do its job, it cannot avoid interacting with those
bureaucracies.
g. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). The Court struck down most of
Arizona's attempt to augment federal immigration enforcement, though it left in place the
most notorious provision of the statute, which requires law enforcement officials to inquire
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Secure Communities took center stage and has come to account for the vast
majority of removals from the interior of the country, superseding the more
limited 287(g) Program, and systematizing long-standing informal cooperation
between local and federal officials."oo But for reasons we discuss in detail in
Part III, the Morton Memos did not achieve their objectives, at least to the
extent they were motivated by a genuine desire to significantly curb line-officer
discretion to initiate the removal of unauthorized immigrants without criminal
records. These institutional developments, in turn, coincided with a powerful
social movement of unauthorized youth demanding recognition of their
rightful place in the United States. The movement eventually made its way into
the White House, while the larger campaign against deportations made a
strong impression on powerful local officials in places such as California,
Chicago, and New York City, who began to resist participation in federal
enforcement."o'
The combination of these institutional and social movement pressures,
along with the imperatives of the 2012 election, created the context in which the
White House announced DACA and then, a little more than a year later,
into immigration status in certain circumstances. Id. at 2510 ("At this stage ... it would be
inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal
law."). It remains unclear the extent to which that provision has been used, for good or for
ill, and much of the political momentum behind provisions of this sort appears
to have subsided for now. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Toward Dirente in Immigration
Federalism, 30 VA. J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 17 & n.49),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624672 [http://perma.cc/AE2Q-3A3J].
1oo. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057, INTERIOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 25 tbl.6 (2012)
(presenting interior enforcement actions by the program from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
2011).
101. See Rodriguez, supra note 95, at 2121; Rodriguez, supra note 99 (manuscript at 12-14). This
resistance helped prompt the Administration's change in policy and demonstrated the
power of the local in cooperative ventures. As Homeland Security Secretary Johnson wrote
at the time of the program's discontinuation:
The goal of Secure Communities was to more effectively identify and facilitate the
removal of criminal aliens in the custody of state and local law enforcement
agencies. But the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is
widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation . . . . Governors, mayors,
and state and local law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly
refused to cooperate with the program . . . . The overarching goal of Secure
Communities remains in my view a valid and important law enforcement
objective, but a fresh start and a new program are necessary.
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., ICE, et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites
/default/files/publications/14_1l2o-memo_secure_conmunities.pdf [http://perma.cc/UYG3
-EWVK] [hereinafter Johnson, Secure Communities Memo].
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Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA). The "Obama relief initiatives," as we call them, emerged in two
phases. In June 2012, then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano,
announced what became known as DACA. 102 According to the DHS
memorandum accompanying the announcement, noncitizens without legal
status who met certain criteria were eligible to apply for a renewable two-year
period of relief from removal, as well as for the authorization to work in the
United States."o3 The central feature of DACA was that it covered blameless
youth with longstanding presence in the United States, namely, unauthorized
immigrants who had come to the United States before the age of sixteen and
had resided continuously in the United States for at least five years.0 4
The Administration styled relief for that group as an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion-a large-scale extension of the "deferred action"
immigration authorities had utilized for decades as a case management and
humanitarian relief tool.' To underscore that the initiative fell within the
102. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces
Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June
15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/o6/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred
-action-process-young-people-who-are-low [http://perma.cc/83EK-N89S].
103. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter
Napolitano, Prosecutorial Discretion Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/si
-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2HX6-G4H41.
104. Id. at 1. In addition, to receive relief under the 2012 version of DACA, an applicant must have
been under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; not have been convicted of certain
crimes; and, at the time of application, either be in school or have graduated from high
school, have obtained a GED certification, or have been honorably discharged from the
Coast Guard or Armed Forces. Id.
1os. The decision to defer action, or delay or decline removal, functions like the criminal
prosecutor's choice not to pursue a case. In the immigration setting, noncitizens whose
prosecutions have been deferred have historically been eligible to apply for work
permits pursuant to INS and now DHS regulation and are considered to be lawfully
present for certain purposes, though deferred action does not confer on them a
lawful immigration status. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action
-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/4KVM-P4G5].
Though Congress has not affirmatively authorized the practice or weighed in on its scope
and the Supreme Court has not directly addressed its permissibility, both had acknowledged
deferred action as part of the system of immigration enforcement prior to the announcement
of DACA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(IV) (2012) (characterizing certain petitioners for
immigrant status subjected to familial abuse as "eligible for deferred action and work
authorization"); id. §1227 (d)(2) (2012) (stating that the denial of a request for an
administrative stay of removal is no bar to applying for "deferred action"); Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (describing deferred action as
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President's enforcement powers, the Administration emphasized that DACA
would not confer a lawful status on its recipients, that the adjudicators of
DACA petitions in United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) retained discretion to deny applications of even those who satisfied
the eligibility criteria, and that DHS retained the discretion to terminate the
status at any time. By the end of 2014, approximately 638,897 noncitizens had
been granted relief under DACA. o6
In an address to the nation in November 2014, the President himself
announced a second round of administrative actions designed to advance a
variety of long-sought policy objectives."o' The centerpiece again consisted of a
large-scale deferred action initiative, this time for the unauthorized parents of
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. Pursuant to this program,
known as DAPA,os eligible noncitizens who are not otherwise enforcement
priorities for the government would be permitted to apply for the deferral of
their removal, as well as work authorization, for three years."o
9 Alongside this
INS's "regular practice ... of exercising . . . discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply
for its own convenience").
106. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Number of I-82iD, Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: 2012-
2015 (December 31), U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY (2015), http://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%2oand%2OStudies/Immigration%2oForms%2oDa
ta/All%2oForm%2oTypes/DACA/I821dperformancedata-fy2O1sqtr.pdf [http://perma.cc
/RNW2-9WNJ] (listing total cumulative initial DACA grants from the program's start
through December 31, 2014). In August 2014, after the initial two-year period of DACA
expired, the Administration began processing applications for renewal of deferred action
status. Cf U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, supra note 1o5 (indicating the procedure
for renewal of DACA). Roughly 148,171 cumulative renewals have been granted. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra (listing total cumulative renewal grants through
December 31, 2014).
107. See Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts To Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/2/us/obama-immigration-speech.html
[http://perma.cc/352G-VHR2]; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House,
Weekly Address: Immigration Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 22, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/22/weekly-address-immigration-accountabili
ty-executive-action [http://perma.cc/Q2B3-2RK4].
lo8. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Le6n Rodriguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enft, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r ofU.S. Customs & Border
Prot. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson, DACA and DAPA Memo], http://www
.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_112omemodeferred action.pdf [http://perma
.cc/Z7B9-K5MG]. The Administration originally called the program Deferred Action for
Parental Accountability.
iog. On February 16, 2015, a judge in the Southern District of Texas enjoined the
implementation of DAPA, concluding that the Administration violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) by failing to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking for what the
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new deferred action initiative, the Administration proposed to tweak the
existing DACA program, expanding eligibility and extending the relief period
to three years."o Together with the announcement of DAPA, DHS Secretary
Johnson also issued a memorandum identifying department-wide guidelines
intended to govern removal and detention policies and budget requests more
generally. The "Johnson Memo" reinforced the Department's longstanding
emphasis on public safety, national security risks, and border enforcement. To
implement these priorities, however, the memo superseded all previous
enforcement guidance with a new three-tiered scheme for prioritizing
enforcement efforts."'
These Obama relief policies are thus best understood as the most dramatic
and politically salient examples of a larger effort to centralize the vast
enforcement authority that modern de facto delegation has given to the
Executive. This centralization has entailed experimenting with different means
of ensuring that political leadership within the agencies, as well as the White
House, exert greater control over the structure of the immigrant screening
system in order to advance the policy objectives of leadership, as well as to
promote consistency and predictability in enforcement. Some aspects of this
centralization have elevated decision-making authority within the
bureaucracy- moving it from lower-level to higher-level decision makers.
Other aspects have drawn power into the bureaucracy that otherwise might lie
outside it -as is true in efforts to reduce the role of state and local actors in
shaping the enforcement system.
judge characterized as a legislative rule. See Texas v. United States, Civ. No. B-14 -2 54 , 2015
WL 648579, at *62 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). We discuss the APA question below. See infra
notes 308-318 and accompanying text.
11o. See Johnson, DACA and DAPA Memo, supra note io8, at 3. DACA initially made eligible
only those childhood arrivals who were under the age of 31 at the time they applied for relief
under DACA. See Napolitano, Prosecutorial Discretion Memo, supra note 103. This limit on
one's age at the time of application was eliminated in the changes announced on November
20, 2014. See Johnson, DACA and DAPA Memo, supra note lo8, at 3.
iii. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, et al. 3-4
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memo], http://www.dhs.gov
/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120 memo-prosecutorial discretion.pdf [http://perma
.cc/EQ57-XP42] (prioritizing for enforcement purposes, in tier one, those posing "threats to
national security, border security, and public safety," in tier two "misdemeanants and new
immigration violators," and in tier three all other recent immigration violators). As part of
this enforcement reform, the Administration also announced the reformulation of the
Secure Communities Program. Though DHS would continue to rely on fingerprint data
collected from state and local arrests, it would change DHS's enforcement policy from
requesting that state and local police detain noncitizens for removal to, instead, requesting
that police simply notify DHS that the release of potentially removable noncitizens from
local custody was pending. See Johnson, Secure Communities Memo, supra note lot, at 1-3.
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All recent administrations have reflected some centralizing tendencies, but
the combination of politics and current events has made centralization efforts
particularly pronounced in the Obama years. Of course, the fact that the
Obama relief initiatives arose in response to these intertwined institutional and
political forces does not tell us that those initiatives are lawful. Nor are they
lawful simply because they fit comfortably within the tradition of executive
branch policymaking that we have brought to the fore in this Part and in our
2009 work. Indeed, the propriety of any one of the forms of executive action
highlighted in this Part could be debated, and the mere historical rootedness of
the particular exercise of a power is not sufficient to endow it with
constitutional status.1 2
The emergence of the relief initiatives as administration policy does,
however, highlight the dynamic evolution of the content and reach of executive
power. In particular, the initiatives embody recent efforts by the President and
political leadership to reorganize this power. Their importance stems from
what they reveal to us about the Executive Branch's internal operations and
those operations' relationship to core constitutional and legal values, and not
just their substantive outcomes. In Parts II and III, we turn from this historical
account to critique and justification, to explain how such internal
reorganization can promote transparency and accountability and thus serve the
objectives of the separation of powers, even as it might deviate from
congressional design and advance the Executive's own policy agenda.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Everyone debating the Obama relief initiatives agrees on two basic points.
First, all acknowledge that executive branch officials have some discretion to
decide whether and when to initiate a prosecution in an individual case. This
understanding represents the paradigm case of the Anglo-American concept of
"prosecutorial discretion." Even those who insist most strongly on a
constrained Executive accept this discretionary authority over charging
decisions in both criminal and civil contexts."' Second, all participants agree
112. See, e.g., Zachary Price, Two Cheers for OLC's Opinion, BALKINIZATION (NOV. 25, 2014, 1:30
PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o14/1/two-cheers-for-olcs-opinion.html [http://perma
.cc/E7JV-EG53] (warning of the one-way ratchet of reliance on past executive branch
practice to establish the legality of a present-day action and noting that "the constitutional
architecture supports an important background norm that executive officials still must seek
to effectuate statutory policies").
113. The existence of this authority does not mean, of course, that such discretion is never
defeasible. A group of ICE agents challenged DACA on the ground that the INA stripped
agency personnel of this discretion and now mandates the initiation of removal proceedings
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that the President cannot decline to enforce altogether a law that is
constitutional. Such an effort to "suspend" the law would amount to an
abdication of his Article II obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.""'
But how do we distinguish the constitutional exercise of prosecutorial
discretion from an impermissible abdication of the President's duty to enforce
the law? Putting aside purely formal arguments about the distinction between
permissible "underenforcement" s and impermissible "suspension," which
suffer from serious conceptual problems,"6 claims about how to draw this
against noncitizens who are inadmissible for having entered the United States without
inspection. See Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, 92o F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No.
3:12-CV-03247-O), 2012 WL 3629252 (arguing that Congress's use of the word "shall" in 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012), which states that "if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding," mandates the initiation of
removal proceedings (emphasis omitted)). For a convincing demolition of this statutory
claim about the INA, see David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-
Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach's Latest Crusade, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration
-enforcement-discretion-the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-latest-crusade [http://
perma.cc/TJP6-2Y4F]. For a discussion of the resolution of this case, see infra note 120. For
a discussion of the tools available to Congress, see infra notes 299-3ol and accompanying
text.
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. But cf Eluc POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTWE
UNBOUND 113-53 (2011) (arguing that the political need to maintain credibility and respond
to public opinion, not legal norms or constitutional rules, constrains the Executive).
11s. Extensive literature explores the pervasiveness of and reasons for underenforcement, as well
as its potential costs. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 426-27 (2002) (arguing that nonenforcement is a rational law
enforcement strategy to deter marginal offenders without expending enormous resources on
pursuing those who would offend regardless of the law); Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1745-48 (2oo6) (criticizing underenforcement
by arguing that it arises when the group in need of enforcement is politically powerless);
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201-06 (1996) (describing the
reasons why zones arise in which law is not enforced as a matter of explicit policy); Matthew
C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116-17 (2005) (linking underenforcement o the
implementation of a larger administrative scheme and arguing that enforcement should be
left to agencies rather than private causes of action to ensure that enforcement is governed
by a unified strategy given that law cannot reasonably be enforced to its limits); Daniel T.
Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 796-99 (2010)
(identifying the phenomenon of deregulation through nonenforcement and arguing that it
is undesirable because it lacks transparency and obstructs accountability).
116. A core conceptual challenge for formalistic approaches is the fact that enforcement decisions
often require judgments about the appropriate relationships among myriad parts of a large
statutory code. Immigration enforcement, for example, inevitably implicates tradeoffs across
numerous INA provisions -between border and interior enforcement, between immigrants
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distinction typically take one of two forms. The first searches for principles that
limit the substantive criteria that can serve as a basis for prosecutorial
discretion. The second focuses on the way the Executive institutionalizes the
criteria- that is, on how the Executive structures its decision making to take
account of substantive criteria it has defined as relevant.
Prior to President Obama's November 2014 announcement, few
commentators had taken the first tack of focusing on whether the substantive
grounds of relief in the President's potential programs were themselves
unlawful.' But that changed when the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) released
a legal opinion to accompany the President's unveiling of DAPA. Before the
President announced his new relief policies, the Secretary of DHS and the
White House Counsel turned to OLC, proposing two deferred action programs
and seeking advice as to whether they were lawful. OLC found one within the
Executive's authority and the other not.`1 OLC's opinion honed in on the
President's substantive priorities, asking whether the central criteria for relief-
who violate U.S. criminal laws and those who ignore provisions governing who may enter
and work in the United States, between targeting immigrants themselves or third parties
(like smugglers or employers) who affect the demand for migration, and so on. Whether
one concludes that these choices lead to the unlawful suspension of "the law" depends on
the level of generality at which one evaluates the Code. At a low level of generality-that is,
with a focus on particular Code provisions-such tradeoffs can often resemble suspension,
because a part of the Code (often a single provision) will end up being almost entirely
unenforced. But if our frame of reference is the INA as a whole, these tradeoffs simply do
not entail any failure to enforce the Code as a whole.
Recall, for example, our discussion in Part I of IRCA's employer sanctions regime.
While we know that millions of unauthorized immigrants are employed by hundreds of
thousands of employers, for years during the Bush Administration, DHS fined fewer than a
hundred employers for violating IRCA. Whether one believes that those facts reflect a
failure to enforce the law depends on the level of generality at which one defines "the law."
And like these earlier IRCA enforcement decisions, the implementation of the Obama relief
policies ultimately will mean that fewer enforcement resources will be directed to certain
parts of the Code-the provisions making deportable those who entered without inspection
or overstayed the terms of their lawful entry - while more enforcement resources will be
directed at other elements of the Code, primarily those that make deportable noncitizens
who have committed serious crimes or pose security risks.
117. In the wake of the President's announcement of DACA, a variety of commentators
concluded his actions were unlawful, but they tended to focus their arguments on the
institutional form of relief. Zachary Price provided the most detailed effort along these lines,
arguing that "individualized" determinations are lawful but "categorical" ones are not. Price,
supra note 14, at 675; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 14, at 784-85 (acknowledging the
President's authority to apply equitable concerns in individual cases but contending that
such authority does not extend to general, categorical rules like DACA). We explain in Part
III why the distinction between "categorical" and "case-by-case" enforcement discretion
cannot bear the weight that Price's argument places on it.
11s. For a discussion of the details, see infra notes 127-133, 150-157 and accompanying text.
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being a parent of a U.S. citizen, for example-were lawful. The answer,
according to OLC, could be found by asking whether providing relief to those
singled out advanced "congressional priorities" embedded in the INA.
Though OLC developed its congressional priorities approach in response to
a direct question about the lawfulness of DAPA, the opinion's analytic
framework transcends the details of any one scheme of enforcement discretion.
In our assessment of it, then, we aim simultaneously to address the
particularities of DAPA (as well as DACA) in order to help resolve the debate
currently raging about these specific programs, as well as to consider the
viability of a congressional priorities framework for understanding any general
limits on enforcement discretion, which can take numerous forms. In other
words, even if DAPA were never implemented"9 and DACA were invalidated
as the result of final federal court judgmentso - outcomes we are skeptical will
lig. At the time of this writing, DAPA remains enjoined. As we discuss in more detail in Part IV,
a judge in the Southern District of Texas concluded that the Administration violated the
Administrative Procedure Act by failing to subject DAPA -a legislative rule, in its view - to
notice-and-comment rulemaking. In the spring and summer of 2015, the Fifth Circuit
denied the United States's motion to stay the injunction and held oral arguments on the
appeal of the preliminary injunction. In both settings, the Fifth Circuit telegraphed its
extreme skepticism of the government's position, and it therefore seems likely that DAPA
either will remain enjoined by the Fifth Circuit or be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
2016. See infra notes 310-312 and accompanying text. Even if the United States were to lose
at each step of the way, it could cure the APA problem by initiating notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Provided time remains in this Administration to go through these motions,
DAPA is likely eventually to come into effect. To be sure, the analysis by the Texas district
court and signals from the Fifth Circuit suggest underlying constitutional discomfort with
DAPA. As we explain throughout this Article, we find the constitutional objections to DACA
and DAPA to be both weak and ultimately inconsistent with the approach to enforcement
discretion the Supreme Court has taken in cases such as Arizona v. United States.
120. Thus far, the United States has succeeded in defending DACA against attack, though
neither the arguments animating those lawsuits nor the procedural developments in them is
on all fours with the Texas litigation. In another lawsuit in the Fifth Circuit, a district judge
in the Northern District of Texas found that ICE agents, but not the state of Mississippi,
had standing to challenge DACA. See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 736, 738,
746 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that ICE agents could not claim a potential violation of their
oaths of office as cognizable injury but could establish injury as the result of potential
discipline they might face for not complying with DACA). The court ultimately dismissed
the agents' lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however. See Crane v. Napolitano,
No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 821166o, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013) (concluding that
the Civil Service Reform Act provides "comprehensive and exclusive procedures for settling
work-related controversies between federal civil-service employees and the federal
government"), affd sub nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). In a lawsuit
brought by Sheriff Joe Arpaio in the D.C. Circuit, a district court has denied a motion for a
preliminary injunction against DACA and dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing.
See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that Arpaio has no authority
to enforce the immigration laws and therefore is not injured by their underenforcement and
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come to pass - evaluating the congressional priorities approach would remain
an important task.
Putting aside one puzzling aspect of OLC's congressional priorities
approach-that it elevates an ordinary argument about agency compliance
with statutory obligations into a constitutional argument about the
President's Article II obligations - the basic analytic framework of the
"congressional priorities" approach seems straightforward.' But its seemingly
straightforward quality turns out to be an illusion. As we explain in this Part,
tying executive discretion to congressional priorities cannot provide a satisfying
limiting principle within immigration law because, for the vast majority of
enforcement choices that must be made, there are no coherent congressional
priorities to be extracted from the Code. Any inquiry into congressional
priorities is thus likely to be futile, which is why the dueling accounts of those
priorities supplied by OLC and its critics are both unpersuasive. Moreover, in
addition to providing little interpretive guidance, the congressional priorities
approach perpetuates a "faithful-agent" model of law enforcement that is
neither descriptively accurate nor normatively attractive. Executive branch
policymaking through enforcement actually advances certain goals of our
scheme of separated powers. When it comes to the exercise of the enforcement
power, therefore, we should embrace what we refer to as the two-principals
model of decision making that has emerged in practice.
A. Congressional Priorities and Faithful Agents
Though we ultimately disagree with the OLC opinion's approach, the
opinion reflects the best instincts of OLC: that significant and novel executive
concluding that his claim of injury stemming from the need to expend resources to address
crime and other costs associated with DACA was speculative). The court also telegraphed its
skepticism that Arpaio could succeed on the merits, observing that "the challenged deferred
action programs continue a longstanding practice of enforcement discretion regarding the
Nation's immigration laws" that has been "conferred by statute" and is therefore "consistent
with, rather than contrary to, congressional policy." Id. at 209. The court also concluded
that the policy preserved meaningful case-by-case review. Id. at 209-10. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit held that "Sheriff Arpaio has failed to allege an injury that is both fairly traceable to
the deferred action policies and redressable by enjoining them, as our standing precedents
require." Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F. 3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
121. In his work analyzing DACA, before the President's November 2014 announcement,
Zachary Price offers a heuristic that resembles this OLC approach in the way that it ties the
President's enforcement power to what Congress intends. He emphasizes that the Executive
can engage in "priority setting" but not "policymaking." See Price, supra note 14, at 761. That
said, the limiting principle he devises - the categorical versus individual distinction - does
not attempt to excavate substantive priorities from the INA but instead devises a sort of
structural device for evaluating enforcement discretion.
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branch policies ought to be scrutinized and that such scrutiny is doubly
important when the exercise of power is unlikely to be reviewed by courts and
raises potential separation-of-powers concerns."' The independence of the
Office's judgment is also reflected in an aspect of the opinion Administration
detractors seem to overlook: its conclusion that one of the President's proposed
initiatives was beyond his authority. Though OLC frequently advises the
President that a proposed course of action would not be lawful,' such advice
is rarely made public, making the release of the opinion itself a remarkable
event. In taking on the task of crafting a principle to limit a highly malleable
form of executive authority, OLC's actions highlight that law constrains the
President's actions.
Two crucial legal conclusions structure the analysis in the OLC opinion.
First, the opinion rejects the idea that "resource constraints" provide a
meaningful principle for limiting enforcement discretion.'" Many defenders of
broad deportation relief had pressed that as a limiting principle. But OLC was
right to reject it; as a limiting principle, it is virtually meaningless.' The
122. One of us (Cristina Rodriguez) was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of
Legal Counsel from 2011-2013. The views expressed in this Article are the authors' alone and
do not reflect the views of the Office or of the Department of Justice.
123. See Trevor M. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1718-19 (2011)
(book review) (noting that thirty-two percent of OLC opinions between the beginning of
the Carter Administration and the first year of the Obama Administration "went
predominantly against the White House").
124. OLC grounds its discussion of the enforcement power and the President's duty under the
Take Care Clause in principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985), only one of which relates to agency judgments as to whether "agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another" and "whether the agency has enough
resources to undertake the action at all." OLC Memorandum Op., supra note lo, at io
(citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831). In evaluating DAPA, in particular, OLC emphasizes that
limited resources did not provide the only reason for DHS's actions. It noted, "DHS has
explained that the program would also serve a particularized humanitarian interest in
promoting family unity" and that this justification "appears consonant with congressional
policy embodied in the INA." Id. at 26.
125. In the debate over the 2014 policies, defenders of the Administration position have
repeatedly emphasized that the President does not have close to sufficient resources to
remove all noncitizens who are removable, therefore making it necessary for
him to prioritize those enforcement resources he does have. See, e.g., Open Letter
from Immigration Law Professors 6 (Nov. 25, 2014), http://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites
/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/executive-action-law-prof-letter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/NSQU-2GWG]. This argument is unexceptional. But prior to the OLC opinion, a
number of supporters of the relief initiatives had argued further that resource constraints
provided an appropriate measure and means of constraining executive discretion. The
suggestion was that so long as the Executive Branch spent, in accordance with
appropriations legislation, all the enforcement resources Congress had provided, the
President had faithfully executed his duty to enforce the law. See, e.g., id. (arguing that a
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existence of resource constraints obviously provides a sufficient condition for
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. If the Executive lacks the resources to
pursue every violator of the law, she must make choices about which ones not
to pursue-that much is a truism. But resource constraints are not a necessary
condition for the exercise of discretion: the paradigmatic historical
justifications for prosecutorial discretion have little or nothing to do with
resource constraints. And even were one to reject this history and conclude that
resource limits should be considered necessary, the ubiquity of resource
constraints would prevent this principle from providing any meaningful
constraint on the exercise of executive authority. DHS has been showered with
resources and operates with a budget larger than all other federal law
enforcement agencies combined. Yet DHS could ignore broad swaths of the
immigration code and still spend its appropriated dollars. After all, DHS
currently spends its full appropriation every year and still manages to deport
only a tiny fraction of the potentially removable noncitizens living in the
United States."'
Instead of looking to financial constraints, OLC concluded that a limiting
principle could be supplied by "congressional priorities" embedded in the
serious legal question would arise only if the Executive Branch "were to halt all immigration
enforcement, or . .. refuse to substantially spend the resources appropriated by Congress"
and noting that the Obama Administration has "fully utilized all the enforcement resources
Congress has appropriated [and] enforced the immigration law at record levels through
apprehensions, investigations, and detentions that have resulted in over two million
removals"). Impoundment might violate Article II, and it would certainly violate statutory
law, but nothing short of failure to spend appropriated resources would be unlawful. Cf
Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17, at 10-11, 15 (listing express constraints
imposed by Congress and constitutional rights limitations, as well as a general requirement
of reasonableness, as limiting principles, but presenting resource constraints as the primary
constitutional, structural limit on discretion, noting that "nothing in these new policies will
prevent the President from continuing to enforce the immigration laws to the full extent
that the resources Congress has given him will allow. As long as he does so, it is impossible
to claim that his actions are tantamount to eliminating all limits.").
126. In 2013, for example, DHS removed almost 438,000 noncitizens. See John F. Simanski,
Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY
(Sept. 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois-enforcementar_2013
.pdf [http://perma.cc/9A7Z-XT44]. The unauthorized population alone remains at
approximately eleven million, and the number of removals includes many lawfully present
noncitizens who otherwise violated a term of the immigration laws. The fact that the Obama
Administration has deported more noncitizens each year than any prior presidential
administration in American history does not change the reality that it can remove only a
small subset of those who are in fact removable. For a discussion of the relative removal
rates across administrations, see Marc R. Rosenblum & Doris Meissner, The Deportation
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Code: these priorities, it concluded, constrain the substantive criteria that can
lawfully serve as the basis for deportation relief.' In its opinion, OLC
determined that, where the decision to grant relief tracked priorities the Office
unearthed from the statute, such as keeping intact the families of citizens and
lawful permanent residents, relief fell within the permissible zone of
discretion.8 But where OLC believed that the relief could not be tightly linked
to priorities embodied in existing statutory provisions, it concluded that the
Executive was without legal authority to act."9 The opinion surveys numerous
executive branch uses of deferred action and emphasizes that Congress was
aware of them, seeming to use past practice as a form of precedent. But the
opinion then turns to determine whether the President's new proposals
building on that history are, in fact, "consonant with, rather than contrary
"~130to, priorities derived from the statute itself."' OLC ultimately determined
that the decision in DAPA to provide relief to the parents of U.S. citizens and
green card holders would promote congressionally articulated priorities, but
that a proposed program to provide relief for the parents of DACA recipients
would not.
To our knowledge, the notion that the exercise of enforcement discretion is
lawful only if consistent with congressional priorities had not yet emerged as a
claim in the debate at the time OLC issued its opinion. At that moment, we had
not yet seen defended elsewhere the idea that executive priority setting ought
to be informed by the Executive's own analysis of the enforcement obligations
(and forms of relief) Congress thought most important. At the same time, the
approach feels familiar. It aligns analysis of presidential enforcement authority
with the way courts (and offices such as OLC) decide whether administrative
agencies have lawfully exercised their delegated authority. This focus on
consistency with congressional priorities in the context of administrative
rulemaking reflects the dominant approach to administrative law, in which
127. OLC Memorandum Op., supra note io, at 24 ("[A]ny expansion of deferred action to new
classes of aliens must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that it reflects consideration within
the agency's expertise, and that it does not seek to effectively rewrite the laws to match the
Executive's policy preferences, but rather operates in a manner consonant with
congressional policy expressed in the statute.").
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id. at 32-33.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 13-17, 24-25 ("[T]he proposed deferred action program would resemble in material
respects the kinds of deferred action programs Congress has implicitly approved in the past,
which provides some indication that the proposal is consonant not only with the interests
reflected in immigration law as a general matter, but also with congressional understandings
about the permissible uses of deferred action.").
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principal-agent models - both informal and formal - are used to conceptualize
and evaluate the administrative state." When we characterize Congress as the
principal and the Executive as its agent, the obvious question becomes whether
the agent is promoting his principal's goals or, instead, advancing his own. The
turn to congressional priorities in the OLC Memorandum thus reflects a larger
commitment to a delegation-centric model of congressional-executive
relations - call it the faithful-agent model of prosecutorial discretion.
On the surface, the faithful-agent model might seem to have even stronger
purchase in the enforcement context than in other administrative settings. In
rulemaking, Congress has expressly delegated policymaking and thus
interpretive authority to the Executive, but the duty to enforce is more akin to a
straightforward obligation to follow the law on the books."' Congress passes
laws, the Executive enforces them-or so the argument goes. Under this
reasoning, the constitutional allocation of enforcement power to the Executive
assumes that the President and the bureaucracy will enforce Congress's policies
and priorities.
Of course, elucidating those priorities will likely involve a more
freewheeling, inference-based inquiry than entailed by ordinary statutory
interpretation, because Congress does not typically draft statutory enforcement
priorities to accompany its substantive rules.3 Priorities can be gleaned from
any of a statute's provisions and not just the provisions being enforced or
interpreted."' Any executive branch effort to limit its enforcement judgments
132. See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005); DAVID
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATED POWERS (1999); Mathew D. McCubbins
et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
243 (1987). For an overview of the historical development of these models in political
contexts, see Sean Gailmard, Accountability and Principal-Agent Models, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLICACCOUNTABILITY (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014).
133. OLC's congressional priorities approach thus implicates debates about whether the
administrative state merely implements or also interprets legislation. We do not purport to
resolve or even address those debates here and observe only that the enforcement power at
first glance is less consistent with a view that the Executive has broad interpretive authority
than actions undertaken pursuant to express delegations.
134. In discrete instances, Congress has articulated general enforcement guidance, usually in
appropriations legislation. For a discussion of the utility and force of such guidance, see
infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
135. In its opinion, for example, OLC focuses not on the statutory provisions that would form
the basis of removal for potential relief recipients under DAPA, i.e., the provisions that make
unauthorized presence a ground of removal. Instead, it draws support for its conclusion that
the INA embodies family unity from various provisions that grant relief from removal under
specified circumstances that are unlikely to be applicable to those who would be eligible for
DAPA. See OLC Memorandum Op., supra note io, at 27-28. For a discussion of how this
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based on its own understanding of the goals Congress sought to achieve with
the statutory framework in question is thus likely to give the Executive Branch
considerable interpretive authority.
But even with these caveats, it might remain appealing to ground
enforcement judgments in an argument that they advance goals set by
Congress. Under this view, enforcement judgments emanate from tough value
choices made by Congress, not the President. The President simply extracts
those judgments from the statute, using sophisticated legal analysis.
Analytically, this approach preserves congressional supremacy in the
lawmaking process. The strongest version of this model would treat the
Executive as a functionary, though both OLC 36 and commentators"' wedded
to the principal-agent model recognize the reality that the Executive must
exercise judgment when determining how to enforce the law. They simply seek
to discipline that judgment in a way that ensures Congress, not the President,
remains responsible for substantive policy.
B. The Limits of Congressional Intent
The appeal of the congressional priorities approach is understandable. But
we do not believe it provides an effective principle for limiting executive branch
enforcement judgments in immigration law and many other domains. The
congressional priorities approach fails because those priorities are a mirage.
Little meaningful congressional guidance exists about how to appropriately
structure the ex post screening rules for immigration law. As we explained in
Part I, the modern structure of immigration law effectively delegates vast
screening authority to the President. The interlocking statutory and political
developments we describe have opened up a tremendous gap between law on
the books and on the ground. In a world where nearly half of all noncitizens
living in the United States are formally deportable, there can be no meaningful
search for the congressionally preferred screening criteria."8 The keys to the
immigrant screening system effectively belong to the Executive, which has the
differs from purposive forms of statutory interpretation, see infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
136. OLC Memorandum Op., supra note so, at 5.
137. See Price, supra note 14, at 677, 68o, 696-97 (arguing for a framework of legislative
supremacy and executive judgment and acknowledging that faithful agency does not require
"robotic" interpretation but rather judgment and priority setting, rather than
policymaking).
13s. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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authority (and some might even say obligation) to define screening criteria."'
As we described earlier, administrations have wielded this authority to reshape
the screening system over time, a practice the Obama Administration has
continued.14o
In theory, of course, Congress could constrain de facto delegation by
complementing its substantive statutory enactments with detailed enforcement
instructions or prohibitions. In practice, Congress has rarely done this - in
immigration law or any other regulatory arena. Occasionally Congress blandly
obligates DHS to do something like "prioritize the identification and removal
of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime, or to fund a
particular number of beds for immigrant detention (34,000, to be exact)."' But
loose language of prioritization does little to constrain the Executive's
authority,14 3 and even numerical prescriptions like the bed-space mandate only
scratch the surface of the decisions the Executive must make when enforcing
immigration law. Negative injunctions issued by Congress have the potential
to be more powerful; prohibiting DHS from granting any immigrant deferred
action, for example, would more seriously constrain the President's power to
structure the immigrant screening system. But these sorts of prohibitions are
also rare.
In this world, it will generally be futile to search for "congressional
priorities" that legally constrain executive branch decisions about which
immigrants, from within the vast pool of eleven million unlawfully here, may
be deprioritized for deportation (not to mention congressional views as to how
139. For further discussion of this point, see supra Part I.C and infra notes 280-282 and
accompanying text.
140. For examples of the guidance issued by various administrations to set these priorities, see
supra note ill and accompanying text. OLC acknowledges the need for administrations to
prioritize, citing the observation in Heckler v. Chaney that decisions about whether to enforce
the law require complex judgments that involve factors "peculiarly within [the agency's]
expertise." OLC Memorandum Op., supra note io, at 4 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985)). But in its search for a way to ensure that the Executive does not "rewrite"
the law through enforcement, it requires that those judgments be "consonant with"
congressional policy. Id. at 6.
141. See OLC Memorandum Op., supra note io, at io (citing Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 251).
142. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6,
div. D, tit. II, 127 Stat. 342, 347 (providing that "funding made available under this heading
shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000 detention beds"); see also H.R. RP. No. 112-
492, at 56 (2012) (directing "ICE to intensify its enforcement efforts and fully utilize these
resources" rather than rely on alternatives to detention).
143. For example, directing the Administration to prioritize the removal of persons who have
committed serious offenses provides no guidance with respect to how to address the
millions of other noncitizens who are removable.
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such deprioritization ought to be structured). And given the absence of such
priorities, efforts to invoke them ultimately only obscure the reality that
executive branch officials are making important value judgments about our
immigrant-screening system.
Our argument should not be confused with the claim that presidential
immigration law grows out of inherent Article II authority and exists
independently from Congress. To the contrary: the argument is perfectly
consistent with the claim that the President has no inherent constitutional
authority over immigration policy.14 4 in such a world, the Executive makes
enforcement judgments within the domain Congress has created. Congress's
statutory grounds of removal, for example, specify necessary conditions for the
exercise of the enforcement power against a noncitizen, and the President
cannot act outside the domain defined by those conditions. Thus, if DHS
decided to start deporting immigrants who had failed to pay child support-
not a ground of deportability under the INA- that decision would be unlawful.
Nor is our argument that the very idea of "congressional priorities" is
incoherent in principle, or that such priorities can never be identified in
practice. Ordinary interpretation often entails the search for Congress's specific
intent or overarching legislative "plan.""'s The idea of legislative priorities (or
purposes, or intent) is, in our view, crucial to the construction of any
persuasive interpretive theory (though the fact that it has been embraced by so
many conservative legal scholars arguing against DAPA's lawfulness is perhaps
ironic)." When a court confronts the question of whether an immigrant's
144. Some historical examples of the President exercising inherent authority to regulate
immigration do exist. As noted in Part I, for example, the President claims authority to
grant Deferred Enforced Departure from Article II and his power to conduct foreign
relations. See also Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 485-92 (highlighting how President
Truman appeared to claim inherent executive authority in the management of the Bracero
guest worker program). The reach of this inherent Article II authority is beyond the scope of
this Article, as we are more concerned with the role the President plays within the domains
Congress constructs. Additionally, the inherent authority model has always been marginal
in the immigration sphere and has receded over time.
145. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) ("A fair reading of legislation demands a
fair understanding of the legislative plan.. . . If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a
way that is consistent with [that plan].").
146. This is not, of course, to minimize the well-understood difficulties associated with the
concept of legislative intent. For a classic treatment of the problem of collective intent, see
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They,"Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L.
REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992). For important work about the distinction between the enacting
legislature and the current legislature, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, lol YALE L.J. 331, 390-403 (1991); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79
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criminal conviction amounts to a ground of deportability under the Code,
statutory interpretation arguments grounded in legislative intent will be
perfectly plausible.'47
But statutory interpretation questions of this sort typically have as their
focus a discrete piece of statutory text. While interpreting that text might
require placing it in the context of a larger code or in relation to other statutory
provisions, the inquiry will typically be much more grounded in a discrete set
of legislative materials than in inquiry into enforcement priorities.14 Because,
as we have noted, legislatures are not in the habit of writing enforcement
instructions to accompany the substantive rules of a code, the congressional
priorities approach will almost always be unmoored from any particular text
and will require drawing inferences from a wide, amorphous range of statutory
provisions and legislative materials. These materials are unlikely to contain
much guidance. And the lack of guidance should come as no surprise, once we
recognize that the pervasive failure of legislatures to write down enforcement
instructions reflects the implicit delegation of those choices to the Executive.
That general challenge is only magnified in the specific context of modern
American immigration law, where de facto delegation has given the Executive
tremendous authority to manage the ex post screening rules by picking
deportees from among a population of immigrants who are all obviously, and
incontrovertibly, deportable. That is not to say, we reiterate, that the notion of
congressional intent is conceptually incoherent. It is always possible to
construct fanciful examples in which enforcement judgments would clearly
contradict congressional purposes. Immigration law is no different in this
respect. If the President announced that no enforcement resources would be
directed toward immigrants with criminal convictions, and instead all
resources would go toward deporting only long-term residents who were
CALIF. L. REv. 613 (1991); and William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Court, 1993 Term -Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 1o8 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994).
147. Take, for example, the term of art "aggravated felony." Various consequences turn on
whether a noncitizen has been convicted of a crime that falls into this category, but whether
a federal or state offense constitutes an aggravated felony is far from straightforward. This
has been the subject of numerous cases of statutory interpretation within the courts of
appeals and at the Supreme Court. Resolving the interpretive questions at stake in those
cases will for some interpreters involve inquiring into statutory purpose. For a discussion of
the development of this statutory ground of removal, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra
note 83, at 598-99.
148. In this sense, the congressional priorities approach and our critique of it are also orthogonal
to the analysis required of courts under the APA to determine whether agency action has
been arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise "not in accordance with
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married to Americans, we would not hesitate to conclude that such an
enforcement decision is prohibited by the congressional priorities embedded in
the Code, as well as appropriations law. But no President is likely to adopt such
a policy. Thus, within extremely broad limits -limits that, we show below,
easily sweep up programs like DACA and DAPA- the structure of modern
immigration law simply leaves us with no discernable congressional
enforcement priorities.
To see the failure of the congressional priorities approach in practice, we
need look no further than OLC's efforts to extract such priorities from the INA
in order to evaluate the two relief initiatives proposed by the Administration.149
OLC ultimately determined that the INA's goal of promoting family unity
justified DAPA, which provides relief to the parents of U.S. citizens and green
card holders. It observed that the statute creates a path to lawful immigration
status for immediate relatives of U.S. citizens without numerical limitation,
and that "numerous provisions of the [INA] reflect a particular concern with
uniting aliens with close relatives who have attained lawful immigration status
in the United States."'0 But it rejected an initiative that would have provided
relief from removal and work authorization for the unauthorized parents of the
beneficiaries of the DACA program of 2012. The Office determined that such
relief was beyond the President's authority because the INA did not reflect
"comparable concern for uniting persons who lack lawful status (or prospective
lawful status) in the United States with their families. Extending deferred
action to the parents of DACA recipients would therefore expand family-based
immigration relief in a manner that deviates in important respects from the
149. OLC in a sense recognizes this problem, noting: "These limits, however, are not clearly
defined. The open-ended nature of the inquiry under the Take Care Clause-whether a
particular exercise of discretion is 'faithful[]' to the law enacted by Congress-does not lend
itself easily to the application of set formulas or bright-line rules." OLC Memorandum Op.,
supra note lo, at 5. But whereas we would abandon the effort to draw substantive limits,
OLC does its best to find them.
150. Id. at 26. OLC also noted that, even though LPRs may not directly petition for the
admission of their parents, the former could become citizens and then petition for family
unity. Id. at 27. The opinion also cites the provision of the INA that authorizes the Attorney
General to cancel the removal of certain aliens who have citizen or LPR relatives and to then
adjust those aliens' status to permanent resident. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012)).
Importantly, OLC applied a sort of "lesser included" standard to evaluating the relationship
of DAPA to the statute. It reasoned that, because the proposed deferred action program
would provide temporary relief, it was "sharply limited in comparison to the benefits
Congress has made available through statute" and therefore "would not operate to
circumvent the limits Congress has placed on the availability of those benefits." Id.
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immigration system Congress has enacted and the policies that system
embodies.""'
In the wake of the opinion's release, critics of DAPA disagreed strongly
with OLC's view about how to cash out the congressional priorities embedded
in the INA.'5 2 The Code does not promote family unity in some abstract and
general way, they argued. Instead, the Code sometimes makes immigration
benefits available for family members and at other times conspicuously declines
to do so.' In other words, Congress has clearly and specifically defined the
limited circumstances in which it values family unity, and the circumstances of
DAPA recipients are not among them. For decades the INA has prohibited
children born in the United States from immediately sponsoring their parents'
entry into the United States. A U.S.-born child must turn twenty-one before
she can do so-a restriction that prevents the Fourteenth Amendment's
birthright citizenship rule from enabling unauthorized immigrants to acquire
status quickly by having children in the United States.' But U.S.-born
children are precisely the group who, under DAPA, serve as the basis of relief
151. Id. at 32. Unlike U.S. citizen children (and lawful permanent resident children who might
eventually become citizens), the unauthorized youth shielded from removal by DACA
cannot under existing law file petitions for their parents to be admitted as lawful permanent
residents. Id.
152. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 14 (characterizing DAPA as belonging in the third category of
Justice Jackson's famous framework for evaluating executive authority, or the lowest ebb of
executive authority in light of Congress's regulation, and concluding that the policy's
"unilateral grant of these immigration benefits defies Congress's will"); Price, supra note 112
("[T]he constitutional architecture supports an important background norm that executive
officials still must seek to effectuate statutory policies."); see also Peter Margulies, Taking
Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation
of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REv. 105, 111 (2014) (evaluating DACA and concluding that it is
inconsistent with Congress's will in passing the INA, where Congress "expressly provided
only limited avenues for the exercise of discretion and impliedly offered room for additional
discretion only on a case-by-case basis").
153. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 14 (arguing that OLC's invocation of cancellation was
"remarkably misleading" because Congress tightened the standards for cancellation in 1996
and made it available as relief only in cases in which removal would impose "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" and because Congress capped the annual number of
cancellations at 4,000, making relief far from immediate).
154. See id. ("Long-standing congressional policy, clearly fixed in statute, disallows immediate
relative petitions for parents until the child reaches age twenty-one. A test looking to
consonance with congressional policy . . . has to be more candid about all the elements of
that policy."); Michael W. McConnell, Why Obama's Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL
STREET. J. (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-mcconnell-why-obamas
-immigration-order-was-blocked-1424219904 [http://perma.cc/KDSL-DN5N] (arguing that
"DAPA dispensed with" the statutory requirements that "undocumented-immigrant parents
of U.S. citizens . . . wait until the child turns 21, and then . . . leave the country for lo years
before applying for a change of immigration status on account of that child").
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for their unauthorized parents. This shows, say Administration critics, that
OLC got things exactly backwards.' To the extent the INA expresses priorities
about when family unity should be the basis of immigration benefits, it has
expressly rejected the priorities reflected in DAPA.
Similar arguments have also been made that DACA is inconsistent with the
INA's priorities. DACA treats early childhood arrival in the United States as the
touchstone criterion for relief from deportation. But the INA nowhere
privileges young arrivals in its immigrant screening rules. Moreover, Congress
has repeatedly rejected the so-called DREAM Act,' 6 which would provide a
path to legalization for many of the young migrants covered by DACA-further
evidence, critics argue, that the Code cannot be read to reflect a congressional
priority to provide protection to these young migrants."s'
155. See Margulies, supra note 14 (arguing that the INA sends a "clear signal to foreign nationals:
Entering the US without inspection and having kids is not a ticket to lawful residence or any
of the benefits that lawful residence provides" and that "[t]he OLC memo misses this clear
legislative signal").
156. See David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Billfor Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/12/19/us/politics/1
9 immig.html [http://perma.cc
/4894-S3N3]. The DREAM Act is a bill that has been introduced in Congress repeatedly
that would give permanent resident status to unauthorized immigrants who were brought
to the United States as children, completed two years of college or U.S. military service, and
met other requirements. For an argument that DACA implements the DREAM Act through
executive fiat, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 14, at 787-92.
157. Interestingly, the OLC opinion does not itself even make an argument that DACA is
consistent with congressional priorities reflected in the INA. The opinion asked only that
the Office formally evaluate the legality of DAPA and the proposed relief program for the
parents of DACA recipients. In a footnote discussing the Office's earlier oral advice
regarding DACA, however, the memorandum suggests that OLC might have had in mind a
very different rationale for DACA itself. One possibility is that blamelessness -the fact that
young migrants often bear no responsibility for their unauthorized status- implicates
humanitarian and constitutional values that justify the exercise of discretion in DACA.
Blamelessness connects to anti-inheritance principles reflected in the Fourteenth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright
Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 76 (1997) (discussing the
Constitution's rejection of titles of nobility); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Citizenship Clause,
Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1363, 1365 (2009) (articulating an anti-inheritance principle and arguing that the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "represents our constitutional reset
button" by placing "all people, regardless of ancestry, on equal terms at birth, with a legal
status that cannot be denied them"). It also connects to conceptions of luck egalitarianism
prominent in political philosophy. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism-a
Primer, in RESPONSIBILITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 24 (Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska
eds., 2011); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point ofEquality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 288 (1999)
(criticizing luck egalitarian thought and arguing that the point of equality is to address
oppression, not to "eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs"). Moreover, the
idea of blamelessness played an important role in the famous immigration case Plyler v. Doe,
157
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Who has the better argument? In our view, neither side persuades. OLC's
critics are correct that there is no general policy in favor of family reunification
that applies consistently throughout the Code. But critics are wrong too: the
mere fact that U.S. citizen children cannot file green card petitions for their
parents until age twenty-one does not tell us that the Code prohibits their
parents from being provided with some lesser form of relief from deportation.
DAPA simply defers a parent's deportation; it does not provide any lawful
immigration status, let alone the right of permanent residency that comes with
a green card. For the same reason, critics are mistaken in thinking that the
Code's inclusion of specific, limited grounds for "relief' from removal-like
those contained in the Code's "Cancellation of Removal" provision-undercuts
DAPA's legality. The relief provided under the cancellation provision is, again,
green card status, not deferred action. If all forms of relief from removal,
including deferred action, really had to be limited to the enumerated grounds
of "relief' in the Code, then nearly every grant of deferred action would be
unlawful-not just the President's current policies -because DHS generally
extends deferred action to noncitizens who are not eligible for more robust
forms of relief like cancellation.158
If we attempt to abstract from any particular statutory provision to the
claim that a web of provisions - really the whole Immigration Code read
intratextually -dictates the result that either OLC or its critics are correct, we
are left with an all-too-familiar level-of-generality game. At some high level of
generality (i.e., does the INA prioritize families?) OLC's view looks more
persuasive. At some lower level of generality (i.e., does the INA endorse
deferred action for the out-of-status parents of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents?) it looks less persuasive. But we have no way to
determine which level of generality to choose, given the way the INA evolved
over time. The INA, initially adopted in 1952 and amended in significant
fashion many times in the decades since, consists of a long series of legislative
457 U.S. 202 (1982), which struck down Texas laws restricting unauthorized 
children's
access to the public schools. In concluding that the laws violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court emphasized the blamelessness of the unauthorized children for their
immigration status. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220-21; cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our
system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable."). David Martin explains the legality
of DACA in these terms, emphasizing that it "covers only a small percentage of removable
aliens and . . . shields only those not culpable for the initial immigration law violation."
Martin, supra note 14. Note that these justifications do not stem from congressional
priorities.
158. OLC's rejection of deferred action for the parents of DACA recipients suffers from this 
same
problem. See, e.g., Steve Legomsky, Why Can't Deferred Action Be Given to Parents of the
Dreamers?, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014
/s1/why-cant-deferred-action-be-given-to.html [http://perma.cc/C272-23VF].
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accretions. Each addition to the Code reflects a complicated mix of conflicting
priorities either balanced against one another by a single Congress or across
Congresses. The provisions for family-based immigration benefits have, for
example, evolved in complex ways over more than a century."' There is little
doubt that American immigration law makes family ties more important than
do the immigration systems of many other nations."'o But the devil is in the
details: the general principle of family unity has been defined, qualified, and
cabined in numerous ways, as have the general policy goals of augmenting the
U.S. labor supply and providing protection for noncitizens fleeing disasters of
various sorts, for that matter. A statute like the INA-one constructing a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that has evolved in dynamic fashion over
time and that embodies such a high level of complexity-will often not be
amenable to many common intratextualist interpretive moves. The legislative
"plan" of the INA is so full of internal contradictions and complexities as to be
nearly impossible to characterize as pursuing concrete "priorities" at anything
other than the highest level of generality.
This problem is not unique to immigration law. Today, it is common to
many regulatory arenas, and looking for congressional priorities to constrain
enforcement discretion will therefore pose a more difficult problem than those
typically posed by statutory interpretation. When it comes to the INA, no
individual relief provision points to Congress's intent to prohibit the adoption
of a particular prioritization scheme for dealing with the eleven million
removable noncitizens in the United States. Nor does the Code as a whole, read
intratextually, do so. And at bottom the reason goes back to the general theory
we laid out at the top of this Part: the rise of de facto delegation consolidated in
the Executive the authority to make these sorts of judgments.
C. The Two-Principals Model ofImmigration Policymaking
At a general level, debates over the scope of executive power traffic in two
competing frames of reference. The congressional priorities approach embodies
a faithful-agent model according to which the Executive, when fulfilling its
responsibilities through rulemaking, administration, or enforcement, should
always ask itself: "What would Congress do?" The President's obligation is to
159. For a representative example exploring what is to be gained from family immigration, see
Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 8o U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2013). For a collection
of sources discussing the U.S. immigration system's prioritization, as well as denigration, of
family ties, see LEGOMSKY& RODRIGUEZ, supra note 83, at 269 n.10.
160. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285,
1319-26 (2012) (discussing U.S. immigration law's focus on family-based immigration and
its connection to ideas about immigrant integration as well as racial and ethnic exclusivity).
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reflect as nearly as possible the policy Congress would adopt, were Congress
itself making the regulatory or enforcement decision. Under this framework,
the Executive exercises no policymaking autonomy and refrains from making
contested value judgments, even as it exercises judgment and sets priorities.
When it comes to understanding the enforcement power, we believe this
framework is mistaken as a descriptive matter and unappealing as a normative
matter. Instead, we offer a contrasting account-a two-principals model62
according to which the President possesses his own policymaking power. This
model appears most clearly in the foreign affairs context and in debates over
the extent of inherent authority the President possesses as Commander-in-
Chief or as a function of Article II. It also characterizes theories of
administration and statutory interpretation that capture the power of the
modern Executive to displace Congress as a policymaker.16 3 One of our core
contributions in this Article is to elucidate how a version of the two-principals
model also characterizes the enforcement domain, not as a matter of inherent
presidential authority, but as a function of the imperatives of the President's
obligations under the Take Care Clause, which emanate from but are not
wholly controlled by Congress.
In this Part, we begin by reinforcing this two-principals claim descriptively.
We then move to establish why the Executive serves rather than undermines
certain core separation-of-powers values when acting as a kind of second
principal in the exercise of the enforcement power. But first, we should say a
few words about what we mean by two principals. We do not mean to suggest
that the President and Congress are substitutes. Instead, we envision the
Executive as a principal because, using the tools conferred by both the
Constitution and the historical development of a particular regulatory arena,
the President acts as a policymaking counterpart to Congress. He does so by
playing a major and independent role in constructing the domain of
enforcement over time, defining whom and under what circumstances the law
will regulate. Moreover, to say that the Executive is a co-principal does not
mean that the President himself is authorized or obligated to act as a pure
unitary principal of the sort sometimes imagined in the separation-of-powers
scholarship. Enforcement power can be lodged in a variety of institutional
locations within the Executive Branch. Part III explores this explicitly,
disaggregating the Executive and considering the possibility that the
policymaking potential of the enforcement power may necessitate, or at least
161. See Price, supra note 14, at 677.
162. We thank Daryl Levinson for this formulation of our argument.
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justify, some degree of high-level political control of or supervision over
priority setting. 6 , In the remainder of this Part, however, we bracket this
institutional complexity and think about executive power in general terms.
1. Executive Construction ofEnforcement Domains
The faithful-agent model cannot be squared with the reality of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration and many other regulatory arenas. It is
a descriptive impossibility. Outside the immigration context, for example, it
would be strange to argue that the myriad discretionary decisions made by
federal prosecutors and other law enforcement officials are (or should be)
motivated only by a sense of the value judgments Congress made when
enacting the criminal law. To the contrary, when a prosecutor makes a plea
deal, she is much more likely to describe the choices embodied in the plea in
terms of an all-things-considered pragmatic calculation that is guided by
oversight within her office and, ultimately, by what justice requires. Her time
would not be spent scouring the criminal code to unearth some latent
congressional priorities that somehow compelled the particular plea deal.6 s
Prosecutorial discretion has long entailed executive branch officials' legal
authority (and responsibility) to make difficult value judgments about the
exercise of the state's coercive authority. 166
164. For further discussion of who should be understood as the principal within the Executive
Branch, see infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
165. In his rejection of the independent counsel statute as a gross intrusion into the President's
power to control prosecutors within the Executive Branch, Justice Scalia offers a vivid
picture of the sort of judgments prosecutors routinely make - a picture that does not square
with a congressional priorities model. He writes:
Almost all investigative and prosecutorial decisions- including the ultimate
decision whether, after a technical violation of the law has been found, prosecution
is warranted- involve the balancing of innumerable legal and practical
considerations. Indeed, even political considerations (in the nonpartisan sense)
must be considered, as exemplified by the recent decision of an independent
counsel to subpoena the former Ambassador of Canada, producing considerable
tension in our relations with that country. Another preeminently political decision
is whether getting a conviction in a particular case is worth the disclosure of
national security information that would be necessary. . . . In sum, the balancing of
various legal, practical, and political considerations, none of which is absolute, is
the very essence of prosecutorial discretion.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707-08 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Some critics of the President's relief initiatives believe that decisions by line-level
prosecutors are an inapposite comparison. Zachary Price, for example, argues that those
decisions are different in kind because they are made on an individualized basis, while the
decision to establish DACA or DAPA involves a "categorical" judgment by high-level agency
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This dynamic of prosecutorial policymaking is perhaps even more vivid
when we move from the retail level of the line prosecutor to the level of the
agency head or the President himself. As we documented in detail in Part I, a
simple principal-agent model does not accurately capture the history of
immigration law and enforcement. While the nature and scope of executive
power in immigration law has evolved over time in response to events and
structural phenomena, as it has in other regulatory domains, an especially
notable fact of immigration history is that the President has regularly acted as
an independent policymaker, pursuing agendas that his corresponding
Congresses may or may not have shared. In the first century of immigration
law, Presidents used quintessentially executive powers-namely the
negotiation of treaties - to advance their agendas, and they were able to do so
because Congress had yet to occupy the field of immigration regulation with an
elaborate code.,6 7 But even in the twentieth-century context of domesticated
executive power, amidst the rise of immigration delegation, the President has
played the independent policymaking role to at least as robust an effect, both in
exercising delegated authorities and in large part through the exercise of the
enforcement power in the context of de facto delegation.
Our account of IRCA, in Part I, presents a good example: the substantive
legal regime that determines whether and how to regulate employers and their
unauthorized workers has evolved over the last three decades through the
application of the Executive's enforcement judgments. IRCA as a regulatory
system in 2015 looks quite distinct from IRCA as a statute enacted in 1986. The
combination of partisan politics and the institutional dynamics of enforcement
itself (the assessment of its costs and the efficacy of different methods of
enforcement, for example) have reconstructed the regulatory domain Congress
created with its initial statutory enactment.
But as the evolution of IRCA highlights, the modern immigration system
should not be understood to embody a simple static and uncontested shift of
authority to the Executive. Nor is this joint federal lawmaking necessarily
collaborative or harmonious. Rather, it consists of the branches responding to
one another's regulatory choices. Presidential immigration law has precipitated
a variety of responses from Congress, which has both ratified and resisted the
officials (or even by the President himself). See Price, supra note 14, at 674; see also Price,
supra note 112. For reasons we explore in Part III, we do not believe this distinction between
individual and categorical judgments can be sustained. And for reasons we explore in this
Part, we believe there to be value in executive branch policymaking through enforcement.
167. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 469-71.
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Executive's use of his authority.6 On occasion Congress has responded with
actual lawmaking, as in the case of refugee policy.',6 In other moments,
Congress has wielded the power of the purse, using appropriations measures to
shape executive branch conduct.1o
In response to DAPA, in particular, House Republicans have sought to tie
funding for the Department of Homeland Security to riders that would block
implementation of the Obama relief initiatives; this is but the latest example of
this phenomenon.1 7 ' That they have not succeeded could either demonstrate
the limited utility of appropriations threats, or that these Republicans were
simply grandstanding, exerting a less formal form of control through politics.
The congressional-executive dynamic often does not rise to the level of
lawmaking. Congress's response to the President's use of his de facto delegated
power frequently takes the form of political posturing, whether during election
campaigns or in hearings called to bring attention to opposition among
members of Congress.17' But rather than think of these responses as reflecting
168. See id. at 502-05 (discussing congressional resistance to Presidents' uses of parole power); id.
at 507-o8 (discussing Congress's addition to the INA enabling adjustment of the status of
Haitian and Cuban entrants in the aftermath of large-scale parole by President Carter).
169. See id. at 507-08. While the efforts to constrain the use of parole power might be the one
(partial) exception, even these instances of responsive immigration legislation by Congress
have not amounted to the sorts of congressionally imposed constraints sometimes seen in
other regulatory arenas, where Congress responds to executive branch enforcement
decisions by enacting statutory prohibitions, instructions, or deadlines.
170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the detention bed mandate). In
addition, the ever-increasing appropriation of funds for DHS generally reflects
congressional efforts to shape enforcement. See Meissner et al., supra note 63, at 2, 9
(documenting two decades of "sizeable, sustained budget requests and appropriations made
by the Executive Branch and Congress . . . under the leadership of both parties" and
emphasizing that the U.S. government spends more on federal immigration enforcement
than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined).
171. See, e.g., Ashley Parker, House and Senate Prepare Measures To Keep Homeland Security
Funded, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.conl/2o1/o2/27/us/house-and
-senate-near-differing-plans-to-avoid-homeland-security-shutdown.html [http://perma.cc
/K8RS-BNTS].
172. See, e.g., Unconstitutionality of Obama's Executive Actions on Immigration: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on theJudiciary, 114th Cong. 1-3 (2015) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (introducing a hearing featuring testimony opposed to the
President's executive actions and accusing the President of "one of the biggest constitutional
power grabs ever" and "rewriting the laws when [he] can't convince Congress to change
them"). At the same time, congressional complaints about the President's policymaking
through enforcement have transcended partisan dynamics-though the charge of
fecklessness may be less frequently lobbed at Republican Presidents (despite their examples
of underenforcement) and more frequently aimed at Democrats (despite their zealous
enforcement). Tellingly, however, Congress has never responded by acknowledging, much
less addressing, the underlying "causes" of de facto delegation.
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the petulance or dissatisfaction of a principal whose agent has gone astray, we
should understand them as embodying the rivalry of two principals and the
friction that can result when the center of policymaking gravity moves from
one to the other.
This two principals understanding of executive power differs in important
respects from other influential accounts of interbranch relations. As noted in
Part I, we disclaim the position that the legality of the President's actions turns
on whether precise historical precedents or analogs exist. In that sense, our
argument diverges from and is more radical than the view, present in some
scholarship as well as executive branch practice, that congressional
acquiescence over time to a particular executive branch practice is what makes
it lawful. 173 Instead, on our account, the President effectively acts as a principal
within a regulatory space that has been constructed over time, even if Congress
has not acquiesced. In immigration law, that space is breathtakingly broad in
part because of the rise of de facto delegation. And within that space, the
President shapes immigration law by continually revising and restructuring
enforcement authority."At the same time, our account is more restrained than
the one contained in the historical gloss literature. That literature concludes
that practices to which Congress has acquiesced at Time One become immune
173. The argument that historical executive branch practices qualify as constitutional precedents
often entails the claim that those practices reflect a legal convention that should be accorded
constitutional status. The "historical gloss" literature is founded on the idea that discrete
exercises of presidential power, acquiesced in over time by Congress, become constitutional
precedents that support the continued legality of that exercise of presidential power-even
in the face of new resistance from Congress. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REv. 411 (2013) (exploring the
significance of congressional acquiescence and arguing that it is necessary for a practice to
achieve constitutional status but also exploring the limits and dangers of identifying or
claiming acquiescence). For a discussion of the difficulties of using historical practice in this
way, see Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75 (2013), which
criticizes Bradley and Morrison, in particular, for failing to account for the role of courts as
"gloss producers."
174. Our model also differs from the claim made in scholarly and popular accounts that robust
and independent presidential action can be justified during times of polarization, when
Congress fails to fulfill its own constitutional responsibilities or obstructs policymaking. See
David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation ofPowers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7-11 (2014); Cass R.
Sunstein, Robert Walmsley Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., Keynote Address at
the University of Chicago Legal Forum: Partyism (Nov. 7, 2014), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2536084 [http://perma.cc/U9PT-THYT] (arguing that in the face of partyism-
or deep prejudice against members of the opposing party -vast delegations and a receptivity
to the Chevron principle offer good ways to ensure ongoing problem solving by
government). While we would agree that a two-principals model could be especially useful
in such circumstances, we also believe the model's value transcends polarized contexts, for
reasons we explore infra Part II.C.2. In addition, defining what constitutes obstruction
seems to us a fraught enterprise.
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from congressional override-that is, constitutionally entrenched-at Time
Two. In contrast, in our account, Congress can defeat presidential power at
Time Two, producing a more fluid politics of congressional-executive relations
over time.
This defeasibility does not mean Congress is, ultimately, the only "true"
principal, or that our account can be reduced to the claim that presidential
immigration law is nothing more than the product of agency "slack.""' The
idea that mere agency slack is all that is at stake is misleading for the same
reason that the faithful-agent framework (from which the idea of slack is
drawn) leads us astray. Conceptualizing the tremendous divergence between
congressional statutes and executive branch outcomes that we document in
Part I as the product of slack suggests that we should find ways to control that
divergence. Slack is undesirable -something one always wishes to squeeze out
of the principal-agent relationship, something that we are saddled with only
because principals are incapable of perfectly monitoring their agents. The
history of immigration law we tell, however, suggests that presidential
policymaking is too pervasive and autonomous to fit this model. And as we
explain in Part II.C.2 below, there is value in that relationship that would be
quashed by an insistence that the goal of administrative law and design should
be to tighten up slack. It is true that, as a matter of formal game theory, the
President can be labeled principal only if his authority is indefeasibly by
Congress. But we think that model obscures the interbranch dynamics that
have existed in practice, and we believe our conceptions of those dynamics
must take account of that practice.
2. Against Faithful Agents
If we have succeeded in our descriptive account of two principals, at least
within the domain of immigration enforcement, the question then becomes
what to think as a normative matter about the system we now have." Our goal
175. Thank you to Dan Ho for pushing us to clarify this point.
176. As should be clear from everything we have said thus far, we do not believe this normative
question can be collapsed into a formalistic inquiry into whether the President's exercise of
the enforcement power ceases to be "executive" and becomes "legislative." To be sure, there
is a long intellectual tradition, dating at least to Montesquieu and Locke, advancing the idea
that certain forms of power belong to certain types of government actors. For a leading but
somewhat forlorn defense of this view, see Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought
and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 438, 442, 467 (2013), which claims, "Even if the principle is
dying a sclerotic death, even if it misconce~ves the character of modern political institutions,
still it points to something that was once deemed valuable -namely, articulated government
through successive phases of governance each of which maintains its own integrity ..... Modern
administrative law has largely moved us past this formalistic idea of dividing power
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is not to erect a theory of separated powers from the ground up, or to identify
an "optimal" separation of powers. It can be hard to avoid abstract generalities
when attempting to articulate the reasons for horizontal divisions of power.
The Supreme Court's regular references to the prevention of tyranny or the
protection of individual rights as the purposes of the separation of powers may
ring true as far as they go," but they are little more than platitudes when a
genuine competition for power is at stake, in part because those power
struggles do not themselves involve a clear battle between tyranny and
freedom. We are deeply skeptical that a true first-principles inquiry can
succeed, and a central conceit of our work is that any theory of power allocation
must emerge from institutional and historical context.17 That is not to say that
we don't think current arrangements can be improved-a task we take on in
Part IV. But if we reason from abstractions rather than from practice, we will
lose sight of a number of benefits that flow from the two-principals model of
according to its type. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation
of Powers Laws, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 605-o6 (2001) (turning attention away from
constitutional separation of powers and toward consideration of how governmental power is
shared by a "large and diverse set of government decision-makers"); cf Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Gen. Counsels of the Fed. Gov't (May 7,
1996) (discussing cases such as Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), that identify
congressional aggrandizement, or congressional efforts to formally exert executive powers),
reprinted in 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS- 514 (2000).
17. The "purpose" question is quite under-theorized in Supreme Court precedents. Much as it
does in the federalism context, the Court gestures toward abstract values such as protecting
liberty and preventing the rise of tyranny before it elaborates the particular power
arrangements it believes the Constitution has erected to advance those values. However, the
connection between the constitutional allocations and the values is typically assumed rather
than analyzed. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2011); Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 273-74
(1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989) ("This Court consistently
has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers . . . that, within
our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches
is essential to the preservation of liberty. Madison, in writing about the principle of
separated powers, said: 'No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."' (citations omitted) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the
goal of separation of powers is to "diffuse[] power the better to secure liberty").
178. In rejecting the idea that there is some single, platonic separation-of-powers principle, we
share much in common with John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1939 (2011), which argues that there is no freestanding
principle of the separation of powers. Of course, we differ a good deal as to the reasons for
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immigration lawmaking that has emerged over time. Given the system we've
inherited, it will be useful to understand its upsides.
In so doing, we focus on a second-order set of tradeoffs that the separation
of powers entails: the classic struggle between the exercise of power to
accomplish the ends of government and the overarching need to ensure that
power is constrained, or exercised in a nonarbitrary fashion.179 A central feature
of this inquiry, for our purposes, is a debate about how best to ensure that the
Executive acts in an accountable fashion, and then whether that accountability
should be to apolitical norms of reasoned decision making or to popular and
political conceptions of accountability.so In this sense, the inquiry sounds as
much in administrative law as it does in constitutional law. In the balance of
this Part, we explain why the two-principals model as applied to the
enforcement power resonates with aspirations for constrained and accountable
governmental power across the branches. We reserve for Part III a full
discussion of the accountability tradeoffs embodied in the Obama relief
initiatives. A key insight of our account of immigration enforcement is that
independent priority setting by the Executive can, within the scheme of
separated powers, actually facilitate the constrained use of power. Much
separation-of-powers scholarship concerns itself with the rise of the imperial
presidency, which prompts views that range from cheerful acceptance to
179. For a discussion of this dichotomy between power and constraint, see Jon D. Michaels, An
Enduring, Evolving Separation ofPowers, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 515 (2015). As Michaels describes
the literature and the theory, he argues that the concept of checking powers is not just about
constraining abuse; it is also about legitimating the exercise of power. See id. at 523. The
Supreme Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence is full of language linking both
separation of powers and federalism to the related goal of diffusing power or preventing its
concentration. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1244-45 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (depicting the Framers as "concerned not just with the starting
allocation" of power but also with power's ability to concentrate over time); Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 593-94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing the potential for "[t]he accretion of
dangerous power" if separation of powers is not vigilantly guarded); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (stating that the Constitution established "dual
sovereignty" in the national and state governments); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (stating that the separation of powers was created with the purpose of "prevent[ing]
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch" and analogizing it to federalism).
18o. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1891-97
(2015) (distinguishing between political or electoral accountability and legal accountability,
or the concept that "all exercises of governmental power be subject to constitutional limits
that the political branches lack power to alter through ordinary legislation"); Michaels, supra
note 179, at 540-57 (exploring the civil service as a counterweight to the political leadership
of agencies and arguing that the former provides a form of constraint that helps ensure
independent and apolitical decision making).
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alarmism,"' though whether to cheer or warn often depends on the sources of
power the Executive purports to be using. 12 A crucial dynamic missing from
this account, which revolves around the assumption that the Executive is the
branch in need of constraint, emerges from our observation of how de facto
delegation has operated in immigration law. Executive action and priority
setting in the exercise of the enforcement power can serve to constrain power
in a world of overbroad legislation. For example, the enforcement priorities
articulated across administrations to emphasize the removal of security and
safety risks constitute executive efforts to construct a more rational screening
system within the overinclusive sweep of today's immigration code.'
Moreover, the act of actually enforcing the law-of confronting its real-
world effects-can help point to limits or unintended consequences of the law
as drafted.' Enforcement brings to life the consequences of legislation-one
181. Compare POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 114 (arguing that in the modern administrative
state, the Executive governs subject to weak or nonexistent legal constraints), with BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 6 (2010) (emphasizing the
danger of a "runaway presidency").
182. Compare Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 14, at 784-85 (arguing that the President violated his
responsibility under the Take Care Clause by initiating DACA), with JOHN YOO, THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 1o6-
09, 184-90 (2005) (locating robust presidential foreign affairs and war powers in Article II
of the Constitution that overcome congressional efforts to limit them). See generally Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 501, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2553285 [http://perma.cc/UsjV
-PHY4] (defining "flip-flops" as decisions by lawmakers, politicians, and others to change
their approaches to federalism, the filibuster, recess appointments, executive privilege, and
other structural arrangements to serve their ideological goals and attributing flip-flops to
"merits bias" or a psychological phenomenon according to which short-term political
commitments make the necessity of certain institutional arrangements eem self-evident).
183. This is not to say that the immigration enforcement bureaucracy has not been zealous in its
mission. Immigrants' rights advocates would charge the Obama Administration, in
particular, with overenforcement. But this charge often obscures the complexities of
institutional context. The prioritization memos issued by various administrations may not
have had as significant an impact as their political authors might have liked. As we explore
in Part III, the Obama relief policies are themselves a recalibration of enforcement policy to
capture that fact. Within the Executive Branch, the push and pull between political
appointees and the civil service ensures that the exercise of the enforcement power will itself
consist of mixed goals and imperfect results.
184. Another example of this dynamic can be found in the resistance by former executive branch
officials from the first Bush and Clinton Administrations to the mandatory detention
provision Congress added to the Code in 1996 for noncitizens in removal proceedings on
the basis of having committed an aggravated felony or violation of certain other grounds of
removal. When the American Civil Liberties Union took a due process challenge to this
provision all the way to the Supreme Court in 2003, numerous former INS officials filed an
amicus brief emphasizing how the provision constrained executive discretion to determine
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concrete manifestation of the informational advantages of the presidency. We
should want the Executive Branch to have the power to grapple with those
consequences based on judgments forged through its own experience. Indeed,
these informational benefits can often only be acquired in a dynamic context, in
which executive branch officials have authority to make decisions subsequent to
congressional policymaking. For the Executive to respond to the lived
experience of the law by shifting priorities can help hold the legislature
accountable, but also advance a policy debate by pointing a regulatory regime
in better directions.
These epistemic benefits of executive action also bring with them increased
policy responsiveness. While responsiveness is no unalloyed virtue, executive-
branch initiative taking can perform a valuable constitutional function in
immigration policy, particularly within a system that governs a polity marked
by deep ideological differences and in a domain where a significant legislative
reform occurs, at best, once a generation.s' One way executive-driven priority
setting has fostered responsiveness is by offering a counterpoint to the interest
groups that dominated Congress, with the White House serving as an
alternative site for organizing and advocacy for the immigrants' rights social
movement. Whatever we think about the merits of their various positions,
multiplying outlets for interest-group competition, and expression of popular
preferences through policy, can promote the responsiveness of government.
To the extent that the concern about executive policymaking through
enforcement stems from the desire for accountability, we do not think the
Executive suffers from a democracy deficit as compared to Congress in any
meaningful sense. 86 The mechanisms of democratic influence and
accountability may differ from those that operate on the legislature, but they
exist not only in the President's election mandate, but also in the
whether a noncitizen in removal proceedings could be released on bond in harmful and
counterproductive ways. See Brief for T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 4-14, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491).
185. David Pozen calls for treating certain "remedial" measures taken by the Executive Branch as
forms of norm-based self-help that advance separation-of-powers goals, rather than as self-
aggrandizing, and he emphasizes the value of self-help during times of "agonistic" and
"dysfunctional" government. See Pozen, supra note 174, at 7-11. For reasons explained infra
notes 189-190 and accompanying text, we do not regard the two-principal dynamic as
depending on polarized or dysfunctional government. Rather, we see it as vital under
ordinary circumstances, too, when legislation is either difficult to achieve or when Congress
has chosen inaction for other reasons.
186. See infra notes 226-229 and accompanying text (discussing the literature concerning
presidential administration and the value and function of presidential control over agency
policy, including by emphasizing the relative accountability of the President). See generally
Andrias, supra note 52, at 1090-94 (highlighting the accountability of the President in
defending his and his political appointees' control over enforcement judgments).
169
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
corresponding organization of interest groups that pressure the White House
and the agencies, and in the modern media's insistence that the President
explain and justify his actions and take his policy initiatives "on the road."'
8 In
fact, the Obama relief initiatives and the reformulation of Secure Communities
offer prime examples of the Executive's responsiveness to popular dissent from
administration enforcement policies and the underlying statutory framework
that sets the stage for them. Relatedly, formal and informal interactions with
Congress will themselves constrain the Executive. In the war-powers context,
scholars have drawn attention to such potential. Stephen Griffin, for example,
writes of a "cycle of accountability" that consists of interbranch interaction over
time through which "mutual testing and deliberation results," such that the
branches learn from their mistakes.
187. The concept of "accountability" merits some unpacking, because it can come in the form of
being answerable to the political process, or from the numerous internal constraints that
operate within the Executive Branch and through the application of judicial review over
agency action. For a nuanced discussion of forms of accountability, see Metzger, supra note
180, at 1886-97. Given the numerous internal constraints on the Executive Branch that exist,
including competition among agencies in shared regulatory space, centralized White House
review of agency action, the presence of lawyers across the branch assigned the function of
ensuring executive action comports with the law, and institutions such as the Inspectors
General, we reject the Posner and Vermeule formulation of the Executive as "unbound." See
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 114 (describing the Executive's power as largely
unconstrained by legal mechanisms); see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:
THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENT AFTER 9/11, at 83-160 (2012) (discussing the interagency
process, the Inspectors General, and the role of lawyers as forms of constraint). The ICE
Agent's Union, and the lawsuit it has brought challenging DACA, represents one potential
example of internal constraint, as do the different and generally enforcement-oriented
preferences of the bureaucracy. See Rodriguez, supra note 95, at 2110 (discussing the role of
institutional culture within agencies as part of a coherent picture of "federal" priorities and
preferences). Whether there should be more and better internal constraints may be worth
debating, and scholars such as Neal Katyal and Gillian Metzger have initiated important
inquiries along these lines, but we would be wrong to think of the Executive as a necessarily
and truly dangerous branch. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of
Powers, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1o6, io6-1o (2oo6) (arguing for the implementation of a
separation-of-powers principle within the Executive Branch, given the scope of the
President's power); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and
External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 425 (2009) (calling for paying close
attention to internal administrative design and analyzing which structures serve as the most
effective checks on executive power).
188. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2013). Importantly, Griffin
argues that this cycle has not operated properly since 1945 and that scholars focused on
whether Congress has authorized military action miss the deeper problem of the absence of
codeliberation on the use of force. Id. at 8-9. The factors that account for this decline in
deliberation are likely complex, but whereas the President has occupied the domain of
foreign affairs, Congress remains his rival and counterpoint in the domestic setting.
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It may be that robust policymaking through enforcement creates
disincentives for Congress to act. But while we could certainly characterize
recent immigration history as embodying a failure of congressional will, we
doubt that the causes of legislative stasis include executive initiative taking.
Whatever the reasons for congressional inaction -whether they be
dysfunction, paralysis, or simply the choice to not act - the President's decision
to offer an affirmative, substantive vision can expand the policymaking domain
in constructive and idea-generating ways. In this sense, the Executive acts as an
engine in the policymaking process. This agenda-setting function may be
particularly vital during times of polarization that produce legislative stasis,18 9
such as the one we seem to be living through, but this function of executive
policymaking is by no means limited to moments like ours.o90 Presidential
immigration law can help mitigate one of the ordinary costs of our separation-
of-powers regime - the reluctance or inability of government as a whole to
act-thus furthering the interest of a healthy tradeoff between power and
constraint.
Again, action in and of itself is not necessarily good. And whether executive
action of the sort initiated by President Obama in his relief policies will actually
prompt further policy deliberation is an empirical question. Executive action
often amounts to a second-best alternative to legislation. Nowhere is that more
true than in the immigration enforcement context, where prioritization cannot
provide legal immigration status to those who receive deferred action under
Obama's relief initiatives."' Thus, we should remain concerned with the
possibility that executive policymaking will disable or displace Congress in
some way-a point we take up in more detail in Part IV. But having a rival or
complementary policymaker in the Executive can be good for the democratic
and problem-solving features of government.
Our dynamic understanding of the relationship between Congress and the
Executive, and our conception of the domain of regulation as one that evolves
over time through the exercise of the enforcement power, reflect what we
believe to be an important moment in the intellectual history of separation-of-
18g. For a similar argument in the federalism context, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,
16-18 (2007).
190. In this sense, our claims about the value of two principals differ from some recent accounts
of the separation of powers and politics. See Pozen, supra note 174; Sunstein, supra note 174.
191. See infra p. 215.
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powers scholarship - both at the descriptive and the normative levels. The
constitutional framework sets up institutional rivalries as forms of constraint
on government power. But these constraints do not come exclusively from the
formal powers the Constitution assigns each branch and the "checks" each one
possesses over the other.' 2 Our immigration history shows how constraints
can also arise from the push and pull of politics and institutional design."'
Unique to our account is the way in which we illuminate, through history, how
constraints on government can arise when each branch acts as an institutional
source of policymaking in the same domain.
This idea that the roles and powers of the political branches are defined
through a complex historical process that cannot be easily captured through
either formal models or deductive, judicial-style reasoning is far from limited
to the immigration arena. 194 In fact, it appears even in settings where the
192. For a classic statement of three different forms of separation of powers that commentators
often conflate, see Waldron, supra note 176, at 438-42, which distinguishes among
separation of powers, checks and balances, and dispersal of power generally and argues that
separation of powers is, above all, a matter of "articulated governance."
193. In Part III, we elaborate on this last point in particular and highlight how dynamics internal
to the Executive Branch can serve as sources of constraint. This institutionally grounded
conception of separation of powers serves as a counterpoint to an ascendant line of thinking
that rejects the Madisonian theory of separation of powers and emphasizes instead that, to
the extent constraints exist on the branches, they come from the "separation of parties," or
divided government. See POSNER& VERMEULE, supra note 114, at 4 (rejecting altogether the
notion that a legal concept of separation of powers does any work and arguing that
constraints on the Executive come in the form of popular politics); Bradley & Morrison,
supra note 173, at 438-47 (arguing that the Madisonian theory of checks and balances on
which theories of congressional acquiescence to executive branch practice are based no
longer accurately describes the relationship between the branches or captures the realities
(and difficulties) of legislation); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation ofParties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2330-47 (20o6) (arguing that during times of cohesive
and polarized politics, competition between the branches will vary widely and may
disappear altogether if the branches are controlled by officials from the same party). These
theories quite successfully dismantle the most abstract and starry-eyed versions of the
Madisonian vision. But because their foil is a theory, they operate at a level of institutional
abstraction that prevents them from appreciating some of the ways in which institutional
constraints within government play a large role in the wielding of the enforcement power-
dynamics our immigration history helps to bring to light. For an account of internal and
external constraints on the Executive Branch that captures some of these institutional
realities in the war powers and national security contexts, see generally GOLDSMITH, supra
note 187.
194. Our thinking along these lines is ultimately part of a moment in the separation-of-powers
scholarship that seeks to understand the nature of power by appreciating how it plays out in
practice. Trevor Morrison and Curtis Bradley, for example, call for attention to the role that
history plays in the construction of executive power and argue that historical practice can
render a particular arrangement constitutional in status. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note
173; Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45-52, 70-76 (2013)
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Constitution clearly allocates overlapping power to Congress and the
President, as in the war-powers context.' As we have emphasized, whether
this sort of relationship between the branches proves productive really depends
on context. Moreover, policymaking through enforcement judgments presents
concerns that policymaking through rulemaking does not: the source of
delegated authority is less clear, and it can be difficult to externally police the
executive decision-making process -concerns we flagged back in 2009. In Part
III, we take up this dilemma and explore how the Obama relief policies
simultaneously harness the benefits of policymaking through enforcement,
enhance accountability, and promote constrained government by making
enforcement judgments more transparent. Even within our vision of executive
policymaking through enforcement, we do believe there should be a limiting
principle on executive action, in service of the basic value of constraining
government power. We turn now to a more fruitful source of such a principle.
(arguing that the scope of the presidential removal power should be seen as a political
question, in part because of the political-science scholarship suggesting that the removal
power does not serve as a constraint on the bureaucracy, which renders judicial intervention
in agency design counterproductive); Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114
COLUM. L. REv. 1595, 1620-31, 1683-86 (2014) (arguing that the branches negotiate their
institutional interests with one another and that courts are not well placed to monitor these
"intermural deals," which instead should be policed for bad outcomes by elected officials);
Pozen, supra note 174, at io (criticizing the separation-of-powers scholarship that turns
away from "legal modes of reasoning" and arguing that unwritten, quasi-legal norms shape
and constrain interactions across the U.S. government, producing both "retaliation" as well
as cooperation). Though we differ in our conclusions about the nature of executive power
and the proper role of Congress and the courts in constraining it, all of these works share an
understanding of interbranch relationships as constructed over time.
195. In an important recent work on presidential war powers, for example, Mariah Zeisberg
develops a "relational" model of separation of powers and rejects the idea that the branches
must adhere to "determinate textual meaning." MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 7-9, 18-i (2013). She argues instead that we can
evaluate the branches' work based on "how well they bring their special institutional
capacities to bear on the problem of interpreting the Constitution's substantive standards
about war." Id. at 18-19. She sees interbranch conflict as a potentially productive source of
both deliberation over constitutional meaning and accountability for ultimate policies. Id. at
30-31. The focus on deliberation and accountability has much in common with Griffin's
approach discussed supra note 188 and accompanying text. See also Stephen M. Griffin,
Zeisberg's Relational Conception of War Authority: Convergence and Divergence in Achieving a
New Understanding of War Powers, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2015) (noting the shared
emphasis on "the nature and value of interbranch deliberation").
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III. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
The faithful-agent model of congressional-executive relations we reject in
Part II focuses on the substantive relationship between the choices or values
reflected in the INA and those reflected in the President's enforcement of the
statute. This approach, we have argued, leads us astray. But that does not mean
we think all bets are off. In this Part, we turn from substance to process and
argue that the inquiry into the legality of President Obama's relief programs
and other similar exercises of the enforcement power should revolve around
whether the Executive should be constitutionally prohibited from
institutionalizing prosecutorial discretion in certain ways. ,
6 On this account,
the concern is not who gets protected from deportation, but how they come to
be protected.
Numerous critics of the Obama relief initiatives have focused on these
process concerns and declared his actions unconstitutional because of the way
they institutionalize the Executive's discretion. One prominent critique holds
that the initiatives are unlawful because they provide "categorical" forms of
relief, rather than resting on the exercise of "individualized" discretion.
1 7 A
second claim emphasizes that the way the relief initiatives institutionalize
discretion threatens to undermine the "rule of law," by which critics mean legal
compliance.
This Part explains why these claims are misguided as a matter of both law
and theory. As a theoretical matter, these claims about President Obama's relief
initiatives are actually just retail-level examples of more general debates that
have long raged in legal theory and administrative-law scholarship. We will
show that these critiques all boil down to claims about one or more of three
choices: the choices between (1) rules versus standards, (2) centralized versus
decentralized control over prosecutorial discretion, and (3) secret versus public
norms regarding the exercise of that discretion. The Obama relief initiatives'
central "innovation" is to bind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to more
rule-like criteria, to centralize the supervision of discretion to a greater extent
than is typical in enforcement contexts, and to make the exercise of discretion
predictable and transparent. In other words, DACA and DAPA choose rules
over standards, centralization over decentralization, and transparency over
secrecy.
196. Whereas in this Part we focus on why the Obama Administration relief initiatives 
serve
rather than undermine structural separation-of-powers values, in Part IV we consider what
forms of institutionalizing discretion might present constitutional concerns, and we
enumerate some of the external sources of constraint that exist.
197. See, e.g., Price, supra note 14, at 674-75.
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These choices ultimately advance the core rule-of-law values of consistency,
transparency, and accountability: they ensure that similar cases are more likely
to be treated alike, that the exercise of discretion is more predictable, and that
enforcement outcomes align more closely with the policy preferences of the
agency's political leadership and the President himself9' This does not mean,
of course, that the choices embodied in DACA and DAPA are legally required,
or even that they would in all contexts be legally permissible. At a high level of
generality and abstracted from the details of the Obama relief initiatives, these
choices are contestable. In many situations, good reasons exist to prefer
standards to rules, decentralization to centralization, and secrecy to
transparency; these choices involve tradeoffs between values at the very core of
the American legal tradition. But for this very reason, it is impossible to make
much progress in evaluating how those tradeoffs cash out without careful
attention to institutional context. And once we understand the institutional
realities against which the Obama Administration developed its relief
initiatives, the choices embodied in DACA and DAPA become easy to defend.
Importantly, we ground our defense of the institutional choices reflected in
the Obama relief initiatives by accepting the importance of identifying limiting
principles on the enforcement power-principles that arise from constitutional
structure, not just extralegal sources.199 But we acknowledge that these limits
must, given the structure of the modern administrative state, inevitably derive
198. Anil Kalhan similarly argues that DAPA helps the DHS ensure that "its personnel heed
important rule-of-law values such as consistency, transparency, accountability, and
nonarbitrariness." Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the
Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE 58, 85
(2015). Though a deep analysis of what is meant by rule-of-law values is beyond the scope
of this Article, we believe consistency rather than uniformity captures what we can
realistically expect from complex enforcement efforts. For a discussion of the difference
between uniformity and consistency, see Cristina M. Rodriguez, Uniformity and Integrity in
Immigration Law: Lessons from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123
YALE L.J. F. 499 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/uniformity-and-integrity-in
-immigration-law [http://perma.cc/7NFN-U7CF]. In addition, we emphasize perceptions
of fairness by the regulated public, rather than nonarbitrariness, because we are reluctant to
describe the differentiated results of a decentralized, diffused decision-making process as
necessarily arbitrary.
199. In view of the futility of substantive limits, another approach to understanding the
enforcement power could be to reject the idea that any constitutional limits exist or can be
reliably determined. We might adopt the perspective of Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
and accept that the only real limits on executive power come from politics and public
opinion. See POSNER& VERMEULE, supra note 114. As we suggest throughout this Article, we
reject their descriptive account that legal rules and practices fail to constrain the modern
Executive. And we share at least one assumption with the critics of the Obama relief
initiatives - that the exercise of executive power ought to be disciplined as the result of legal
and constitutional considerations.
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from the contextual application of the broader objectives we identify in this
Part and Part II. Critics have been blind to both that institutional context and
to the realities of administrative governance. Their view that the institutional
choices embodied in DACA and DAPA are unconstitutional (rather than just
undesirable) embodies a radical theory that the Constitution sharply restricts
the ways in which the Executive may organize itself.
A. Rules and Standards
The Obama Administration's relief initiatives institutionalize discretion in
an innovative way-just not in the way critics charge.2oo According to critics,
DACA and DAPA are unconstitutional because they exercise discretion on a
"categorical" rather than an "individualized" basis. The individualized exercise
of discretion comports with the canonical form of prosecutorial authority, the
argument goes. But the categorical exercise of discretion amounts to an
unconstitutional act of executive "lawmaking."o"
It might be tempting to dismiss this claim by pointing to the conceptual
flaw in this dichotomy. Every exercise of prosecutorial discretion, including
those authorized by the Obama relief initiatives, is "individualized" in the sense
that individual persons seek or will be granted relief as individuals.2 2 Given
200. Some scholars have attempted to characterize DACA and DAPA as a run-of-the-mill action
by the President, consistent with past practices. See Gilbert, supra note 18. As we explained
in Part I, while we think the initiatives are consistent with the history of executive branch
policymaking through the exercise of the enforcement power, many of the precedents
typically cited for this claim were not of the same scale as DACA or DAPA, and those that
were can be characterized as providing only transitional relief. We believe what the
Administration has done is novel and simultaneously an improvement on the status quo and
imperfect (for reasons we explain infra Part IV) but not constitutionally defective.
201. See, e.g., Price, supra note 14. In describing the appropriate use of the enforcement power,
Price emphasizes that the Executive may engage in priority setting within the parameters of
statutory policy but that it may not engage in policymaking. Id. at 677, 749 ("[E]xecutive
officials should understand their task as a matter of priority setting within the parameters of
statutory policy . . . ."). Our claim throughout this Article has been that the structure of
immigration law transforms priority setting into policymaking, but that the raison d'ftre of
the administrative state belies the idea that executive policymaking through enforcement (or
rulemaking) is constitutionally worrisome.
202. Leading defenders of the Administration's policy have emphasized that the memoranda
detailing the policy and providing instructions to line-level adjudicators emphasize that they
retain discretion to deny deferred action even to those who meet he eligibility criteria. See
Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that the memoranda governing
both DACA and DAPA "are filled with clear, careful, explicit, repeated commands to officers
to make individualized, case-by-case discretionary judgments"). Even if it were not the case
that adjudicators retained discretion beyond application of the eligibility criteria, the
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this, it is unclear what it even means to say that DACA and DAPA do not
involve "individualized" determinations regarding the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The fact that large numbers of noncitizens who meet the announced
eligibility criteria will come forward to apply does not mean that each
application will not be adjudicated on an individual basis. This sort of confused
talk about individualized decision making is part of what plagued debates
about profiling for years, and the history of that debate shows that there is little
profit in trying to make this analytic distinction do much work as a matter of
law or theory.2 o3
But while the focus on "categorical" decision making is confused, we can
recharacterize this argument to capture what seems to be at the heart of critics'
concern. The core of their objection appears to be that the Obama relief
initiatives have substituted rules for standards in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. As a descriptive matter, this claim is essentially accurate. The
initiatives innovate because they move from a system of suggestive
enforcement guidelines to a much more rule-bound enforcement system.
Previously, grants of "deferred action" were made on an ad hoc basis, guided
by loose priorities laid out in a series of agency memos on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. These memos specified dozens of factors relevant to
relief determinations (many of which embodied vague standards), and said
little about the appropriate relationship between the factors.
DACA and DAPA reshaped this decision-making process to make it much
more rule-bound. (They also formalized the application process, a point we
will take up in a moment.) First, DACA and DAPA reduced considerably the
number of criteria relevant to eligibility for relief; rather than dozens of factors
being relevant, the initiatives selected just a handful. Second, the initiatives
replaced loose criteria with more objective ones. Under DAPA, for example, the
two most important criteria the applicant must establish are that she has
resided in the United States for at least five years, and that she has a child who
is a U.S. citizen or green card holder.2 o4 Third, DACA and DAPA clearly specify
the logical relationship among the listed criteria. Each criterion is a necessary
condition, meaning that an immigrant must show that she satisfies all of the
enumerated criteria in order to be eligible for the exercise of discretionary
relief.
adjudications still would be individualized. The distinction between individual and
categorical judgments ultimately amounts to a question of framing.
203. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILING, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (20o6) (explaining
the conceptual impossibility of "individualized" decision making, if an individualized
decision is defined as one that does not permit the decision maker to make any group
generalizations).
204. See Johnson, DACA and DAPA Memo, supra note 1o8, at 4.
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Defenders of the relief initiatives have tried to resist the claim that DACA
and DAPA have a rule-like structure. The Department of Justice has taken great
pains to emphasize -both in the OLC opinion and in the Texas litigation over
DAPA- that the relief programs authorize agency personnel to exercise
discretion to deny relief to otherwise-eligible noncitizens. 205 But the
preservation of formal discretion does not mean that DACA and DAPA are not
more rule-like than the regime they would replace. The relevant question is
whether, as a causal matter rather than as a formal one, discretion plays as large
a role in deferred-action determinations under the new initiatives as under the
old regime. The answer to that question is unequivocal: while discretion
previously pervaded every aspect of each decision, it plays a very limited role
under the new initiatives. Government-provided data for DACA show that
almost no eligible applicants have been denied relief as a matter of discretion.
From DACA's inception until the end of 2014, USCIS approved 638,897
applications and denied 38,597. 06 Most denied applications were rejected
"based on a determination that the requestor failed to meet certain threshold
criteria.',2 o7 In other words, a full ninety-four percent of adjudications have
resulted in grants. And of the six percent that were rejections, most were
based on the failure to satisfy DACA's eligibility criteria, not on the exercise of
discretion to deny relief to an otherwise-eligible applicant. 209 Thus, the
205. See Defendant's Emergency Expedited Motion to Stay the Court's February 16, 2015 Order
Pending Appeal and Supporting Memorandum at io, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-
254, renumbered No. B-14 -2 54 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2015); OLC Memorandum Op., supra
note io, at 8-9. In describing DACA and DAPA as preferring rules over standards, we do not
take a position on the question of whether DAPA constitutes a legislative rule for the
purposes of the APA and as understood within the administrative law doctrine. We engage
with that issue more fully in Part IV. Here, we make a legal-theory point by using "rules" as
compared to "standards" to describe the structure of decision making. The desire to defend
against the APA claims in the Texas lawsuit has detracted from candid discussion of what
the Administration sought to accomplish with DACA and DAPA as a matter of executive
branch organization.
206. See Declaration of Donald W. Neufeld ¶ 23, at to, Texas, slip op. USCIS accepted 727,164
applications by this date, and 49,670 remained pending. See id.
207. Id.
2o8. See id.
209. See id. To be sure, these correlational statistics cannot, on their own, provide conclusive
proof of causation. Because DACA applicants are self-selected, it is theoretically possible that
the formal preservation of discretion plays a much larger role than these data suggest. If
many potential applicants would be denied relief as a matter of discretion, and if these
potential applicants can accurately predict the discretionary denial and therefore decline to
apply whenever they anticipate that they will lose at the discretionary stage, then we would
observe few discretionary denials, even though the presence of discretionary authority
played a large role in the program. But while such a scenario is observationally equivalent to
what we see in the grant-rate data, it is not equivalently plausible.
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program appears to have operated, as intended, to ensure that certain types of
immigration-law violators - those who satisfied the rule-like eligibility
criteria-succeeded in their applications and therefore became protected from
deportation.
These outcomes do not mean that the discretion left to USCIS officials is
not in some sense "real." Out of the hundreds of thousands of DACA
applications, there do appear to have been a small number in which
adjudicators have denied relief to applicants who otherwise satisfied the
eligibility criteria.2"o Thus, our claim is not that the formal preservation of
discretion is somehow a sham. The formal discretion left to adjudicators may
have been intended to preserve some of the case-by-case flexibility for truly
exceptional cases; or perhaps it was mainly intended to insulate the new
policies from certain kinds of (misguided) legal challenges."' But even if
discretion remains relevant in rare cases, it is hard to resist the conclusion that
the more rule-like components of the decision will be dispositive of ultimate
relief decisions in the vast majority of cases.m' This reality is, in fact, precisely
210. There is some dispute in the Texas litigation about exactly how many applications may have
been denied as a matter of discretion. The district court concluded that "[n]o DACA
application that has met the criteria has been denied based on an exercise of individualized
discretion." Texas, slip op. at 109. This conclusion does not appear to be consistent with a
declaration submitted on behalf of the United States as part of the litigation, which
documents at least two instances in which DACA applicants who satisfied the threshold
eligibility criteria were denied relief as a matter of discretion. See Neufeld, supra note 2o6,
¶ 18, at 8. As that declaration notes, however, "Until very recently, USCIS lacked any ability
to automatically track and sort the reasons for DACA denials . . . ." Id. ¶ 24, at 1o-11. For that
reason, it appears to be impossible to know whether additional discretionary denials
occurred beyond the two examples noted in the declaration.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 309-318 (discussing, and rejecting, the view that a more
rule-bound regime of prosecutorial discretion might run afoul of the APA's "legislative rule"
jurisprudence).
212. In many decision-making structures that mix rules and standards -including DACA and
DAPA- the relative importance of different criteria cannot be determined as a matter of
pure logical deduction. For example, it would have been fully consistent with the formal
decision-making rules for DACA adjudicators to have denied relief, as a matter of discretion,
to half of all otherwise-eligible applicants. And certainly other immigration relief programs,
such as cancellation of removal (which also mixes rules and discretion), have much higher
rates of discretionary denial.
It is interesting to note, however, that a pretty regular pattern does seem to emerge in
legal decision-making contexts that combine a complex set of eligibility criteria with a back-
end grant of discretionary authority: the rule-like stage seems to reduce the role discretion
plays. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (20o8) (testing empirically the
constraining power of rules in one example of these sorts of mixed decision-making
structures). Asylum determinations are a good illustration of this phenomenon.
Adjudicators must determine whether an applicant meets the legal definition of refugee or
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why the Administration replaced a wholly discretionary regime subject to
suggestive guidance and ad hoc supervision with a rule-like application process
in which discretion is limited to a backstopping role. As a practical matter, the
structure of DACA and DAPA significantly constrains, if not functionally
eliminates, the discretion of those adjudicating relief applications.
Critics are thus correct that the Obama initiatives replaced the old regime
of discretion with a new regime bound by rules. Contrary to the critics,
however, we do not believe this renders the programs unconstitutional. For
these critics, the articulation of objective criteria and the overwhelming grant
rates for DACA applicants who met the criteria render the program an
unconstitutional act of executive "lawmaking." " Under this view, the
distinction between rules and standards maps onto the constitutional division
between "legislative" authority under Article I and "executive" authority under
Article II; vague standards are less "legislative" than clear rules, and vice versa.
But even for those who subscribe to formalistic accounts of the constitutional
separation of powers, under which each branch exercises power of a particular
type (and we are not among them), this argument makes little sense. Taken
seriously, it would lead to the conclusion that Congress improperly exercises
Article II "executive" authority when it enacts vague standards into law. The
Sherman Antitrust Act would be unconstitutional, along with myriad other
laws.' Such an argument would require a robust reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine. It also would require courts to conclude that
administrative agencies improperly usurp Article I "legislative" authority
otherwise falls within any legal bars to asylum. But even if an applicant satisfies the criteria
for asylum, an adjudicator still retains the discretion to deny an application for equitable
reasons. In practice, the existence of the eligibility criteria has disciplined the inquiry and
narrowed the authority of adjudicators; only a small percentage of asylum applicants who
satisfy the eligibility criteria are denied asylum as a matter of discretion. See, e.g., Gulla v.
Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916 ( 9th Cir. 2007) ("It is rare to find a case where an IJ finds a
petitioner statutorily eligible for asylum and credible, yet exercises his discretion to deny
relief."); 3 CHARLEs GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02(12)(d)
(2011). And while there is some possibility that discretionary denials are suppressed because
asylum law's malleable eligibility criteria make it easy for adjudicators to conduct legal
analysis that comports with their preferred outcome, thereby obviating the need to deny
applications on discretionary grounds, the DACA and DAPA criteria are not nearly so
malleable.
213. See, e.g., Price, supra note 14, at 759-61. As noted above, this claim is sometimes cast as a
formalist argument about the separation of powers: the idea is that the distinction between
rules and standards maps onto the constitutional division between "legislative" authority
under Article I and "executive" authority under Article II. See supra notes 176-178 and
accompanying text.
214. Magill, supra note 176, at 621.
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whenever they issue regulations that embody bright-line rules. So much for the
modern administrative state.
More generally, American law rarely constitutionalizes the choice between
rules and standards in public administration. Courts have in some cases
constitutionally required reliance on rules - generally in cases where courts
perceive a significant risk that discretionary decision making will serve as cover
for discriminatory decision making. This idea runs through a number of First
Amendment doctrines and helps explain the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution." In other circumstances, courts have constitutionally
prohibited reliance on rules, generally where courts have concluded that
adjudicatory discretion (and often a particular adjudicatory forum) must be
preserved in order to secure the liberty or property interests of individuals
protected by the Due Process Clause. The prohibition on categorical rules for
pretrial detention in the criminal context offers a prominent example.216 But
these instances are clear exceptions to the general agnosticism of constitutional
law on this question.
Even if the choice whether to structure decision making rigidly or flexibly
rarely raises constitutional questions, it does implicate a question at the heart of
twentieth-century administrative law and bureaucratic design: what is the best
way to mete out mass justice, including in contexts like the one at issue here, in
which millions of cases demand the attention of the Executive?17 Attempts to
answer that question generally must grapple with the foundational tradeoff
between rules and standards: rules promote equal treatment across cases, but
they necessarily define "like cases" in a more reductionist way than standards.
Broad standards and "individualized discretion" can foster more fine-grained
judgments about when justice or other equitable factors support relief. =8 But
they necessarily achieve nuance at the expense of equal treatment across cases -
215. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 809-12 ( 7th ed. 2013).
216. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). But see Demote v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003) (accepting the constitutionality of such categorical rules in at least some immigration
detention contexts).
217. For an important early effort to work through this question, see generally JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1985).
218. On the tradeoffs between rules and standards, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING
IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983); and Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
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especially in a world where the same decision maker cannot decide all cases and
power is diffused across a bureaucracy.1
There is no single answer to how best to strike these tradeoffs. In the
context of mass administrative justice, however, the choice of whether to adopt
rules or open-ended discretion is closely linked to the question of whether to
centralize authority within the bureaucracy and exert significant supervisory
authority over line-level executive officials. Within the Executive Branch, rules
facilitate oversight and make it easier for high-level executive branch officials,
many of whom are politically accountable, to prevent low-level agents from
imposing their own views about when and how the law should be enforced.20
But rather than eliminating discretion from the system, as critics charge,
constraining low-level decision makers with rules simply relocates discretion to
a point higher up in the bureaucracy. It is in this sense that discretion most
truly remains within the system under the President's relief initiatives. That
discretion simply belongs primarily to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh
Johnson, the officer to whom the INA formally delegates discretionary
enforcement authority." He retains the power to alter the criteria for relief in
any way he sees fit, or even to cancel the relief programs." And once we
219. Another conventional tradeoff between rules and standards is that rules are often more
costly to specify ex ante and less costly to apply ex post. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562-63 (1992). This tradeoff is also
important to understanding why DACA and DAPA were likely structured the way they
were, because they place the costly process of ex ante specification in the hands of high-level
political officials rather than line-level bureaucrats.
220. Cf Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1078 (2011) (noting the coordination costs of the diffusion of authority within the
bureaucracy but suggesting the countervailing value of promoting independence by
empowering the civil service).
221. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103, 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) ("The Secretary, acting
through the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, shall be responsible
for the following: . . . (5) Establishing national immigration enforcement policies and
priorities."); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating
to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . ."). There is some irony in the fact that
critics are arguing that enforcement discretion cannot constitutionally be exercised by the
statutory delegatee but instead must be exercised by a set of subordinate officials. We
explore the radical nature of this claim about the structure of the administrative state below.
222. Though the President announced the DAPA initiative, Secretary Johnson issued the
memoranda governing the program. See supra notes 1o8, iii and accompanying text. The
White House clearly was involved in the formulation of DAPA, as evidenced by the fact that
the OLC opinion analyzing the program's legality was addressed both to the Secretary and
to the White House Counsel. See OLC Memorandum Op., supra note 1o, at 1. Though we
speak in terms of the President's authority, therefore, the enforcement judgments we
describe throughout the Article are clearly the product of collaboration within the Executive
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acknowledge that the formal discretion left to line-level adjudicators to deny
relief is of little practical importance, this transfer of discretion becomes all the
more pronounced. We doubt Secretary Johnson (of his own volition or at the
President's direction) will exercise his discretion to alter or terminate the
program. But this doubt does not mean that Secretary Johnson actually lacks
discretion; it simply means that we are confident about how he will exercise
it.223
B. Supervision (Not Separation) ofPowers
The argument that "categorical rules" violate some requirement of
"individualized discretion" really amounts to an argument that the supervision
and centralization of discretion in immigration law are prohibited. The
prohibition on centralization could be cast as a statutory directive, as a
constitutional requirement, or as an imperative of good institutional design. So
far as we are aware, no one has advanced the statutory argument - that
Congress embedded in the immigration code a requirement that enforcement
discretion be located exclusively in the hands of line-level enforcement
personnel. This argument's absence is unsurprising, given that nearly all the
statutory developments of the last several decades point in the other direction,
promoting consolidation rather than diffusion within the Executive Branch of
authority to make discretionary decisions about who should be deported.'
Branch, with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the leadership of DHS playing the key
role in mediating presidential preferences and the management of the bureaucracy.
223. This confidence that Secretary Johnson will not reverse course leads some to believe that the
relief is thereby more durable than ordinary decisions to defer prosecutions -a view that
leads some to (wrongly) characterize the relief as a grant of "legal status." See infra notes
274-275 and accompanying text.
224. One particularly salient set of examples is the 1996 amendments to the INA that eliminated
the authority that immigration judges had to grant relief from deportation. As we explained
in 2009, these changes took place against a status quo in which the enforcement arm of the
INS (now DHS) had considerable discretion about whom to place in proceedings in the first
place. Rather than squeezing out discretion, the 1996 amendments simply consolidated
discretion in the hands of enforcement officials by removing it from the hands of the
somewhat-more-independent immigration judges. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at
517-19. A similar story can be told about the slow death of a procedure, known as judicial
recommendation against deportation (JRAD), which permitted an Article III judge to grant
relief from deportation in the course of adjudicating a federal criminal case. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361-64 (2010). Congress eliminated JRAD authority in 1990 and
then further eliminated the Attorney General's discretionary authority to grant relief from
deportation in 1996. Id. The elimination of JRAD took discretionary authority that was
dispersed out to the federal judiciary and consolidated it in the hands of executive branch
officials responsible for policing and prosecuting immigration violations.
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Accordingly, we focus in this Part on the institutional and constitutional
versions of the anticentralization claim. As a matter of institutional design, we
show that the efforts in DACA and DAPA to centralize decision making have
been significant administrative improvements on the practices of diffused
prosecutorial discretion that preceded them. Second, we show that the notion
that either the separation of powers generally, or the Take Care Clause in
particular, constitutionalizes decentralization within the Executive Branch in
the way imagined by critics of the relief programs is wildly implausible."
1. Institutional Design
The long-term trend in American bureaucracy has been toward
centralization -elevating decisions within agencies themselves, as well as above
agencies into the Executive Office of the President. Political scientists and legal
scholars from Terry Moe to Justice Elena Kagan have documented this
trend, 6 and both unitary theorists on the right and advocates of presidential
administration on the left have defended it.17 Even recent developments in the
225. Some constitutional constraints surely exist on the organization and staffing of the
bureaucracy, though none of the constraints clearly required by the Constitution, as
described by judicial doctrine, apply to the sorts of choices we identify here. See Magill &
Vermeule, supra note 220, at 1038-41 (discussing constitutional rules that constrain agency
structure, such as the Constitution's Appointments Clause and the law governing removal,
as well as the demands of procedural due process that require hearings or individualized
processes in certain circumstances).
226. See generally WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Terry Moe,
The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235 (John E. Chubb
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and
Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 85o (1999). It is important to note
that centralization within an agency and centralization within the institution of the
presidency are conceptually distinct phenomena, though they are causally related. With
respect to the President's relief initiatives, both sorts of centralization are at work. Most of
our discussion in this Part focuses on the way that those initiatives centralize discretionary
decision making within the immigration bureaucracy. It is clear from the rollout of the
initiatives, however, that the White House was intimately involved in overseeing the
development of the initiatives.
227. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 52; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven Croley, White House Review of
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Supreme Court's administrative law canon have promoted and (implicitly)
defended administrative centralization.
Considered abstractly, of course, it would be difficult to identify a single,
optimal level of centralization that applies across the bureaucracy to all (or even
many) agencies and regulatory contexts. It is unsurprising, therefore, that a
number of administrative law scholars have resisted Kagan's normative gloss
on the centralization Moe describes." In the critics' telling, centralization can
diminish transparency, obscure lines of accountability, undermine expert
decision making, and politicize agency action.
But our argument that the Obama relief initiatives promote the more
disciplined and accountable use of executive power does not depend on taking
a side in this general debate. If the last two decades of scholarship prove
anything, it is that the appropriate level of centralization cannot be determined
in the abstract; whether and how to centralize depend on how the relevant
institutions operate in practice. Those who have argued that Obama's relief
programs are unconstitutional have mostly elided this institutional detail. But
it is precisely this detail in the immigration setting that offers us a unique
policy experiment with which we can actually assess the centralizing tradeoffs
made by Obama's relief initiatives. If we evaluate the initiatives in terms of
what they replaced, we see how they promise to significantly improve the ex
post screening system by regularizing it through the supervision of line
officials.
Prior to DACA and DAPA, the Administration launched a prosecutorial
discretion initiative that sought to preserve and guide line-level enforcement
authority. The Obama Administration announced this initiative in June 2011
with the release of the so-called Morton Memos - directives that laid out the
criteria the political leadership of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and DHS wanted to govern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by
228. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201; Magill & Vermeule, supra note 220, at 1061-72. Recently, Gillian Metzger has reminded
us that centralization and supervision are not just often desirable - sometimes these forms of
oversight can be constitutionally mandatory. See Metzger, supra note 180, at 1903 (arguing
that the Constitution imposes such a duty to ensure that the exercise of executive power is
according to law, rather than arbitrary, as well as a duty to ensure that the Executive is
politically accountable). The possibility that supervision can be constitutionally mandatory
is commonplace in federal courts doctrine and scholarship, but it has far too often been
overlooked in writing about administrative law.
229. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 59-62 (20o6); Nina
A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight ofAgency Decision Making, lo8 MICH. L. REv.
1127, 1130 (2010).
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ICE employees.230 The memos defined "prosecutorial discretion" broadly to
encompass nearly every sort of enforcement decision made by ICE agents,
including, crucially, the decision to initiate removal proceedings and the
decision to grant deferred action." As we noted in Part I, the memos were far
from the first such documents; officials in both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations issued guidance documents listing criteria intended to inform
myriad discretionary enforcement judgments." Yet both the content of the
Morton Memos and the timing of their release, coinciding as they did with
broader agency efforts designed to bring consistency to the system of screening
noncitizens for deportability, led many advocates to see the memos as
heralding a new era in which immigration discretion would be wielded on a
more widespread and consistent basis." This assumption may have been
overly optimistic. The memos only articulated priorities; they did not indicate
an intention not to remove low-priority targets, nor did they identify the means
by which the priorities would inform the actual judgments of the line agents
scattered across the country. By touting the memos, however, the
Administration made a kind of political promise to shift the brunt of the
enforcement system away from status violators and toward more serious
offenders.
Many of the Morton Memos' factors for exercising prosecutorial discretion
(and granting deferred action) bear a marked similarity to the deferred action
criteria eventually embodied in the Obama relief initiatives. The factors
included an immigrant's length of residence in the United States, as well as
educational history, family ties, and criminal record (or lack thereof) - factors
closely related to the eligibility criteria for both DACA and DAPA. 4 Having
been a child when one migrated to the United States - the keystone criterion
230. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 96.
231. Id. at 2-3.
232. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Julia Preston, U.S. Pledges To Raise Deportation Threshold, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2011, http://vww.nytimes.com/2o11/o6/18/us/18immig.html [http://perma.cc/42WW
-Y2LT]. This view was held not only by media organizations and immigrants' rights
advocates, but also by advocates of stricter immigration controls. See The Morton Memos:
Giving Illegal Aliens Administrative Amnesty, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM,
http://www.fairus.org/morton-memos [http://perma.cc/6X8D-E7HZ].
234. See Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 96, at 4 (referencing "the
person's length of presence in the United States"; "the person's pursuit of education in the
United States, with particular consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S.
high school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a
legitimate institution of higher education in the United States"; "whether the person has a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent"; and "the person's criminal
history, including arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants").
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under DACA-was also deemed important under the Morton Memos.2 3 '
Although the factors in the Morton Memos were less precise and more
numerous, and although the logical relationship among them was not well
defined, their resemblance to the DACA and DAPA priorities is
unmistakable. *
Despite this resemblance, however, the Morton Memos did not have the
immediate and obvious effects of DACA (and presumably of DAPA, once
implemented), and perhaps for precisely that reason, they provoked much less
public controversy than either of the Obama relief initiatives." In the months
following the memos' June 2011 release, there were few observable changes in
the exercise of immigration prosecutorial discretion. According to widespread
accounts, ICE continued to place immigrants who should have been among the
lowest enforcement priorities in removal proceedings, routinely ignoring
individual requests for deferred action.2" Moreover, a large-scale review of
235. While the Morton Memos took pains to note that their list of factors was not exhaustive,
they simultaneously emphasized that "there are certain classes of individuals that warrant
particular care," including "minors" and "individuals present in the United States since
childhood." Id. at 5; see also id. at 4 (highlighting "the circumstances of the person's arrival
in the United States and the manner of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the
United States as a young child").
236. This highlights another puzzling aspect of the arguments from congressional intent we
criticized in Part II: the Morton Memos could have been subjected to pretty much the same
wooden congressional-priorities critique that has been leveled against DACA and DAPA.
Many of the Morton Memos' criteria are not clearly supported by the text of the INA, and
some of them are in tension with discrete provisions of the Code. Yet many who criticize
some or all of the President's proposals for relief express no doubts about he legality of the
sorts of prioritization policies represented by the Morton Memos. See, e.g., OLC
Memorandum Op., supra note so, at 7-11 (explaining how the prioritization policy
announced by DHS (now known as the "Johnson Memo") fits comfortably within the
President's enforcement discretion). Even the Texas district court that recently enjoined
both DACA and DAPA took pains to emphasize its view that the agency has unreviewable
discretion to prioritize its enforcement efforts and resources, essentially accepting the
prioritization scheme set out in the memos Secretary Johnson issued to replace the Morton
Memos. See Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-254, renumbered No. B-14-254, slip op. at
68-70 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015).
237. In a notable exception, a group of ICE officers in the Houston field office contested the new
prosecutorial discretion policy, arguing that it created a "secretive review process." The
national ICE union eventually passed a no-confidence motion citing ICE Director John
Morton and Assistant Director Phyllis Coven. See Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez, The
Limits of Discretion: Challenges and Dilemmas of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Enforcement, 39 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 666, 677-78 (2014). Some members of Congress also,
predictably, criticized the memos, see Rosenblum, supra note 3, at 5 n.13, though the
concerns did not get widespread traction.
238. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar
Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR 437 (2013); Julia Preston, Deportations Under New U.S. Policy Are
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over 300,000 ongoing removal cases, implemented in conjunction with the
memos' release in order to identify those cases in which prosecutorial
discretion was warranted, resulted in a very small number of case closures."
And while the fraction of criminal deportees did go up somewhat through this
period, that trend appears to be largely the product of changes to other
enforcement initiatives, not the Morton Memos themselves.
Additional evidence of the Morton Memos' ineffectiveness can be seen in
the operation of Secure Communities, another signature Obama enforcement
initiative. That program, launched in the fall of 2008 by the Bush DHS, turned
every local criminal arrest in the country into a point of immigration
Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1l/11/13/us/politics
/president-obamas-policy-on-deportation-is-unevenly-applied.html [http://perna.cc/EE24
-VQNJ]; Holding DHS Accountable on Prosecutorial Discretion, AM. IMMIGR. LAw. Ass'N &
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (NOV. 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=37615
[http://perma.cc/2EWM-G9Y7].
239. See ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Initiative: Latest Figures, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE 1 (Apr. 19, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/278 [http://
perma.cc/CYR2-AMS6] (stating that less than one percent of pending cases were closed by
the end of September 2011); Julia Preston, Deportations Continue Despite U.S. Review of
Backlog, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2oi2/o6/o7/us/politics
/deportations-continue-despite-us-review-of-bacldog.html [http://perma.cc/XU74-ZZT3]
(stating that fewer than two percent were closed by June 6, 2012). The low rate of closure
was exacerbated by delays in background checks, as well as by the fact that a fair number
of respondents declined offers of administrative closure, presumably because they had
pending claims for more permanent forms of relief. See Immigration Policy
Ctr., Prosecutorial Discretion: A Statistical Analysis, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June
11, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/prosecutorial-discretion-statistical
-analysis [http://perma.cc/XT9F-TSP5]. Even adjusting for these facts, the rates of
eligibility remain remarkably low and declined as the program proceeded. See Ben
Winograd, ICE Numbers on Prosecutorial Discretion Keep Sliding Downward, IMMIGR. IMPACT
(July 30, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.conl/2012/o7/30/ice-numbers-on-prosecutorial
-discretion-sliding-downward [http://perma.cc/7FCT-JMAB]. In a speech at he University
of Georgia, former DHS Secretary Napolitano discussed the impetus for DACA and cited,
among other factors, the difficulty of moving the bureaucracy in the
direction the Administration desired through mechanisms such as the comprehensive
review for administrative closure. See Janet Napolitano, President, Univ. of Cal., John A.
Sibley Lecture at the University of Georgia School of Law: Anatomy of a Legal Decision 9
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://law.uga.edu/sites/default/files/President%2oNapolitano%20Sibley
%2oLecture%2oUGA%2oSchool%200fb/o2oLaw%2olo.27 -1 4 .pdf [http://perma.cc/3X4M
-2YR3] ("Bureaucratic momentum was not [on our side]. DHS was a new entity-a vast
department that brought together many distinct agencies in the aftermath of 9-11. Our
earlier call for a review of the backlogged cases in removal proceedings through the lens of
our stated priorities helped a bit. But in the end, it did not have the desired impact. The
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screening.4 0 Universal screening at the point of arrest provides a tremendous
amount of information to the federal government- information that can be
used (and that the government has argued was designed to be used) to make
decisions about removal both more consistent and more responsive to federal
priorities. Under the program, federal officials, not local police, decided
whether to place an immigrant identified through arrest data in removal
proceedings.241
If the Morton Memos had actually significantly impacted the decisions
made by agency personnel about whether to place a particular immigrant in
removal proceedings, one would have expected to see that impact reflected in
the pool of immigrants arrested by ICE under Secure Communities; those
memos applied directly to arrest decisions made by ICE agents under Secure
Communities. Yet no effect was apparent in the wake of the Morton Memos'
release. Figure i shows the composition of that pool over time, broken down by
the criminal history of those apprehended and placed in deportation
proceedings following notification to DHS as part of Secure Communities.4
Two aspects of the Figure stand out. First, a large percentage of people placed
in proceedings under the program had no criminal history at all: nearly a third
had no criminal conviction, despite the fact that the program was publicly
touted as a means of targeting "criminal aliens."" Second, the composition of
the arrestee pool did not change at all after the Morton Memos were released.
The arrest decisions of line-level ICE agents under Secure Communities looks
much the same before and after June 2011. 14 While the memos formally
singled out noncitizens without prior convictions as lower priorities for
240. For an overview of the program, see Cox & Miles, supra note 97, at 93-98. The program
involved data sharing between the FBI and DHS. Id. at 94. State and local police
departments routinely route fingerprint data collected during arrests to the FBI. Id. Under
Secure Communities, that data was forwarded to DHS and compared to a large database
containing information on essentially every noncitizen encountered by the agency. Id. If the
database returned a hit, ICE then determined whether the arrestee was potentially
removable and, if so, whether to issue a request that police detain the person until ICE
assumed custody. Id. at 95.
241. See id. at 131-35; see also Cox & Posner, supra note 160, at 1344-46 (explaining the advantages
for the federal government over section 287 agreements).
242. Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from
"Secure Communities," 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 956 fig.4 (2014).
243. See Johnson, Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1oi, at 1 ("The goal of Secure
Communities was to more effectively identify and facilitate the removal of criminal
aliens . . . .").
244. To be clear, there are some longer-term enforcement trends that bridge the release of the
Morton Memos. The fraction of deportees with a criminal record had been rising since
2008, and this trend continued after the memos' release.
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removal, the reality on the ground was that they
arrested by ICE after the memos' announcement.'
Figure 1.
CRIMINAL HISTORY OF NONCITIZENS ARRESTED
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These data highlight the limitations of the Morton Memos' approach to
producing meaningful changes in the exercise of immigration discretion." In
245. It is certainly possible that, after a number of years, the Morton Memos would have been
institutionalized in supervisory or disciplinary strategies so that they might ultimately have
had some effects on enforcement. But as we explain below, we are very skeptical that any
such strategies could have precipitated a shift that comes close to matching the effects of
DACA and what would likely result from the implementation of DAPA-the guarantee that
millions of unauthorized immigrants would be immune from removal for defined periods of
time with the likelihood of indefinite continuation into the future.
246. Li refers to noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies, such as murder or rape, or two or
more felonies. L2 refers to noncitizens convicted of any felony that is not an aggravated
felony or three or more misdemeanors. L 3 refers to noncitizens convicted of one or two
misdemeanors. Noncriminal refers to noncitizens who have no criminal conviction but have
civil violations of immigration law, such as overstaying a visa.
247. Another, perhaps more cynical, view of the Morton Memos is that they were motivated
largely by politics, or the desire to curry favor with immigrant advocacy and Latino
communities, rather than by a genuine desire to change the types of unauthorized migrants
being deported from the United States. On this view, it should also be no surprise that the
190







THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW REDUX
retrospect, this limitation of a guidance-document-oriented approach should
not be surprising. The memos embody an effort to shift the culture of
enforcement at the agency through an articulation by leadership of best
practices. But even if agency leadership sought to monitor compliance with the
memos' priorities through vigilant supervision buttressed by the disciplining of
officials who consistently failed to respect the memos' priorities, observable
changes in enforcement practices would have taken considerable time to
emerge. And, producing dramatic results of the sort achieved by DACA would
have been elusive. The Morton Memos would have had to change the behavior
of large numbers of ICE agents-the line-level enforcement personnel
principally responsible for making decisions about whether to place an
immigrant in removal proceedings.4'
Many agents were extremely resistant to the memos' central goal, some
quite vocally." They work within a law enforcement agency that has an
enforcement-oriented and results-driven institutional culture, not unlike the
culture of the FBI and the DEA. It should not be surprising to find resistance
within the ranks to the premise of the Morton Memos. Men and women who
see their jobs as punishing lawbreakers could have felt as if they were being
directed to ignore the transgressions of immigration violators. 20 This
Morton Memos had little effect. Regardless of their true aim (or whether it is even possible
to characterize them as having a single aim), opponents of the Administration's deportation
policies were able to use the Morton Memos' "failure" as a focal point for messaging and
organizing that helped create the political conditions that gave rise to DACA in 2012. See
supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
248. This question of whether and how to control line-level prosecutors, and even the U.S.
Attorneys themselves, has been a perennial one in analyses of federal criminal law. See, e.g.,
Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1469-70 (2008) (analyzing a discretion memorandum issued by Attorney General
John Ashcroft and concluding that it established no enforcement mechanism and left space
for flexible application in its language, and that the lack of sufficient numbers of attorneys in
Main Justice in the District of Columbia to monitor the thousands of local line attorneys in
field offices thwarted the memorandum's centralizing goal); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1562-63 (1981) (arguing that
guidelines to prosecutors need to be "specific enough to provide genuine guidance when
applied to a particular set of facts").
249. See, e.g., Press Release, ICE Union, ICE Agent's Union Speaks Out on Director's
"Discretionary Memo"; Calls on the Public To Take Action (June 23, 2011), http://iceunion
.org/download/286-287-press-release-pd-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JNA-ZRCY].
25o. This enforcement culture is, in part, the product of the culture within the INS, the legacy
agency that was abolished in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135. And the law enforcement orientation within the INS was one reason advocates
had long argued that the enforcement and services functions of the agency should be
separated. The 2002 Act did so, locating enforcement functions within ICE and CBP while
services functions were located within USCIS. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
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discontent ultimately bubbled up through the employees' union," and once
DACA was announced, some members of the union filed suit against the
Secretary of DHS, arguing that the policies required them to violate their legal
duties to enforce immigration law.2 s2
But even if the inability of the Morton Memos to significantly (and
quickly) reshape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion comes as no surprise, it
was quite consequential. The limitations of the approach bolstered forces -
both inside and outside the agency -that sought to draw critical attention to
the Administration's deportation policies generally. Many advocates initially
regarded the memos as a strong promise of protection, and their
disappointment with enforcement practices in the wake of the memos helped
create the political conditions that ultimately persuaded the Administration of
the need to centralize enforcement judgments in order to better insure
protection of status violators.5 One way of understanding the Obama relief
initiatives, then, is as a determination that the Administration could no longer
wait for the indirect guidance of the memos to take root and shift the culture of
the agency. Political leadership thus turned to a more decisive and reliable
approach to insulate mere status offenders from law enforcement.
For critics of the Obama relief initiative, this influence of politics on the
formulation and timing of DACA underscores the argument that the President
engaged in impermissible policymaking. We contend, however, that the inter-
weaving of political and institutional incentives for administrative
reorganization is to be expected generally and can often be constructive. The
move to a more rule-bound and centralized regime provided the rule-of-law
benefits associated with promoting consistency in official decision making,
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 242-48 (7th ed. 2013) (providing an overview of the
functions of each DHS component).
251. See Zatz & Rodriguez, supra note 237, at 678.
252. See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 8211660 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013)
(dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), affd sub nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d
244 (5th Cir. 2015). Though the suit specifically attacked the shape of DACA, the suit
embodied an approach to enforcement discretion distinct from the one the Administration
sought to advance even before DACA, thus undermining DHS leadership's attempts to
channel that discretion through informal, standards-based guidelines.
253. See Ahilan Arulanantham, The President's Relief Program as a Response to Insurrection,
BALKINIZATION (NOV. 25, 2014, 5:oo PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o14/11/the
-presidents-relief-program-as.html [http://perma.cc/X925-LLHF]; see also Zatz &
Rodriguez, supra note 237, at 679-81 (citing interviews with advocates who expressed
concerns that the Morton Memos could not change institutional culture, that their
implementation was slow and uneven, and that making the case for an exercise of discretion
was particularly difficult for immigrants placed in mandatory detention).
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amplifying political control and, most importantly, instituting accountability
over the enforcement power.
On top of that, we are aware of no evidence that the pre-DACA regime of
prosecutorial discretion guided by informal memoranda was serving the
salutary function typically associated with discretion- promoting fine-grained
judgments involving individual equities about when the initiation of removal
proceedings was warranted. In the case of the Obama initiatives, then, the
benefits of centralization and the rule-like inquiry it entailed came without the
costs typically associated with a move away from discretion. The fact that the
same initiatives advanced the political goals of the Administration, or may have
been timed in response to political pressures, or the fact that the
Administration could have been more patient with the Morton Memos'
approach, are not reasons to declare them suspicious, much less
unconstitutional. Instead, the evolution of the Morton Memos into the Obama
relief initiatives underscores our claims in Part II about the potential value of a
two-principals model of enforcement.
The trajectory of the Morton Memos also explains what we believe to be
the most salient features of Obama's relief initiatives for the purposes of
evaluating their legality. DACA made two interrelated institutional changes to
the prior regime of discretion. In addition to the turn to rules that we discussed
in the previous Part-a move that facilitated oversight of the bureaucracy and
constrained lower-level decision makers - DACA changed the decision makers
themselves. Not only did the Obama initiative locate the bulk of discretion in
the hands of DHS leadership, it took the process of individual adjudication out
of the hands of line-level ICE agents and the enforcement arm of the
immigration bureaucracy and handed it over to personnel in USCIS, the arm of
DHS responsible for conferring immigration benefits.254
This shift to USCIS might seem to have further fractured enforcement
responsibilities across the bureaucracy, since ICE remains responsible for
enforcement generally. In fact, however, it had the effect of further centralizing
discretion. USCIS decided that all DACA applications would be processed in
one of four major service centers, rather than dispersing them to eighty-seven
field offices around the nation.2 ss Moreover, the agency required that nearly
every discretionary denial recommended by a service center be reviewed by
decision makers at USCIS headquarters in northern Virginia.256
Even more important, the shift from ICE to USCIS amounted to DHS
leadership, presumably in consultation with the White House, selecting the
254. See Napolitano, Prosecutorial Discretion Memo, supra note 103.
255. See Declaration of Donald W. Neufeld, supra note 2o6, at 5-9.
256. See id.
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agency component more likely to share the views of the President and agency
leadership and therefore more amenable to oversight in its administration of
the program. 7 As the benefits-granting component of DHS, USCIS is more
likely than ICE to be institutionally predisposed to viewing immigrants as
claimants with potential entitlements; ICE is more likely to see them as
lawbreakers. This change in decision makers, combined with the adoption of
rules, thus facilitated the centralization of prosecutorial discretion decisions
within DHS, making it possible to overcome the Department's seeming
inability to supervise the exercise of discretion under the Morton Memos
regime.
Seen through this lens, the President's relief initiatives form part of a
broader trend in recent years toward the centralization and reorganization of
immigration enforcement authority. We documented some of this movement
in The President and Immigration Law, which showed how a series of statutory
changes shifted discretionary authority that had previously been held by
individual immigration judges within the Department of Justice to DHS.`5
Other data points in this trend include the rollout of Secure Communities,
along with the scaling back of section 287(g) agreements that sometimes gave
considerable discretionary immigration authority to local officials." To be
sure, the pattern of centralization has been complicated. It would be a mistake
to suggest that significant authority over the shape of immigration law no
longer exists outside executive leadership, or that such diffusion of authority
could ever be extinguished, since immigration enforcement depends on public
and private institutions beyond the federal bureaucracy.260 Nonetheless, these
257. This story highlights the role of an agency's institutional culture in limiting the ability of
high-level executive branch officials to quickly redirect the institution's priorities. At the
same time, it shows the ways in which bureaucratic redundancy can diffuse the constraints
that institutional culture might place on the pace of policy change. Because there were two
agencies within DHS with the legal authority to make decisions on deferred action, the
leadership within the Department could select the agency with an institutional culture more
in line with the goals of the administrative initiative. See Jason Marisam, The President's
Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 821 (2013); cf Magill & Vermeule, supra note 220,
at 1040 (arguing that where top officials have a closer relationship to the President, they are
more likely to override others within the agency, suggesting that assignation of
responsibility based on proximity of views to the President and political leadership can
enable greater control of the bureaucracy by those delegated the power at issue).
258. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 517-19.
259. See Cox & Posner, supra note 16o, at 1344-48; Rodriguez, supra note 99 (manuscript at 9-
so).
26o. See generally Cox & Posner, supra note 160 (describing the myriad ways in which federal
immigration law expressly incorporates local conditions and judgments); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 1o6 MICH. L. Rev. 567
(2008) (describing how state and local police and other bureaucracies play vital direct and
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recent developments show that DACA and DAPA, far from being anomalous,
reflect the latest significant moves in the ongoing reorganization and
centralization of the immigration bureaucracy.
This series of recent institutional changes has helped constrain and control
the use of the enforcement power in an immigration regime that today gives
the Executive capacious authority. The Obama relief initiatives promise to do
the same, if and when the Administration can fully implement them. The
tradeoffs between rules and standards and centralization and diffusion may be
intractable in the abstract, but in this context they point clearly in one
direction.
2. Constitutionalized Decentralization
Our account of the institutional dynamics leading up to the Obama relief
initiatives also has the benefit of highlighting a strange idea implicit in the
conception of the separation of powers advanced by the President's critics. On
the one hand, these critics complain about the failure of the Executive Branch
to serve as Congress's faithful agent. They worry about the lack of sufficiently
strong checks on principal-agent problems that arise across the branches. But
they would address this problem by constitutionally prohibiting the President
from attempting to ameliorate principal-agent problems within the Executive
Branch, arguing that the President cannot take a centralizing step to ensure
that the priorities reflected in immigration enforcement match his agenda,
instead of being the product of tens of thousands of line-level agents within the
immigration bureaucracy.
Perhaps critics who make this claim believe that bureaucratic insulation
from either politically appointed agency heads, or from the Executive Office of
the President itself, actually furthers congressional control. The perennial
argument in administrative law in favor of empowering the civil service
sometimes takes this form, emphasizing that these employees are less likely
than a political appointee or the President himself to ignore the wishes of
Congress, or to be motivated by aggrandizement of the President and his
indirect roles in controlling immigration movement and facilitating immigrant integration);
Rodriguez, supra note 95 (discussing the influence of local bureaucracies on federal decision
making).
261. For various critiques of DACA and DAPA that can be understood in these terms, see sources
cited supra note 14.
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political party. 262 This idea also sometimes animates arguments for
independent agencies.
To the extent the arguments in favor of insulating low-level bureaucrats
intend to promote Congress's ubstantive enforcement priorities, we are deeply
skeptical of their purchase in this context. As we explained in Part II, the work
of the Congresses that enacted the various provisions that have constructed the
Executive's domain over immigration enforcement do not embody any
coherent enforcement priorities. Insulating low-level bureaucrats from the
President in this setting, therefore, will not facilitate their compliance with
congressional priorities. It will simply enable them to freely pursue their own
agendas.
More importantly, when theorists argue that insulating bureaucrats from
the President may empower Congress, they do so primarily to defend the claim
that the Constitution permits Congress to legislate such insulation by adopting
new organizational structures for administrative entities, such as staggered-
term commissions, or restrictions on the President's removal power.264 Here,
in sharp contrast, the constitutional critique of the President's relief initiatives
amounts to a claim that the Constitution requires this sort of insulation -even if
neither Congress nor the President prefers it. This claim amounts to radical
constitutional theory. On this account, the Constitution imposes stringent
dictates on the internal organization of the Executive Branch, precluding even
the modest effort to discipline the exercise of prosecutorial discretion within an
agency by subjecting its exercise to somewhat more rule-like criteria. Even if
one thought that the idea of empowering low-level bureaucrats to resist
supervision might be attractive in certain situations, constitutionalizing those
views in a way that prohibits other organizational judgments by either
Congress or the President would be a mistake.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the scope of our two-principals account
in Part II comes into further relief. Our concept of the Executive as a second
principal necessarily entails permitting politically accountable leadership to
exert supervisory authority over line-level agents. But our account certainly
does not require disabling line-level officials. After all, the informational
advantages the Executive possesses-the learning that comes through
262. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control ofAdministrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); McCubbins et al., supra note 132.
263. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 333-57 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010).
264. Such arguments are necessary because others, in particular those who subscribe to certain
theories of the "unitary executive," believe that this sort of congressional interference is
unconstitutional. The President, these scholars argue, is constitutionally entitled to
supervise decision making within the Executive Branch. See sources cited supra note 227.
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enforcement and that should inform ongoing policymaking -enter the system
first and foremost through the work of line-level agents and bureaucrats and
their operations in the regulatory field. The Executive's capacity to act as a
second principal depends on diffusion in this sense -on the actual officials who
produce regulatory reality and see the operation of the law in practice. But
what the Obama relief initiatives seek to do is to channel and control the
information flow from the field to the center, and our claim in this Part has
been that such control should not be constitutionally prohibited (indeed, it
might sometimes be constitutionally required). As in the criminal justice
system, each individual immigration prosecutor or law enforcement official
possesses mall-scale policymaking power. When structured with the sorts of
rule-of-law values we explore in this Part, the power that this gives to the
Executive as a whole should be understood as both legitimate and productive.
C. Transparency and the Rule ofLaw
As we noted at the outset of this Part, the Obama relief policies implicate a
third tradeoff- between transparency and secrecy. One might worry that
increased transparency pits two laudable rule-of-law values against each other.
On the one hand, through their transparency about how enforcement
judgments will be exercised, the initiatives secure greater consistency and
predictability in the exercise of discretion, reducing the extent to which
decisions about who will be deported appear arbitrary or random.6' Curbing
inconsistency and arbitrariness in the exercise of government power is
commonly defended as a boon for the rule of law.266 But clarity can come at a
cost. Critics of the Obama initiatives worry that the very predictability of
enforcement-or, more precisely, the predictability of who will be protected
from enforcement - will undercut compliance with the INA and reduce the
deterrent effect of the law, thereby threatening the rule of law. 67
265. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 192 (2014); Cox & Rodriguez,
supra note 7, at 536; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1800-01 (2010); Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in
Immigration Law, lo U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 57 (2012).
266. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 155 (1961); Corey Brettschneider, A Substantive
Conception of the Rule of Law: Nonarbitrary Treatment and the Limits of Procedure, in GETTING
TO THE RULE OF LAw 52 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011); David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be
Treated Alike? (Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 24, 2002), http://www
.aw.uchicago.edu/files/files/24.strauss.like-cases.pdf [http://perma.cc/DPW3-VZA5].
267. See Martin, supra note 14; Price, supra note 14, at 755 n.360, 761 ("[K]eeping their priorities
secret may preserve the deterrent effect of the statute on a public ignorant of actual executive
enforcement practices.").
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On this account, any effort to rationalize the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion will necessitate a tragic choice between rule-of-law values: the value
of making enforcement predictable on the one hand, and the value of legal
compliance on the other .26 This claim applies far more broadly than to the
President's immigration actions: it amounts to an argument that no
enforcement regime can simultaneously maximize both fairness and legal
compliance. For the President's relief initiatives in particular, the argument
suggests that critics would favor more emphasis on legal compliance, while
supporters would be happy to trade reduced compliance for increased fairness.
This account poses an interesting dilemma, but we believe the choice to be
illusory, not tragic, in our particular immigration setting. To make this case,
we first show that this "tragic choice" logic rests on fuzzy thinking about
deterrence. Second, and more important and controversial, we explain why
concern about legal compliance rests on an incomplete understanding of
modern American immigration law.
1. The Logic ofDeterrence
There is an entirely mundane reason to doubt that DACA or DAPA will
undermine the deterrent value of the law: both of the President's initiatives
apply retrospectively. They grant relief only to past immigration violators, not
to future ones. Because eligibility for DACA or DAPA requires at least five
years' continuous residence in the country, the immigration violations of most
eligible immigrants will have occurred more than five years ago, years before
the President announced the policies. In fact, given estimates that the majority
of the unauthorized population has been living in the United States for at least
ten years, "' DAPA relief may well end up helping mostly those whose
immigration violations are more than a decade old.
The relief initiatives' retrospectivity makes the programs very different
from conventional policies of prosecutorial discretion, which should reduce
concern about their impact on law's deterrent value. Most prosecutorial
discretion policies set out criteria that guide decisions about which future
268. The only way to avoid such a conflict would be to devise rule-like schemes that constrain
enforcement discretion, but to somehow keep them from the public. Maintaining a gap
between the system's operation and the public's beliefs about how it operates strikes us as
extremely difficult. Even if it were possible, it is important to note that enforcement would
then only be rational, not predictable. Thus the decisions of enforcement officials might still
appear arbitrary to the public.
269. See Randy Capps & Marc R. Rosenblum, Executive Action for Unauthorized Immigrants,




THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW REDUX
offenders will be prosecuted for certain legal violations. The Department of
Justice's recent guidance about low-level marijuana offenses provides a run-of-
the-mill example. The policy tells legal subjects-you and me-that a U.S.
Attorney's office is extremely unlikely to prosecute us for possessing a few
marijuana cigarettes. This announcement might well affect our decisions about
whether to abide by the federal prohibition on marijuana possession laid out in
21 U.S.C. § 841. Indeed, the Department of Justice almost certainly wanted to
shape people's decision making in this way, freeing states like Colorado and
Washington to experiment with regimes that opted to decriminalize marijuana,
regulating its distribution and use through noncriminal means.2 70
DAPA and DACA, by contrast, should not produce such a behavioral
response. They are best conceptualized as exogenous legal shocks that will
affect the size of the existing pool of unauthorized migrants without altering
the legal regime that applies to future immigration violators (or to those who
do not receive relief under the program). This feature enables the policies to
drive a wedge between the values of deterrence and predictability; DHS can
make enforcement more predictable without undermining future legal
compliance. In fact, these programs might even improve future compliance
with immigration law. With fewer resources devoted to identifying and
deporting those who receive relief, DHS can redirect enforcement resources to
increase the likelihood that future immigration law violators will be caught
(thus increasing deterrence). DHS directives released alongside the relief
policies in November 2014 reveal this strategy: DHS will devote more resources
to the border, as well as to identifying those who become deportable by virtue
of convictions for certain crimes.271
Critics who claim that DACA and DAPA will undermine the rule of law
might resist this account of legal compliance in two ways. First, they might
reject the notion that the programs grant relief for past immigration violations,
arguing instead that immigration violations, by their very nature, constitute
ongoing offenses. Every day an unauthorized migrant spends in the country
amounts to a legal violation, and only by leaving the country can she put an
end to her lawbreaking. Thus, the argument goes, even if DACA and DAPA do
not affect the behavior of other migrants, they undermine legal compliance by
the very migrants granted relief under the programs. Absent the programs,
270. But cf Price, supra note 14, at 758 (arguing that DOJ's marijuana policy is permissible
because it only announces a policy rather than guaranteeing immunity).
271. See Johnson, Enforcement Priorities Memo, supra note 111; Johnson, Secure Communities
Memo, supra note 1o; Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
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some number of these migrants might self-deport to bring themselves into
compliance with the law, but in the presence of the program no one granted
relief will do so.
For a number of reasons, we reject this conceptualization of immigration
violations. We need not delve into the complexity of what it means for conduct
to constitute an ongoing legal violation, because the argument contains a more
basic flaw: by focusing on the individuals eligible for relief, it ignores the effect
the relief programs are likely to have on legal compliance more generally.
DAPA might make compliance via self-deportation less likely for those eligible
for relief, but it enhances the likelihood of compliance by those not eligible for
relief by raising the risk that the latter will be deported. In other words, even
on an account that treats immigration status violations as ongoing violations,
neither DACA nor DAPA undermines the overall level of deterrence;-" they
simply shift the brunt of deterrence from one population to another.2 "
Second, critics might challenge the sharp analytic distinction we have made
between retrospective and prospective relief. The distinction depends on the
credibility of the government's commitment not to extend relief in the future to
those who violate immigration law after DACA or DAPA's announcement.
Commitment presents a perennial problem for amnesties and other forms of
relief for past legal violations. If people begin to believe that similar relief will
be granted again in the future, they might break the law in anticipation of a
future grant of amnesty. If DACA grants relief to some immigrants who
arrived as children, perhaps more children will attempt to enter the country in
hopes of some future DACA-like program. Some commentators made precisely
this claim last summer, when apprehensions of unaccompanied minors at the
Texas border suddenly skyrocketed. And similar claims have been made about
past immigration relief programs, most notably the legalization program that
was a part of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which
granted green cards to nearly 2.7 million unauthorized immigrants, more than
half of the then-existing unauthorized population.274
272. Of course, the story may be more complicated, given the wealth of evidence that people do
not respond to risk in the way predicted by expected utility theory. See, e.g., DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). But this evidence
simply gives us more reason to doubt the simple story of legal compliance told by critics of
the President's relief programs.
273. For immigrants' rights advocates, of course, this shift may still be troubling. Beyond the
boundaries of DACA and DAPA lie many sympathetic cases of unauthorized noncitizens
with deep ties to the United States who have long-ago, minor criminal convictions, or who
have not been present for the requisite time to qualify for the relief initiatives.
274. See Nancy Rytina, IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Naturalization
Through 2001, U.S. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV. (Oct. 25, 2002), http://
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Evidence from IRCA's legalization gives us reason to doubt strong claims
that immigrants will make different migration decisions simply because of a
slight increase in the highly uncertain prospect of some unspecified relief years
down the road. Economists studying IRCA's effect on unauthorized migration
found no evidence of an increase in the flow of migrants hoping for a future
program." Moreover, in the present political environment, it seems equally
possible that DACA and DAPA will serve as anchors that lower, rather than
raise, the probability of more expansive relief down the road. Prior to these
programs, a legislative legalization program formed a central component of the
immigration reform bills passed by the Senate in 2006 and 2013.276 Most
commentators think a legislative amnesty will eventually come to pass, in part
because of the sheer magnitude of the unauthorized population. The open
questions include when that legislative relief will ultimately come, and how far
it will extend. It may be that the Obama relief initiatives will shape future
legalization by limiting any program to those who have benefited from DACA
and DAPA. But we think any such predictions would be foolish. What effect, if
any, DACA and DAPA will have on future reform turns on political dynamics
so complex that even those who are central players in the drama, right down to
the congressional leadership and President Obama himself, seem to have little
idea how it will play out. Given this extreme uncertainty, we think it
implausible that DACA or DAPA's influence on the prospect of relief for future
immigration violators will meaningfully affect the migration decisions of
prospective migrants contemplating coming to America, either by encouraging
or discouraging them.
2. Underenforcement and Ex Post Screening
The retrospective nature of DACA and DAPA make them special from the
perspective of deterrence. But even if the compliance critique fails at the retail
level, the turn to transparent, predictable, and rule-bound enforcement
strategies could still raise compliance concerns, thus implicating the tragic
choice between rule-of-law values. For this reason, it is important to explain
why the choice between transparency and compliance is illusory in light of the
structure of modern American immigration law - a structure other regulatory
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ircaon4int.pdf [http://perma.cc/92X2
-R7ZV]-
275. Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented
Immigration? Evidence from IRCA, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 437-38 (2003).
276. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
11 3th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act
of 2006, S. 2611, io9th Cong. (as passed by Senate, May 25, 20o6).
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contexts may share and that in the immigration setting transcends the Obama
relief initiatives.
The argument against transparency in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion conflates two very different types of enforcement settings. In one,
the legal system makes clear that the desired level of some conduct is zero. In
such a setting, there ideally would be perfect compliance with the legal
prohibition. But compliance might fall short of that, and the government may
lack the resources to punish every single violator. In that context, secrecy about
enforcement strategy can be valuable, and transparency can threaten legal
compliance. The threat to compliance will be most palpable when an offense
can be committed in multiple ways, or in multiple places. In such situations,
publicizing what law enforcement officials will be looking for, or where they
will be looking, can make it easier for would-be violators to avoid having their
legal violations detected. Secrecy about law enforcement tactics, even to the
extent of randomizing those tactics, can often increase compliance, both by
raising the risk of detection and by creating more uncertainty about the level of
risk." For these reasons, the IRS works hard to keep its audit algorithms
secret, state highway patrols do not disclose the locations of speed traps,
Customs and Border Patrol frequently moves the roving checkpoints it uses
along the southern border, and the CIA and other intelligence agencies resist
disclosure of their surveillance tactics. 2
277. Risk can rise, rather than simply be redistributed across potential offenders, because
strategic evasion is eliminated. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 818 (1998). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (laying the foundation for strategic, rational action
accounts of lawbreaking). For an overview of the large game-theoretic literature on these
questions, see DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY (Radha Poovendran & Walid
Saad eds., 2014).
278. This idea relates to a view in legal theory, dating back at least to Jeremy Bentham, that "[a]
law confining itself to the creation of an offense, and a law commanding a punishment to be
administered in case of the commission of such an offense, are two distinct laws." JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 331 (Dover
Classics 2007) (1789). On this view, legal obligations can motivate behavior even in the
absence of a sanction, and hence it is possible to speak of a legal obligation and a legal
remedy as "two distinct laws." Some deny this view, of course: rational choice theorists of a
certain sort, for example, deny that obligations ever create an independent reason for action.
But for those who do not deny this possibility, there can sometimes be value in keeping
certain aspects of the official remedial regime hidden from public view-to the extent
possible -to prevent gaps in the remedial regime from undermining the influence of some
statutory rule on behavior. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1984); see also Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (developing a
taxonomy of rights and remedies). Crucially, however, this idea turns on the notion that the
"true" legal norm is not itself instantiated by the remedial regime.
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But for reasons we already have explained in our development of the
concept of de facto delegation, this account does not describe the immigration
enforcement setting. In the world of de facto delegation, where exceptionally
broad grounds of deportability and long-standing acceptance of high levels of
unauthorized immigration have made half of all noncitizens living in the
United States formally deportable,79 a perfect world is not a world of perfect
enforcement.'o This is so not simply because the government has limited
resources - the claim around which most defenses of the President's actions
have turned.8' Nor is it true only because the social costs of deporting all
unauthorized migrants would be enormous (though they would be). Rather, it
is because immigration law's formal prohibitions do not accurately reflect the
structure of the immigrant screening system. The INA does not establish fully
the contours of culpability under immigration law. Instead, our system of de
facto delegation requires the Executive to assume responsibility for sorting
"deserving" violators out from non-deserving ones-for making the sorts of
policy judgments we defend in Part II. 28 The screening decisions of executive
branch officials who decide which formally deportable noncitizens deserve
deportation thus shape the true limits of the law.
In our view, the screening the law requires will be most fair if the Executive
conducts screening universally and makes its rules transparent. Universality
makes it possible to treat like cases alike, and transparency provides notice to
immigrants about he actual structure of the screening system (as opposed to
the formal structure of that system). We need not worry that transparency will
undermine compliance with the formal screening rules of the INA, because the
rules are not meant to be followed to the letter.8' Instead, public behavior
279. See Grieco et al., supra note 82.
280. To be clear, our claim is not that an ideal world would still contain some illegal
immigration. Instead, our claim is that, given the way the law is written and how it has
intersected with social realities over time, we should not understand the existing
immigration regime as one that demands full compliance and therefore enforcement efforts
that seek to achieve full compliance.
281. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 125.
282. See Cox, supra note 36.
283. As we explained in Part II, in making this claim about de facto delegation, we do not mean
to suggest hat Congress specifically intended to overdraw the law and assign the President
the authority to screen. Instead, it is an observation about the evolution and expansion of a
legal regime to cover such a broad swath of conduct that the Executive becomes obligated to
do so. It is a claim about the social meaning and ex post acceptance of a system as it has
evolved and been constructed by Congress and the Executive in tandem. As we also
explained in Part II, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012),
openly acknowledged this conception of executive power by highlighting the central role
that executive branch discretion plays in defining the actual content of immigration law. See
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would track the screening system established by executive discretion, instead of
the (overbroad) criteria articulated in the statute itself. The Obama relief
initiatives aid this objective through transparency.
Other areas of the law share this structure whereby the legally desirable
level of an action is not zero, and according to which overbroad laws have the
effect of empowering public officials to screen for culpable violators from
among a larger pool of formal violators.28 Consider criminal law. Bill Stuntz
has argued that it has just such a structure: legislators draw substantive rules of
criminal liability to sweep in far more persons than are deserving of
punishment, effectively delegating power to prosecutors and police to sift
through the universe of violators, screening for those who are worthy of
punishment.28 In such a system, a rationalized, predictable, and transparent
system of prosecutorial discretion promotes the equal treatment of similarly
situated defendants without undermining compliance with the "true" criminal
law norms that the system seeks to enforce. If we think that low-level
marijuana possession by a person with no other criminal record should not be
punished, then we should hope that judgment applies to all cases, not to a
random subset of violators. And we would not worry that publicizing the
policy would undermine legal compliance, because the very point of the
exercise of discretion would be to communicate that possession under those
circumstances does not deserve punishment.
We recognize, of course, that critics of the Obama relief initiatives, in
Congress and in the commentariat, might dispute our account of the modern
structure of immigration law-we view this claim as our most controversial
and contestable one. The self-deportation strategy advanced by opponents of
illegal immigration reflects a total compliance worldview leavened by the
reality of limited enforcement resources. Measures that induce self-deportation
Cox, supra note 36, at 48-55 (discussing enforcement redundancy in the context of Arizona);
Rodriguez, supra note 157 (discussing the ambiguous social meaning of unauthorized status
and exploring the concept of sociological as opposed to legal membership); supra text
accompanying notes 88-90.
284. The case that the formal rules embodied in the immigration code sweep in far more people
than deserve deportation can be made in two ways: as an interpretive claim about the
structure of modern immigration law, or as a purely normative claim. Our claim here is
primarily interpretive, building on our historical account of the development of immigration
law and the de facto delegation of screening authority to the Executive -a delegation which
presumes that not all those in formal violation of the law should be deported. This is the
sort of claim endorsed by the Supreme Court in Arizona. But our account also undoubtedly
has important normative implications - about the questions of institutional design we are
focused on in this Article, as well as about broader issues we have touched on in earlier work
and continue to develop.
285. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 1oo MICH. L. REV. 505, 506-09 (2001).
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become necessary in a world of limited resources precisely in order to achieve
the total compliance goals of the system. But the core of our argument here is
that these critics operate with the wrong understanding of the nature of
underenforcement in immigration law -one that ignores the actual history and
practice of immigration law and puts them on the wrong side of the Supreme
Court in Arizona. Supporters of DACA and DAPA have reinforced this
confusion about underenforcement's significance; their persistent focus on
resource constraints as both a necessary (and sufficient?) condition for the
exercise of broad deportation discretion promotes the misconception that, in
the absence of resource constraints, the Executive's duty would be to enforce
against all violators (save perhaps for the occasional exercise of humanitarian
discretion). Budget constraints are ubiquitous. But the structural delegation of
screening authority present in immigration law- and some other areas like
criminal law- is not.
D. Benefits Versus Penalties
In choosing rules over standards, centralization over diffusion, and
transparency over secrecy, the Obama relief initiatives highlight some key
debates over how best to organize the modern bureaucracy. In their particular
context, these choices not only make acceptable structural tradeoffs, they
actually promote rule-of -law values and accountable and constrained executive
power. Far from striking a blow on behalf of the imperial presidency, the relief
initiatives represent responsible uses of the enforcement power, even as they
advance the President's political agenda. Any unseemliness of the latter does
not detract from the value of the former.
Of course, in offering this conceptual alternative to the faithful-agent
framework we reject in Part II, the question becomes what sorts of efforts to
structure the enforcement power would give rise to constitutional concerns.
Can we imagine any limits on the way in which the Executive institutionalizes
its discretion or makes the inevitable tradeoffs among rule-of-law values? We
turn to these most difficult questions in Part IV below.
But before developing our account of limiting principles, we pause to
address one last, frequently heard claim about the way in which DACA and
DAPA institutionalize relief loosely related to our arguments in this Part. The
claim is as follows: by choosing rule-like criteria for relief, by centralizing
control over the application of those criteria, and by establishing a transparent
application process, the Obama Administration has conferred on DACA and
DAPA recipients a promise of nonenforcement hat differs in kind from a mere
guideline that de-prioritizes removal on the basis of certain characteristics. This
claim - that there is an important substantive difference between the form of
relief provided by these programs and ordinary prosecutorial discretion -rests
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at the heart of the Texas district court's decision to enjoin DAPA and the
expansion of DACA. In the words of the district court, the programs provide
the benefit of "three years of immunity from [the] law."2' At another point the
decision describes the benefit as the conferral of "legal presence status." 
8
' In
other words, the relief initiatives confer new legal benefits on recipients rather
than simply declining to prosecute them. Providing these legal benefits, in
the critics' view, departs from any coherent understanding of prosecutorial
discretion and exceeds the authority of executive branch officials.S
This argument appears to turn on the legal consequences for immigrants
(or other regulatory subjects) of institutionalizing enforcement discretion in
particular ways. Its subtext might also be that the relief policies' beneficiaries
do not deserve an open and notorious relief from prosecution, even if they
might escape prosecution as the result of case-by-case choices. To the extent
this argument depends on the claim that DAPA and DACA recipients receive a
legally binding promise that they will not be deported for three years,
29 o the
argument is mistaken. The Administration has made no such promise."' As a
286. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *44 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015)
(memorandum opinion and order granting preliminary injunction).
287. Id. at *2; see also McConnell, supra note 154 (arguing that the President has attempted to
create "a new legal status for aliens unlawfully present under the terms of the Immigration
Act" and emphasizing that the President's actions are not a "routine application of
'prosecutorial discretion"' but rather the conferral of benefits such as "work permits and
welfare without statutory authority and notice-and-comment rule-making").
288. While we focus here on the purported benefit of legal status, critics also claim that the work
permits that accompany a grant of relief amount to an unauthorized legal benefit. The
difficulty with this argument is that federal regulations, adopted more than two decades ago
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, authorized the Attorney General (now the
Secretary of DHS) to grant work permits to noncitizens who receive deferred action. See 8
C.F.R. S 274.12 (2015). Bizarrely, this regulation is never cited by the Texas district court.
For a thorough explanation of this issue, see Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17,
at 16-18; OLC Memorandum Op., supra note so, at 21-22.
289. Exactly how the "benefits" conferral exceeded the authority of those officials is unclear in the
district court opinion. The court held only that the APA prohibited the provision of these
benefits in the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Texas, 2015 WL 648579, at
*56. But the court's reasoning appears to entail the much more consequential conclusion that
the President violated Article II by conferring such benefits on immigrants under the guise
of exercising prosecutorial discretion. See id. at *49 ("The DHS' job is to enforce the laws
Congress passes and the President signs (or at least does not veto). It has broad discretion to
utilize when it is enforcing a law. Nevertheless, no statute gives the DHS the discretion it is
trying to exercise here.").
290. Price describes this as a prospective license to violate the law. See Price, supra note 14, at 704.
291. As an aside, it is also far from clear that the Constitution prohibits such promises. If Article
II were understood to do so, it would require that we treat the ubiquitous practice of
granting immunity to criminal defendants as either unconstitutional or unenforceable.
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formal matter, the promise entailed by the relief initiatives is no more a legal
entitlement than the promise that would have accompanied an "individualized"
grant of deferred action in the years prior to DACA. While grants of deferred
action have in the past often been made for multi-year terms, and sometimes
for indefinite periods, these grants have never been understood as legal
entitlements. As with any other instance of prosecutorial discretion, executive
branch officials remain free to reverse course and charge a person previously
granted deferred action. Of course, in practice, such reversals were rare
historically, and we agree that Jeh Johnson almost certainly will not reverse
course next month and order ICE agents to initiate removal proceedings
against those who have been granted relief under DACA. As a matter of law,
however, this reality does not convert a permissible nonenforcement decision
into an impermissible grant of a legal benefit. If it did, grants of prosecutorial
discretion by criminal prosecutors would be widely unlawful, as it is often clear
in the case of such grants that criminal justice officials have no intention of
pursuing changes in the future for the conduct at issue.
We could try to rescue the "benefits" critique by recasting it in a functional
rather than formal light (though critics themselves have cast it in a formalist
way). We could say that the core of the benefits claim is not that the deferred
action granted amounts to a legal entitlement, but instead that, as a practical
matter, DACA and DAPA provide relief that will be more durable than ordinary
decisions to defer or forgo enforcement. This durability, critics might argue,
applies not only within the current Administration, but also beyond it, as it
would be very costly politically for a new President, regardless of party, to
begin removing in significant numbers the beneficiaries of DACA and DAPA
who will have developed strong reliance interests. On this account, the
practical entrenchment likely to arise from the President's actions separates
constitutional exercises of prosecutorial discretion from unconstitutional ones.
These programs may in fact be durable, but that would not distinguish
DACA and DAPA from earlier exercises of immigration enforcement
discretion. Whereas President Obama's initiatives promise only three years of
relief, noncitizens granted deferred action in the past have in many cases been
granted indefinite relief- relief that, in practice, often lasted for periods of
more than three years and sometimes spanned more than one
administration." And, as a theoretical matter, it seems equally plausible that
the institutionalization of relief in high-level agency decisions will ultimately
292. See, e.g., SHOBA S. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 59-63 (2015) (describing the use of open-ended grants
of deferred action, some of which lasted for up to eight years, for U visa applicants). See
generally MANUEL & GARCIA, supra note 29, at 17 (describing deferred action grants outside
of DACA as "open-ended").
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undermine the durability of relief over time. A single decision of a future
administration could reverse the nonenforcement decisions with respect to
millions of noncitizens."' Nothing of this sort would have been possible under
the regime that preceded DACA and DAPA. The literature analyzing
centralization appreciates this possibility, emphasizing the fact that agencies
become more responsive and policies less entrenched-not the other way
around-as decision making becomes centralized in high-level officials who are
less subject to the slow-to-change culture of an institution."
As a descriptive matter, therefore, we are skeptical of the claim that DACA
and DAPA entrench nonenforcement promises to a greater degree than other
forms of enforcement discretion. More importantly, we see no reason why the
practical durability of the policy should be constitutionally relevant: there is no
plausible constitutional theory of which we are aware under which a promise
not to prosecute becomes unconstitutional whenever that promise might be
politically durable.
IV. WHITHER LIMITING PRINCIPLES?
As we showed in Part II, principles to limit the exercise of enforcement
discretion based on substantive factors grounded in congressional priorities will
be elusive across many statutory schemes, especially as those schemes become
more reticulated over time. This reality underscores that the "parade of
horribles" invoked by many critics of the Obama relief initiatives is not so
much a series of hypotheticals about a dystopian post-DACA future as a simple
description of the actual history of many regulatory arenas. Ronald Reagan
dramatically scaled back environmental and antitrust enforcement. George W.
Bush transformed the enforcement culture of the Environmental Protection
Agency, altering threshold regulatory requirements for new source review
under the Clean Air Act and abandoning investigations that had been
commenced under the pre-existing legal regime."s His Administration also
293. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Judge Hanen's-and Michael McConnell's-Mistakes
About "Affirmative Action" in DAPA, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 25, 2015,
2:46 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/02/judge-hanens-and-michael-mcconnells.html
[http://perma.cc/4332-JGKL]; Eric Posner, Faithfully Executed, SLATE (Feb.
19, 2015. 3:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/view-from-chica
go/2015/o2/obamna sdapa-immigration-program-is_1egal-judge-hanen sinjunction will
.html [http://perma.cc/7RTM-NVVH].
294. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 226; Mathew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008).
295. See Deacon, supra note 115, at 811-16; Thomas 0. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works
Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD.
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nearly shuttered the Department of Justice office that pursues structural reform
of police misconduct,"' and the Voting Section of his Civil Rights Division did
not file a single lawsuit alleging discrimination against minority voters for
several consecutive years.9 7 Indeed, Eric Holder came into office as Attorney
General promising to restore the stature and power of the Division. The first
chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission appointed by President
Obama immediately ended a Bush Administration pilot program that required
enforcement staff to seek permission from the Commission before negotiating
a civil monetary penalty against a public company -a policy that had delayed
the enforcement process.9'
These shifts in enforcement policy, while perhaps dramatic, simply reflect
the consequences of politics and presidential elections. Though it might be
magnanimous and perhaps even judicious for the President to tread lightly
when making enforcement judgments, in order to set good precedents for his
or her successors who will have distinct ideological preferences, it may also be
foolishly high-minded. Exercising the enforcement power necessitates making
value judgments, particularly in circumstances where the laws being enforced
either reflect a variety of compromises made by the enacting Congress or leave
the Executive Branch with wide-ranging discretion in implementation. And as
we explained in Part II, there are reasons to value rather than lament the scope
L. REV. 1204, 1257 (2013). In the first three years of the Bush Administration, the
Department of Justice launched only three investigations against energy companies-down
ninety percent from the last three years of the Clinton Administration. McGarity, supra at
1257.
296. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-7 5, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
INFORMATION ON EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, HOUSING AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT, VOTING
AND SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTIONS' ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS 2001
THROUGH 2007, at 22 (2009) (documenting that from 2001-2007, the Bush Administration
initiated only three lawsuits against law enforcement agencies, all of which involved
allegations of excessive force).
297. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE
OPERATIONS OF THE VOTING SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 113 (2013) ("Our
examination of the mix and volume of enforcement cases brought over the past ten years by
the Voting Section revealed some changes in enforcement priorities over time,
corresponding to changes in leadership."); Joseph D. Rich et al., The Voting Section, in THE
ERosION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 32, 41 (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007).
298. The SEC in Transition: A Mid-Year Review of SEC Enforcement in 2oo9,
GIBSON DUNN (2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECinTransition
-MidYearReview-SECEnforcement.aspx [http://perma.cc/UZ8R-AWJH]. Chair Mary
Shapiro also approved a new procedure for rapidly approving formal orders of
investigations and issued 188 formal orders from February to May 2009 and 167 injunctions
against defendants from January to June 2009, as compared to 74 orders and 114 injunctions
during the same periods in 2008. Id.
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of judgment the enforcement power entails - reasons that parallel common
defenses of Congress's delegation of vast rulemaking and, therefore,
policymaking power.
Yet the inevitability and desirability of presidential priority setting does not
mean that the President can exercise the enforcement power without
constraint. In the absence of express and specific statutory direction as to how
to prioritize enforcement, we would still want the Executive to abide by
constitutional norms that expect the exercise of coercive power to be well
supervised and accountable. But these norms will be difficult to translate into
limiting principles based on substantive priorities. Instead, we should devise
limiting principles that operate as forms of constraint on the way the Executive
institutionalizes enforcement priorities. Understanding the choices at stake in
the institutionalization of prosecutorial discretion, as we have presented them,
can help us begin to identify when the form discretion takes might raise red
flags as a matter of constitutional law or culture.
To say that such limiting principles can be identified is not to say that they
will always be judicially manageable. Some might be easily embodied in
doctrine, but others will be difficult to formulate into clear legal rules. For
constitutional scholars who believe the very definition of a "limiting principle"
is that it must be amenable to enforcement by an Article III judge, our view will
be unsatisfying. But we believe that tangling up debates about the existence of
limiting principles with longstanding disagreements about the extent to which
constitutional norms must be judicially enforceable stymies genuine inquiry
into how best to conform the enforcement power to conceptions of constrained
and accountable government.
In what follows, we begin by identifying the sorts of limiting principles
that might apply to the exercise of the enforcement power. But the inquiry into
constraint need not end there. Even if broad use of the enforcement power
according to executive judgment will almost always be constitutional, and even
if it will be difficult to conclude that any given institutionalization of discretion
crosses a constitutional line, we can still evaluate on the merits the Executive's
decisions regarding how to structure its power, as well as any arrangement he
political branches might have reached through the political process. In other
words, it would be a mistake to limit the analysis of the enforcement power to
the constitutional register. We therefore close by considering what might be
deficient with the Obama relief initiatives and the state of affairs that produced
them, as a matter of more general legal and political theory.
A. Current Constraining Principles
Constraints on the President's authority to determine how to
institutionalize discretion within the Executive Branch could arise from a
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number of sources, many of which have nothing to do with constitutional
limiting principles. First, as we discussed in Parts II and III, Congress
possesses a variety of tools to constrain discretion, though some will be easier
to employ than others. Congress certainly could place constraints on the
substance of discretionary choices. As we noted in Part II when describing how
enforcement judgments help construct the regulatory domain, statutes
themselves place limits on the bases of enforcement. The President could not,
for example, declare as a ground of removal an offense Congress has not listed
in the Code. Congress also could draft statutory prohibitions against certain
exercises of discretion,"' or use its appropriations power to shape enforcement
choices, though we have discussed the limits of the latteroo and are skeptical
that the former approach would be a good one to adopt with frequency, given
the affirmative value of executive policymaking through enforcement
articulated in Part II.
Congress could also use institutional design and oversight in tandem to
constrain discretion. It could limit the President's capacity to supervise
officials' discretionary judgments; for example, Congress could require that
particular low-level adjudicators, such as administrative law judges, make
certain decisions without interference from agency leadership. The
development of statutory protections for civil service employees reflects this
sort of judgment and promotes the professionalization of government
employment by insulating employees from the pressure of patronage
politics.30 ' Congress might also seek to diffuse power to make agencies more
responsive to individual members of Congress and oversight committees
through day-to-day, informal interactions. Strategies of this sort might be
difficult to launch, given the fraught legislative process. But Congress could, at
the very least, use hearings and appeals to the press to advance its point of view
299. We acknowledge the existence of a debate concerning whether Congress can direct the
President's prosecutorial judgments. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F-3d 255, 266 n.1i
(D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he President may decline to follow a law that purports to require the
Executive Branch to prosecute certain offenses or offenders. Such a law would interfere with
the President's Article II prosecutorial discretion."). But while it seems clear that a
congressional instruction to prosecute particular individuals would raise serious
constitutional concerns, we would not read Article II as containing inherent authority to
exercise discretion such that Congress could not extinguish that discretion-a power we
think is included in its very power to legislate.
300. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
301. Jon Michaels, in fact, analogizes the civil service to the constraints imposed on government
power by the judiciary in the Madisonian separation-of-powers framework and argues that
modern trends toward privatization pose a worrying threat to this essential source of
constraint of power. See Michaels, supra note 179, at 540-47.
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in a way that might create political pressure on the Executive to change its
behavior.3o 2
But our primary interest here is not in the myriad political and institutional
forces that constrain the President as a matter of fact. We focus instead on the
ways in which the Constitution itself will sometimes directly constrain how
executive officials institutionalize enforcement discretion.3 o3 Constraints can
crop up along any of the three dimensions we identified in Part III. Take the
choice between rules, standards, and unfettered discretion. Sometimes the
Constitution requires government-by-rules; other times it prohibits their use.
First Amendment doctrine, for example, sometimes requires that executive
branch officials make decisions pursuant to rules clearly specified ex ante, in
order to constrain discretionary judgments about decisions to issue permits
and the like-judgments that present a high risk of impermissible
discrimination.3 o4 In contrast, the Due Process Clause sometimes prohibits the
use of highly structured decision-making rules, requiring that an adjudicator
302. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 765, 768-69, 793
(1983) (showing how members of Congress used hearings and the threat of sanctions in the
late 1970s to induce changes in FTC policy); see also Kagan, supra note 226, at 2348-49
(arguing that presidential involvement in bureaucratic decision making stimulates
congressional oversight); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Lau', Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789-93 (1999) (arguing that
congressional oversight hearings are particularly effective in cases of prosecutorial
discretion, where the Executive would otherwise operate in secrecy).
303. One type of constraint on which we do not focus, but which is obviously very important, is
constraint imposed by rights-regarding constitutional provisions like the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. Even in a world where congressional priorities do not limit the substantive
criteria on which the Executive bases enforcement, the Constitution does prohibit the use of
some criteria. So, for example, the President could no more restrict grants of deferred action
on the basis of race than could a federal prosecutor use race as a factor in charging decisions.
See Legomsky, Written Testimony, supra note 17, at 15 ("[P]articular priorities can't . . .
otherwise violate equal protection of other individual constitutional rights."). The
Executive, of course, routinely makes discretionary judgments in the immigration arena
based on nationality. Grants of temporary protected status and deferred enforced departure,
for example, are made for groups of noncitizens based on their nationality, to provide
protection for persons from countries beset by environmental disasters or civil strife or
where the President's foreign policy would be undermined by their return. See supra notes
22, 29 and accompanying text (discussing TPS and DED). In the main, this line does not
present a constitutional concern, even though correlations between race and nationality
abound. But were the President to draw nationality classifications in a manner that
suggested an underlying race-based motivation, we believe it would be appropriate for
critics and even courts to decry the President's actions using the language of
constitutionality.
304. See STONE ET AL., supra note 215.
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retain discretion to take account of any evidence or arguments offered by an
individual claimant.o'
It could also be the case that particular choices between rules and standards
result in impermissible tradeoffs among rule-of-law values. These limits will be
hard to characterize as hard-and-fast constitutional requirements and may be
more appropriately characterized as features of a theory of constitutionalism.
But some criticisms aimed at particular institutional design choices might
sound in constitutional concerns, even though a court would be unlikely to
strike them down. If, for example, the President's initiative permitted any non-
citizen to apply for relief but then left the judgment entirely to the whims of
adjudicators, the loss of supervision resulting from this standards-based
approach might, depending on the practice of the adjudicators, amount to a
loss that cannot be offset by the benefits of individualized, fine-grained
decision making. We could describe this tradeoff as a constitutionally
irresponsible choice, even if it would be difficult to describe it as
unconstitutional such that a court could strike it down.
We could similarly analyze the choice to centralize or diffuse power.
Centralization designed to facilitate preferential treatment of the President's
cronies could present a constitutionally problematic form of
institutionalization. A centralization initiative designed to serve partisan goals
might ordinarily be unexceptional, but it could present a source of
constitutional concern in a context in which custom demands independence.
The centralized and politicized hiring of immigration judges in the Ashcroft
Department of Justice, for instance, contravened civil service regulations and
customs surrounding the hiring of officials otherwise removable by the
Attorney General.30s
The tradeoff between transparency and secrecy could also be governed by
principles or presumptions that would constrain presidential choices about
how to institutionalize discretion. If the structure and integrity of a given
enforcement domain depend on self-compliance by regulated parties, then the
costs of transparency regarding enforcement priorities might be so high as to
be deemed impermissible. In the tax arena, for example, the enforcement
machinery depends heavily on the in terrorem effect of legal regulation; the
system's goal is maximal compliance with the law, and so it is crucial for the
IRS to keep its enforcement priorities hidden from view, in order to maintain
public incentives for widespread compliance. If the IRS were to announce that
305. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
306. By contrast, Gillian Metzger, for example, argues that the failure to supervise the exercise of
discretion can in some circumstances amount to unconstitutional abdication of presidential
responsibilities. See Metzger, supra note 18o, at 1874-86.
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a portion of the Code simply would not be enforced because of the Service's
scarce resources, legal compliance would be undermined for little benefit and
for arguably questionable reasons (perhaps to curry favor with a tax-skeptical
public)."o' In such a circumstance, the charge of "abdication" would have bite,
because enforcement policy would reflect less an attempt to better structure the
location of discretion than an effort to undermine the law itself.
Again, it bears emphasizing that these limits we imagine may not be
judicially enforceable, and we have not conceptualized them as doctrinal
principles. Defining and then mobilizing limits as doctrinal rules would require
that we formulate a comprehensive theory of executive power that would
inevitably be unmoored from constitutional text and have an ambiguous
relationship to constitutional practice. As we emphasized throughout Part III,
we are reluctant to constitutionalize the internal structures of the Executive
Branch, given the complex tradeoffs among rule-of-law values that must be
made when an administration seeks to organize and wield its power.
The difficulty of devising rules of constraint from a set of general principles
does help explain the appeal of OLC's substantive approach, or of the
prophylactic, bright-line framings of critics who have tried to draw the
conceptual distinctions we reject between individual and categorical
judgments, or between non-prosecution and the granting of benefits. But as
we hope we have shown in Parts II and III, the lawyerly appeal of these
frameworks cannot save them as descriptive or normative accounts of the scope
of executive authority. The theoretical framework we have offered as an
alternative may not result in clear lines around the enforcement power, but it
does provide a vocabulary well suited to legal conversations about
constitutional norms with which we (scholars, lawmakers, internal executive
watchdogs) can assess the merits of executive branch practice.
B. Future Discipline
The fact that the President acted lawfully and reasonably when announcing
DACA and DAPA does not mean that our current institutional arrangements
are ideal. The two-principals model of immigration policymaking is the one we
have inherited, and we showed in Part II that important benefits flow from this
model. But we do not maintain that the current regulatory structure is optimal,
and current interbranch dynamics do present downsides. We therefore close by
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considering various ways of improving the constitutional and theoretical
grounding of the President's enforcement power over immigration law.3s
1. Meta: The Process ofInstitutionalization
Let's start with the development of the Obama relief initiatives themselves.
As we have argued, they represent transparency-enhancing and regularizing
improvements on the status quo that preceded them -a world in which the
Morton Memos and other guidance documents provided far too little
information about how the Executive actually exercised its significant screening
authority, and far too little supervision of line-level officials. Yet while the
Obama initiatives themselves are transparent, the process that produced them
was opaque. Mobilized interest groups may well have informed the ultimate
shape of the initiatives, but there were no formal avenues for public input into
the policymaking process. The policies were drafted and vetted only within the
Executive Branch and its self-defined spheres of influence.
One means of addressing this flaw might be through the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The notion that DACA and DAPA count as legislative
rules subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirement, rather than as
general statements of policy, led the district court in Texas to declare that the
Administration had violated the APA.3o' That decision remains pending before
the Fifth Circuit as we write, though the court of appeals appears poised to
affirm the district court, teeing up the APA issue, if not the underlying
constitutional question, for the Supreme Court. 30 In denying the
308. In some sense, this inquiry resembles the debate in the foreign affairs domain over whether
and how Congress should authorize the President to use force against a national security
threat. Even if the President's authority is not in dispute (and it often is), reasons that reflect
constitutional values still exist for him to seek authorization from Congress, and genuine
debate can be had over how best to unleash but yet constrain the President's authority to use
force. See, e.g., Robert Chesney et al., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist
Threats, HOOVER INST. (2013), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents
/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8MG
-PE6M]; Ryan Goodman, Obama's Forever War Starts Now, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb.
12, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/o2/12/obamas-forever-war-starts-now-aumf-isis
-islamic-state [http://perma.cc/6KKG-PUFN].
309. For an elaboration of this holding, see supra notes 109, 119 and accompanying text.
For skepticism by others of the district court's conclusion, see, for example, Cass R.
Sunstein, Texas Misjudges Obama on Immigration, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 17, 2015,
12:56 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-17/what-the-judge-got-wrong
-about-obama-s-immigration-plan [http://perma.cc/M8E7-BBSR].
310. If the Fifth Circuit were to uphold the district court's injunction of the Obama relief
initiatives, we believe there would be a strong case for Supreme Court review, given the fact
that the court of appeals would have enjoined the nationwide implementation of an
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government's request for a stay of the district court's injunction,311 and during
oral arguments on the merits, 312 two different Fifth Circuit panels (with
overlapping membership) appeared skeptical of the federal government's case
(though one judge subjected Texas's claims to withering criticism, as well).
As a matter of existing administrative law doctrine, we are skeptical of this
outcome (though, to be frank, the case law attempting to sort legislative from
nonlegislative rules is a mess).3' But as a matter of principle, the claim that the
important federal program based on legal conclusions in a doctrinally muddy area. Though
not creating an actual circuit split, the courts of appeals cases rejecting challenges to DACA
on standing and jurisdictional grounds might also inform the Court's consideration of
whether the sorts of issues implicated in DAPA require Court attention. For a discussion of
those cases, see supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. In a case challenging the State
of Arizona's refusal to issue drivers' licenses to DACA recipients, the Ninth Circuit recently
requested briefing on the constitutionality of DACA, since the State defends its policy in
part on the claim that DACA was unlawful. This litigation therefore might also generate
disagreement in the courts of appeals. See Order, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-
15307 (9 th Cir. July 17, 2015).
311. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015). In denying the government's request
for a stay of the district court's injunction pending appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the United States had not shown that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims,
including that Texas lacked standing, id. at 747-54, that the INA, and the fact that the policy
constituted the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, precluded judicial review, id. at 757-61,
and that DAPA did not constitute a legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment, id. at
762-67. The court found that the government had not made a strong showing that the
district court erred in concluding that DAPA did not leave agency officials with genuine
discretion. Id. at 765. In its assessment of whether judicial review was available, the panel's
analysis suggests deep skepticism of the government's effort to characterize DAPA as the
mere exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It even points to provisions in the INA that would
suggest that the Secretary's discretion to provide relief based on humanitarian concerns is
limited to specific cases, id. at 760, and observes that "[a] gainst that background, we would
expect to find an explicit delegation of authority to implement DAPA-a program that
makes 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for lawful presence, work
authorization, and associated benefits -but no such provision exists," id.
312. See Michael D. Shear, Appeals Panel Weighs Fate of Obama's Inunigration
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/o4/18/us/obamas
-immigration-overhaul-halted-by-judge-comes-before-appeals-court.html [http://perma.cc
/S 7LL-M 7GA].
313. While the legislative rules doctrine is (in)famously incoherent, courts considering whether
an agency action constitutes a legislative rule tend to focus on the following question: does
the agency action create new legal obligations or benefits for the regulated party? See, e.g.,
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As John Manning
and others have noted, this question cannot be answered without some account of how one
distinguishes the act of interpreting law from the act of making law and, ultimately, without
an account of what constitutes law. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 893 (2004); see generallh Manning, supra note 178. Formalist and
functionalist approaches to these questions produce dramatically different results, and that
is part of what accounts for the doctrinal confusion and indeterminacy. Despite this
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Obama relief policies would have benefited from more procedural formality, or
transparent public input, should be taken seriously. The Administration's
defenders have tried valiantly to frame the relief initiatives as entirely ordinary.
But this framing obscures the innovative nature of DAPA and DACA that we
described in Part III - a characteristic that, when combined with the scale of the
programs, marks them as significant acts of policymaking by the Executive,
much as the historical precedents the Administration cites were. DACA and
DAPA may not confer formal legal status, but they enable millions of
unauthorized immigrants to live and work free of the fear of removal, further
entrenching their interests in remaining in the United States. The Obama relief
initiatives thus significantly increase the political and humanitarian costs of
removing this population at some future point.
Significant policymaking of this sort would have benefitted from public
scrutiny and involvement. 31 Open debate could have informed the
confusion, however, the cases on which the Texas district court relied are clearly inapposite.
In nearly all of those cases, an agency tasked with enforcing a vague statutory obligation -
often one in which the statute required the regulated party to engage in "reasonable"
behavior -cached out that obligation in a guidance document that created a precise, often
numerical standard. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F. 3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208
F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)-
In each case, the court concluded that the agency had created new legal obligations-
mandatory rules of conduct- that were not themselves embodied in the statute. And for that
reason the court held that the agency action must be treated as a legislative rule, regardless
of how the agency itself had characterized it.
While these decisions do sometimes speak about whether the agency has "bound itself'
to a course of conduct, the cases are not-contrary to the suggestion of the Texas district
court-focused on the internal organization of the agency independent of the question of
whether the agency has created new legal obligations. Under these cases, the fact that an
agency directive "binds" low-level employees, by requiring them to comply with rules issued
by their superiors, is not itself sufficient to render an agency action a legislative rule. Issuing
rule-like commands to subordinates is consequential for the legislative rules calculus only
insofar as those commands create or alter the legal obligations of the regulated parties.
If courts take that approach to DACA and DAPA, then there can be little doubt that
they are not legislative rules. As we explained earlier, the President's relief initiatives do not
create or alter the legal rights or obligations of immigrants. In contrast to the D.C. Circuit
cases discussed above, they do not clarify or move some otherwise vague or shifting
boundary between lawful and unlawful immigration status. That formal boundary is plain
from the Immigration Code itself: all of the immigrants eligible for relief under the
programs are currently in violation of immigration law, and they will remain in violation of
immigration law even if they receive deferred action pursuant to one of those programs.
Nothing in DACA or DAPA itself changes their legal status, and it has been well understood
for a half century that the grant of deferred action itself does not confer any legal benefit.
314. Cf Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, slip op. at 29 (5th Cir. May 26, 2015) ("[W]e do
not construe the broad grants of authority [in the INA and elsewhere] as assigning
unreviewable decisions of vast economic and political significance to an agency.").
217
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Administration's judgments on questions such as the relevant criteria, the scale
of the program, and the range of "benefits" that should flow from the granting
of relief, which may have improved the design of the program and certainly
would have enhanced the legitimacy of the President's initiatives.' Such
public deliberation also would have facilitated a central goal underlying the
APA of increasing the accountability of the policymaking process while also
bolstering public confidence in the measures ultimately adopted.
These potential benefits do not mean, however, that courts should overhaul
existing legislative rules jurisprudence in order to force programs like DACA
and DAPA to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as the litigants in
the Fifth Circuit aim to do. The protracted multi-year nature of modern
rulemaking would likely have made such a process unworkable from the
Administration's point of view,"' especially to the extent both DACA and
DAPA were timed to maximize the political payoff of the announcements.
1
Perhaps interest group meetings in the White House were all that could
reasonably have been expected by way of public input into an initiative of this
sort. But that points to a more general dilemma posed by modern
315. For a sustained and compelling argument that the current legal debate over DAPA and
DACA really dissolves into a debate about the legitimacy of the President's policies in
substance, see Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REv. (forthcoming 2015-2016).
316. In July 2015, DHS issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and invited comments
on a decision to expand another program designed to stabilize the status of unauthorized
immigrants. See Expansion of Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility, 80
Fed. Reg. 43,338 (proposed July 22, 2015) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103 & 212). The
original program permitted certain immediate relatives of U.S. citizens to apply for waivers
from the ground of inadmissibility related to unauthorized presence from the United States,
rather than continue to require that they travel abroad. This requirement, which was the
previous practice, not only led to lengthy separations from families due to processing delays,
but also meant those noncitizens ran the risk of being denied a waiver and then being barred
from entering the United States for three or ten years in light of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of
the INA. The 2015 proposed rule would substantially expand those eligible to apply for such
waivers by opening the process to anyone eligible for a visa and thus substantially counters
the disincentives created by the three and ten year bars in section 212(a)(9)(B)(i). The
Administration's decision to invite comment on this proposal may provide some evidence as
to how difficult and protracted a notice-and-comment period would be for DAPA, though
we suspect even this proposal would spark far less controversy than the deferred action
programs.
317. The Administration announced DACA in the summer before the 2012 presidential election,
leading some commentators to conclude that the President's quest for re-election and a
strong showing among Latino voters motivated the decision. See Julia Preston &
John H. Cushman, Obama To Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.coM/2o12/o6/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal
-immigrants.html [http://perma.cc/KF3E-R8R3] (quoting Senator Charles Grassley
arguing that the President put "politics above responsible policies").
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administrative law, where the choice too often is between a cumbersome
notice-and-comment regime and minimal procedural formality.'
Faced with this choice, the incentives of executive branch officials have
predictably produced more and more informality in the sphere of
administrative action. In a way, it would have been shocking had the
development of DACA and DAPA unfolded any differently. Nonetheless, the
absence of manageable channels for public input highlights the basic failure of
administrative law to address the central role that enforcement discretion plays
in important regulatory arenas. Some form of public input into the
development of enforcement priorities with more formality than private
meetings convened by the Executive and less than notice-and-comment
rulemaking would be a valuable contribution to regulatory spheres in which
the enforcement power drives application of the law, as well as the politics and
substantive policy of the area.
2. Prosecutorial Discretion in a Second-Best Regulatory Environment
Perhaps the most fundamental problem still in need of a solution stems
from the facts on the ground that gave rise to DACA and DAPA in the first
place. As we have chronicled here and in previous work, de facto delegation
endows the President with asymmetrical screening power, giving him much
more power at the back end of the system than the front. While exclusion and
deportation are clearly substitute mechanisms for screening migrants,
restricting most regulatory innovation to the ex post screening environment
leaves us stuck in a second-best regulatory environment.
If the President is to have primary responsibility for the structure of the
immigrant screening system, he should be able to determine the optimal mix of
ex ante and ex post screening mechanisms. A better-designed system would
prevent such a large pool of potentially removable noncitizens from arising in
the first place, reducing the need for the coercive power of the state and
therefore the sort of policymaking through enforcement that can tend toward
the opaque and create the impression, if not the reality, of arbitrary decision
making. In other words, the fact that policymaking through enforcement can
play a desirable function within a scheme of separated powers does not mean
that alternative forms of more transparent policymaking are not preferable."'
318. For a discussion of the law-like customs and practices that govern the administrative state
outside the purview of the courts and APA-based policing, see Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan
J. Leib, Regleprudence-at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442413 [http://perma.cc/8GCS-SKC8].
319. A related problem has been the proliferation of states of legal limbo created through
executive action. As compensation for its lack of control over ex ante screening and to
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We can imagine numerous ways to address this problem of an overly large
enforcement realm. Eliminating or narrowing some of the grounds of
removability and scaling up border enforcement represent two opposite ends of
the political spectrum (and each addresses a different source of de facto
delegation). We doubt that either will be especially effective, however, as a
means of curbing the enforcement power. Whereas the former will have an
effect primarily on the margins (at least as long as unauthorized presence
remains a ground of removal), the latter offers a blunt instrument for reducing
the deportable pool and only magnifies the unreviewed power of the Executive
by focusing enforcement where law enforcement power is at its most robust
and judicial review and due process norms are at their weakest. What is more,
the pathologies of de facto delegation have not arisen solely from the legal
structure of immigration law. As we emphasized earlier, the intersection of this
legal structure with powerful social and demographic forces has produced the
current state of affairs. For those whose answer to our dilemma of de facto
delegation would be to use law to prevent the unauthorized pool from arising
in the first place, we suggest that such thinking is likely wishful.
For all of these reasons, we have advocated in the past delegating greater ex
ante screening authority to the Executive to enable the government to respond
to demographic and labor market factors with sensitivity to their fluctuations,
trading explicit delegation for de facto delegation.
32
o Seen in light of our
analysis in this Article of the role of the President as independent policymaker,
this option should seem normatively attractive."' An ex ante process would
make room for far more significant public input than an ex post enforcement
regime -even one as transparent as DACA and DAPA. It also would channel
executive power into less coercive forms than the operation of a law
enforcement bureaucracy. We happen to be at a moment in time when net
address exigencies that have arisen but that the Code does not address, the Executive has
created a variety of immigration non-statuses like deferred action that leave their recipients
at the mercy of executive discretion. Compared to a world in which the Executive has not
wielded such authority, this increasing complexity can seem like a positive development. But
it is less than ideal. For a thorough articulation of these various executive-created statuses,
see Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2015).
320. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 544; Rodriguez, supra note 265.
321. Of course, that presumes the Executive Branch does not prefer to have a pool of potentially
removable and therefore vulnerable immigrants as a labor supply. But ferreting out and
combating this tendency, we think, will be easier if the Executive Branch's responsibilities
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illegal migration appears to have approached zero," and so the need for such
ex ante authority may be less pressing than it would have been a decade or two
ago. But our very point is that the Executive should have substitute tools at its
disposal to adapt to circumstances.
This call for delegation ultimately feeds into one final point. The
President's powers over immigration policy remain limited as compared with
those of Congress. The President has significant control over our shadow
immigration system, but he cannot confer legal status directly on unauthorized
immigrants; only Congress can do that through a legalization program. It has
become commonplace for defenders of the President's actions to emphasize
this point as a way of underscoring that the President's actions have remained
within his domain.323 Within our framework, however, this point highlights
the centrality of Congress to addressing the policy issues raised by the
persistence of a large, unauthorized population. In our view, however,
Congress has been a poor participant in the debate. In 2013, the Senate passed
an astoundingly comprehensive bill that would have launched a legalization
program, but that bill has languished. Congress has contributed to the debate
precipitated by the Obama relief initiatives largely through symbolic
appropriations riders forbidding the President from implementing the
initiatives, as well as threats to defund the Department of Homeland Security.
These forms of debate serve primarily to escalate political conflict while
offering no real hope for policy reform. Perhaps enough members of Congress
prefer the pre-DACA state of affairs, such that we can read these symbolic
gestures as reflective of a considered policy position. But even if one does not
support a legalization program as a matter of policy, the rule-of-law concerns
we have identified as emblematic of the pre-DACA world should be cause for
legislative debate and action.
Some commentators seem to fear that the President's actions have
compounded congressional policy passivity and partisan grandstanding -that
DACA and DAPA have had the effect of disabling Congress, or at least pushing
it into an oppositional posture rather than a lawmaking one.3m We are skeptical
322. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero-and Perhaps Less, PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/o4/23/net-migration-from
-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less [http://perma.cc/YB8W-4 RBR].
323. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 265.
324. This argument resembles claims by the likes of James Bradley Thayer about the impact of
judicial supremacy on congressional action, see James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 32-33 (1908) ("[Wle
introduced for the first time into the conduct of government through its great departments a
judicial sanction. . . It will only imperil the whole of it if it is sought to give [courts] more.
They must not step into the shoes of the law-maker."), or the claim that robust judicial
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of the claim that they have prevented Congress from acting, because it seems
equally plausible that such actions could spur congressional action.
Historically, politicians, advocates, and strategists have offered two different
strategies for prompting Congress to fix the immigration laws. Some advocates
argue that the President should publicly grant relief to millions (or even declare
a moratorium on deportation) in order to highlight the broken nature of the
system and prompt Congress to act. Others argue, instead, that the President
should do his best to enforce the law to the hilt in order to expose the
harshness and futility of the formal rules and thereby create political pressure
for legislative change."' In other words, not even those who are enmeshed in
the congressional-executive dynamic seem to agree on how presidential action
will affect Congress's ability and willingness to legislate.
Moreover, there is an additional reason to be skeptical of the claim that
executive action reduces the likelihood of congressional action. This worry
typically arises in contexts where executive action can serve as a substitute for
congressional action. If the Executive takes action on its own to regulate
greenhouse gases, for example, some worry that its measures will reduce the
pressure for Congress to take steps that will lead to the same outcome - the
regulation of greenhouse gases. Or if courts engage in judicial review to
evaluate the constitutionality of legislation, then Congress will stop worrying
about constitutional questions when it drafts legislation. The crucial difference
between these contexts and the present immigration context is that the actions
of the Executive and Congress are emphatically not substitutes. President
Obama did not legalize five million unauthorized migrants with his relief
initiatives, and he lacks the authority to do so. Action by Congress will be
review absolves Congress of its obligations to conform its actions to the Constitution, see
Louis FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (2011) (criticizing the
"submissive attitude" taken by many congressmen towards their constitutional oath in light
of judicial constitutional interpretation). In statutory interpretation, textualists similarly
claim that a certain type of judicial interpretation - textualism as opposed to purposivism -
will give Congress incentives to draft laws more responsibly and clearly, and by implication
that purposivism promotes sloppy legislative work. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
612, 647-48 (1996) ("[S]eparation of lawmaking from law-exposition . . . provid[es]
legislators an incentive to enact rules that impose clear and definite limits upon
governmental authority, rather than adopting vague and discretionary grants of power.").
325. For a collection of contexts in which actors use full compliance with the law to highlight
what they see as failings in the formal rules, see Dols KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY
PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM HOwARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF
JOURNALISM 209-10 (2013) (discussing Roosevelt's strategy of using strict enforcement to
generate support for legal change among elites); and Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E.
Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 831-32 (2015) (describing "maximalist
enforcement tactics that have been adopted by certain chief executives").
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required to provide a lawful immigration status to most unauthorized migrants
living in the United States. And given that only Congress can confer such
status, it is hard to understand why the President's limited relief programs
would somehow eliminate the pressure for future congressional action on
immigration reform.
Recent history ultimately suggests that Congress would not have acted on
immigration, even if President Obama had not pursued his relief initiatives.
Generally speaking, the partisanship reflected in the debate over deferred
action dominates the relationship between the branches, making it unlikely
that continuation of the pre-DAPA and DACA status quo would have resulted
in more meaningful cross-branch debate. But even so, when turning to
executive branch policymaking as a viable alternative to congressional stasis,
we should not lose sight of what can be lost when the Executive becomes the
primary engine of policy -not just the open and transparent decision making
more likely to come from a less disciplined but more multi-faceted
congressional debate, but also the collaboration between Congress and the
Executive that defines any legislative process.
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that executive policymaking as a
general matter is always a second best option to congressional action. We hope
that our arguments in Part II, highlighting the dynamic, iterative conception of
the separation of powers and the role the enforcement power plays in shaping a
regulatory domain over time, shine through as reasons to appreciate executive
policymaking within a proper and healthy distribution of powers. But we also
believe that, when the President must take bold action to address threats to the
rule of law within the domain of enforcement, a more fundamental
recalibration of political branch responsibilities may be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Presidential immigration law is ascendant. The dominant policymaking
role long played by the President, combined with the twentieth-century rise of
de facto delegation, destabilizes a simple principal-agent model as a way of
understanding the separation of powers in immigration regulation. These
developments have produced an immigration regime in which the President
has significant responsibility for - not just power over - the rules for screening
immigrants. The Executive Branch has actually helped construct the screening
system over time as it has wielded its enforcement power and decided how to
put the INA's statutory framework into effect-a process that has entailed
considerable executive policymaking dynamically related to, but still separate
from, congressional policy. The separation-of-powers framework that emerges
from this history is thus far from static. De facto delegation has not entailed a
simple transfer of power from one branch to another; as we have documented
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here and in our 2009 work, the structure of modern immigration law has
produced an iterative relationship between the branches in which Congress has
played an important, if not dominant, role. Without both an awareness of and
appreciation for these dynamics, the President's immigration enforcement
power cannot be properly understood -let alone cabined.
The separation-of-powers framework we have uncovered is not just an
institutional reality to be bemoaned. We believe there are reasons to accept,
and even to endorse, presidential policymaking through enforcement, perhaps
especially in the immigration context. Such acceptance does not mean that the
President's (and the agencies') exercise of discretion should go entirely
unchecked. But it does suggest that the constraint in most cases will not come
from an inquiry into whether the substantive policy choices embodied in
enforcement initiatives such as DACA and DAPA promote congressional
priorities. In place of that sort of doomed Take Care Clause inquiry,
enforcement policies should be evaluated for whether they make reasonable
rule-of-law tradeoffs and thereby advance the general purposes of the
constitutional separation of powers - constraining and rendering accountable
government power.
Crucially, this rule-of-law inquiry requires that one attend as much to
relationships of power within the branches as across them, as a growing body of
scholarly work has come to appreciate with respect to the administrative state
as a whole. Within this framework, we think it clear that the Obama relief
initiatives are lawful. By using rules to centralize discretionary decision
making, DACA and DAPA make visible the political and policy choices the
Executive Branch has made while enhancing the consistency of the
government's use of its coercive powers. Further, the initiatives tame the
faceless prosecutor by imposing politically accountable constraints on the
decisions of low-level officials. Critics have argued that the programs are
dangerous because they permit the President to replace Congress's judgments
with his own. In reality, however, the relief initiatives have enabled him to
discipline the judgments of low-level enforcement officials, bringing order and
discipline, along with his own substantive preferences, to an immigration
enforcement regime in which the Executive has significant responsibility for
the structure of screening. Advocates for the President's actions who tout the
virtues of "individualized" prosecutorial discretion in this setting obscure the
institutional reality of how that discretion has operated in immigration law,
and they distract attention from the crucial benefits that flow from the way that
DACA and DAPA actually centralize and limit discretionary judgments.
Presidential policymaking has always provoked political controversy, at
least as much because of deep ideological disagreements over immigration
policy as because of the perception it creates of an aggressive or boundless
Executive. The fact that today's particular controversy over the Obama relief
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initiatives has vivid partisan overtones is not to say that limits on policymaking
through enforcement do not exist, even when they do not appear visibly or
clearly in the statutes that set the parameters for executive action. But those
limits will be excruciatingly difficult to define without disabling legitimate and
desirable executive action, given the inevitability of enforcement discretion and
the values-based judgments that attend it. The bright-line rules critics have
offered may have the appeal of ease of application, but they constrain executive
power in ways that are neither constitutionally required nor necessarily
consistent with the goal of keeping executive power in check. The separation of
powers ultimately amounts to a messy political contest, and the search for
clear, lawyerly lines to draw around the powers of the branches, we have come
to believe, is misguided. Even if the current lawsuits succeed in scuttling the
Obama initiatives, the imperatives of enforcement will not disappear, and any
President will respond to those imperatives while pursuing his own objectives.
We can only hope that he has the necessary freedom to structure the
enforcement power in ways that serve the goals of accountability and
constraint, and that he faces public and congressional pressure to do precisely
that.
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